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Abstract	
The	main	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	advocate	a	more	scientiDically	informed	approach	
towards	epidemiological	evidence	in	disease	litigation.	It	analyses	the	judicial	
scepticism	about	epidemiology	in	UK	tort	law,	and	Dinds	that	the	myth	of	scientiDic	
certainty	lies	at	the	heart	of	the	devaluation	of	epidemiology	as	proof	of	speciDic	
causation.	It	traces	misconceptions	about	epidemiology	to	broader	misconceptions	
about	science	as	a	whole	(including	medical	science	and	disease),	and	confused	legal	
approaches	to	causation.	To	explain	why	legal	objections	to	epidemiology	are	erroneous,	
the	thesis	clariDies	fundamental	aspects	of	science	and	disease	causation	that	lawyers	
need	to	better	grasp.	ScientiDic	reasoning	is	inherently	probabilistic.	Further,	medical	
research	indicates	that	disease	causation	is	usually	multifactorial	and	stochastic.	Rigid	
and	deterministic	‘but	for’	questions	are	thus	fundamentally	unsuited	for	assessing	
disease	causation.	The	mismatch	between	legal	and	medical	causal	models	makes	courts	
resort	to	normative,	‘backwards’	causal	reasoning	or	haphazard	exceptional	approaches	
to	disease	causation,	where	the	most	difDicult	dilemmas	around	causation	arise.	This	
thesis	argues	that	courts	need	a	better	test	for	causation	for	disease	that	can	take	
account	of	probabilistic	scientiDic	and	epidemiological	evidence,	and	suggests	one	such	
principled	approach.	Epidemiology	can	be	invaluable	in	such	an	assessment	of	disease	
causation.				
Acknowledgments	
First	and	foremost,	I	owe	an	enormous	debt	of	gratitude	to	my	supervisor	Dr.	Claire	
McIvor,	who	has	been	a	source	of	support	and	inspiration	both	personally	and	
academically,	even	before	this	thesis	began,	and	throughout	it.	She	is	responsible	for	
sparking	an	abiding	love	for	tort	law	when	I	was	a	graduate	student,	and	later	for	
inspiring	my	interest	in	the	interface	between	law	and	medicine.	Claire	has	also	
facilitated	my	attendance	at	conferences	and	meetings	with	experts	in	forensic	sciences,	
statisticians,	and	practitioners	in	disease	litigation.	I	would	like	to	thank	Claire	for	
having	more	faith	in	me	than	I	sometimes	had	in	myself,	and	for	teaching	me	so	much.	I	
am	also	grateful	to	the	School	of	Law	at	the	University	of	Birmingham,	where	I	was	a	
postgraduate	teaching	assistant	for	a	signiDicant	duration	of	this	research.	The	School,	
and	many	individual	colleagues,	have	been	incredibly	supportive	during	my	research.	
The	School	also	provided	me	with	grants	to	attend	and	present	my	research	at	
international	conferences	on	law,	science	and	epidemiology.	I	would	particularly	like	to	
thank	Moira	Wright,	who	provided	much	encouragement	and	support	during	difDicult	
periods	of	this	thesis.		
I	am	very	grateful	to	Paul	Bleasdale	QC	at	No5	Chambers,	for	taking	an	interest	in	this	
thesis,	and	spending	many	hours	of	his	valuable	time	helping	me	acquire	an	insight	into	
the	practical	difDiculties	of	complex	disease	litigation.	Paul	kindly	shared	many	
interesting	thoughts	and	academic	literature,	and	these	discussions	shaped	ideas	that	
appear	in	some	parts	of	this	thesis.	Thanks	are	also	due	to	experts	in	various	different	
Dields	including	statistics,	epidemiology	and	medicine,	who	discussed	my	work	and	
provided	further	clarity,	particularly	Professor	Maurice	Zeegers,	Professor	Colin	Aitken	
and	Dr.	Jonathan	Punt	at	No5	Chambers.									
The	support	of	my	friends	and	family	has	been	central	to	the	writing	of	this	thesis.	I	
would	like	to	thank	my	parents	for	always	having	encouraged	my	academic	interests,	my	
father	for	providing	support	and	a	peaceful	refuge	during	the	writing-up,	to	my	
(scientist)	brother	Anil	for	explaining	the	Uncertainty	Principle	and	for	his	computer	
wizardry,	and	to	my	sister	Renu	for	her	help	in	the	Dinal	stages.	Thanks	are	also	due	to	
the	friends	who	provided	much	understanding,	and	practical	and	emotional	support	
throughout	this	time:	especially	to	Mallica,	Matt,	Bavita,	Alex,	Savitha	and	Viba.	Most	of	
all,	I	would	like	to	thank	Madhav,	Sid	and	Nandita,	who	put	up	with	me	through	the	
difDicult	period,	and	provided	me	with	time,	space,	endless	cups	of	tea,	nourishment	and	
encouragement.	I	am	grateful	for	these,	as	well	as	for	all	the	practical	help	in	the	Dinal	
stressful	stages	(including	my	unending	technology	crises)!	
Table of  Contents  
Introduction …………………………………………………………………………… 1 
Chapter One: Epidemiology and its current status in UK Tort Law….…………13 
	 1.	What	is	epidemiology:	aims,	scope	and	impact	………………….……….…..……18	
	 	 1.1.	Contribution	to	medicine	and	health………….………………..…………20	
	 	 1.2.	Limitations	and	conceptual	issues…………………………………….……23	
	 2.	Epidemiology	in	UK	Courtrooms…………………………………………..…..….….…..26	
	 	 2.1.	Judicial	perceptions	of	epidemiology……………………………..…….…29	
	 	 	 2.1.1	McTear	v	Imperial	Tobacco	Ltd………………..…………..…….29	
	 	 	 2.1.2	Sienkiewicz	v	Greif……………………………………..……..…..…..32	
	 	 2.2.	US	judicial	approaches	to	epidemiology………………………….………34	
	 3.	Misconceptions	about	epidemiology:……………………………………………………40	
	 3.1.	‘Epidemiology	can	only	show	associations,	never	causation’.……42													
	 3.2.	‘Population	studies,	are	irrelevant	to	speciDic	causation’………..…44	
	 3.3.	‘Epidemiologists	infer	causation	from	RR	values,	and	RR>2		 	
	 is	causation	on	the	balance	of	probabilities’……………………………..……48													
4.	Facilitating	legal	clarity	about	the	value	of	epidemiology:	the			
importance	of	clearer	understanding	of	science	and	disease	
causation………………………………………………………………………..…….……………52	
Chapter Two: Science and the law: The legal myth of  scientific certainty……..57 
            
														1.	The	law-science	divide……………………………………………………………..………..62	
	 	 1.1.	MagniDied	impact	on	disease	litigation…………………..…………..…65	
	 	 1.2.	Unrealistic	legal	expectations	from	science.………………………….66	
	 	 1.3.	Hard	and	soft	sciences:the	‘long	shadow’	of	physics	…………..….71
	 	 1.4.	The	implications	for	disease	causation?………………………..………77	
	 2.	Legal	errors	stemming	from	myths	of	scientiDic	certainty:	extreme		
	 attitudes	towards	scientiDic	evidence.……………………………………………………79	
	 															2.1.	The	dichotomous	attitudes	towards	scientiDic		 	 	
	 	 evidence	in	civil	and	criminal	law……………………………….…….……..…80	
	 	 2.2.	Over-valuing	or	devaluing	testimony	due	to	expert	
	 	 ‘status’……….…………………………………………………………………………..…83	
	 	 2.3.	Failure	to	distinguish	between	fact	and	opinion		 	
	 	 testimony………………………………………..…………………………………..……86	
	 	  
	 	 	 	
													 2.4.	Erroneous	legal	criteria	for	reliability	of	scientific		
	 evidence………………………………………………………………..……………..91	
														3.	How	Scientists	Make	Inferences:	scientific		
																		reasoning………………………………………………………….………………………….93	
																												3.1.	What	is	science?……………………………………………..………………95	
	 3.2.	Philosophies	of	science………………………………………………..…97.	
	 	 3.2.1.	Inductivism…………………………………….…….98	
	 	 3.2.2.	Refutationism………………………………….……103	
	 	 3.2.3.	Consensus	and	Naturalism…………………….105
	 	 3.2.4.	Bayesianism………………………………………….106	
	 3.3.	Reconciling	the	philosophies……………………………….………….109	
	 3.4.	How	scientists	make	inferences:	commonalities	between	legal	
	 and	scientific	reasoning…………………………………….…………………..110	
														4.	Science	and	evidence	in	the	analysis	of	disease	disputes…………….…..115	
	 4.1.	Deterministic	and	Probabilistic	Models	of	Causation	in		
	 Science………………………………………………………………………………….116	
	 4.2.	The	value	of	an	uncertain	science:	the	rationale	for	scientific	
	 evidence	in	legal	decision-making……………………….…………………118		 	
																
Chapter Three: Disease Causation: Causation in Law, Causation in Medicine, 
 and a call for congruence……………………………………….………….……..124 
              1.	Causation	in	tort	law:	obstacles	to	the	proper	application	of																																				
.																science……………….……………………………………………………………………….…131	
	 1.1.	Normative	assessment	of	factual	causation………………………131	
	 	 1.1.1	Conflation	of	factual	causation		and	legal	
	 	 causation.……………………………………………….………135	
	 	 1.1.2.	Causation	is	not	equivalent	to	liability:
	 	 	the	inflated	role	of	causation	in	the	liability		
	 	 analysis.…………………………………………………..…..….139	
	 	 1.1.3.	Reducing	the	role	for	normativity..………..…142	
	 1.2.	The	problem	with	necessity-based	tests	for	disease	
	 	causation…………………………………………………………………….…….….144	
															2.	Medical	evidence	about	disease	causation:	the	multifactorial,	 								.	.											
…																stochastic	nature	of	disease………………………………………………………..…147	
	 2.1.	General	difficulties	in	studying	the	effects	of	toxins……..……149	
	 2.2.	Variable	induction	and	latency	periods……………………….……151	
	 2.3.	Single-cause	versus	multifactorial	models	of	disease		
	 causation……………………………………………………………………..…..……154	
	 2.4.	The	under-appreciated	role	of	stochastic	factors	in	disease
	 causation……………………………………………………………………..….…….156	
														3.	Greater	integration	between	legal	and	medical	causation:	how	the										.		
…															law	gets	the	science	wrong……………………………………………………….……159	
	 	
	 										
	 	
	  
Chapter Four: The but-for test, and exceptional tests for causation……………166 
             1.	The	traditional	approach	to	factual	causation…………………………………172	
															2.	The	‘exceptional’	tests	for	factual	causation..………………………………….177	
	 2.1.	The	‘material	contribution	to	injury’		 	
	 (Bonnington)	test……………………………………………….…………………178	
	 	 2.1.1.	Initial	formulation………………………………….178	
	 	 2.1.2.	Inconsistencies,	further	applications	and	
	 	 extensions	of	Bonnington…………………………………181	
	 2.2.	The	‘material	contribution	to	risk’	test	(the	
	 ‘Fairchild’	principle)……………………………………………………….…..…187	
	 	 2.2.1.	Initial	Formulation…………………………………187
	 	 2.2.2.	Inconsistencies,	further		
	 	 applications	and	extensions	of	the		
	 	 Fairchild	test………………………………………….…….…190	
	 2.3.‘Doubling	of	the	Risk’	(DOR)	test………………………..….……….…196
	 2.4.	Problems	in	disease	litigation	highlighted	by	the	
	 	exceptional	tests………………………………………………..……………..….199	
	 	 2.4.1.	The	inadequacy	of	deterministic		
	 	 approaches………………………………..……………………201
	 	 2.4.2.	Over	determination	as	the	norm	in		
	 	 disease	litigation………………………………..…….……..204
	 																												2.4.3.Dangers	of	excessive	judicial	‘pragmatism’:	
	 	 identifying	a	more	principled	approach……………207	
													3.	A	suggested	alternative:	assessment	of	likely	contribution	to	 	
																	disease………………………………………………………………………………………….213	
	 3.1.	The	probabilistic	test	for	disease	causation……………………..215	
	 3.2.	Proportionate	liability…………………………………………………….218	
	 	 	
Chapter Five: Better use of  science: The value of  epidemiology in assessing 
specific causation…………………………………………………….……………224 
													1.	How	epidemiology	makes	casual	inferences……………………….………..…231	
													2.	Examining	the	judicial	concerns	about	epidemiology	and	its	epistemic										
.													validity…………………………………………………………………………………………….234	
	 2.1.	Epidemiology	and	observational	methods:	exploring	the		
	 “fetishisation	of	evidentiary	hierarchies”……………………………………235	
	 2.2.	General	versus	specific	causation…………………………………….245	
	 2.3.	Is	a	Relative	Risk	ratio	(RR)	of	>2	necessary,	or	sufficient,	to	
	 establish	causation?………………………………………………………………250	
													3.	More	effective	use	of	general	scientific	testimony…….………….….……….255	
	 3.1.	Admissibility	issues:	do	we	need	Daubert-type	guidelines
	 	in	UK	courts?…………………………………………………………………….….255	
	 	 	
	  	 	
	 	 	
	 	
	 3.2.	Escaping	the	tyranny	of	numbers:	“People	are	not	numbers”,	
	 but	numbers	can	help	scientific	communication……………….…257	
	 3.3.	Expert	testimony:	evaluating	weight	of	evidence,	and		
	 distinguishing	between	fact	and	opinion….………………….………262	
	 3.4.	More	transparency	and	better	understanding	of	legal		
	 issues	on	part	of	scientific	expert	witnesses…………..…………….264	
													4.	The	way	forward:	A	more	nuanced	and	constructive	role	for								.																		.	
.																science	and	epidemiology	in	UK	law……………………………………………..266	
	 4.1:	Better	recognition	of	the	value	of	epidemiology…….….……267	
	 4.2:	Lessons	from	evidence-based	medicine:	the	pragmatic		use	of	
	 population	evidence	in	medical	decision-making………………….271	
													
														Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………….……..278	
Table of Cases 
 
 
Allen v United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) 
 
Alphacell v Woodward [1972] UKHL 4; [1972] A.C. 824 
 
Amorgianos v National Railroad Passenger Corp, 137 FSupp2d 147 (ED NY 2001) 
 
Associated Newspapers Ltd v Dingle [1961] 2 QB 162 
 
Bailey v Ministry of Defence and another [2007] EWHC 2913 (QB); [2008] EWCA Civ 883, 
[2009] 1 WLR 1052 
 
Barker v Corus (UK) plc [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 AC 572 (HL) 
 
Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428 
(QBD) 
 
Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw [1956] AC 613 (HL) 
 
Brock v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 874 F. 2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989) 
 
Brown v Corus (UK) Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ. 374; [2004] P.I.Q.R. P30 
 
Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 509 US 579 (1993) (SC) 
 
Durham v BAI Runoff Ltd (Employers’ Liability Insurance ǲTriggerǳ Litigation) [2012] 
UKSC 14, [2012] 1 WLR 867 
 
General Electric Co. v Joiner 522 US 136 (1997) 
 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 1052 (CA); [2002] UKHL 22 (HL) 
 
Fitzgerald v Lane [1989] 1 AC 328 
 
Frye v United States 293 F 1013 (1923) 
 
Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd & Others [2014] EWHC 4190 (QB), [2016] EWCA 
Civ 86, [2016] 1 WLR 2036 (CA) 
 
Heyman v United States, 506 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D. Fl. 1981) 
 
Holtby v Brigham and Cowan (Hull) Ltd. [2000] 3 All ER 421 (CA) 
 
Hotson v East Berkshire HA [1987] AC 750 (HL) 
 
John v Central Manchester and Manchester Children's University Hospitals NHS 
Foundation Trust [ʹͲͳ͸] EWHC ͶͲ͹ ȋQBȌ 
  
Jones v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change (ǮPhurnaciteǯ) [2012] EWHC 
2936 (QB) 
 
International Energy Group Ltd. v Zurich Insurance plc. [2015] UKSC 33; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 
1471 (SC) 
 
Kennedy v Cordia Services LLP [2016] UKSC 6 (SC) 
 
Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v Carmichael 526 US 137 (1999) 
 
Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraqi Airways Co Nos 4 and 5 [2002] 2 UKHL 19 
 
McGhee v National Coal Board [1973] 1 WLR 1 
 
McTear v Imperial Tobacco [ʹͲͲͷ] CSOH ͸ͻ 
 
Milward v Acuity Specialty Products ͸͵ͻ F͵d ͳͳ ȋʹͲͳͳȌ 
 
Novartis Grimsby Ltd. v Cookson [ʹͲͲ͹] EWCA Civ ͳʹ͸ͳ 
 
Oxendine v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., ͷ͸͵ A. ʹd ͵͵Ͳ ȋDC App ͳͻͺͻȌ 
 
R v Cannings [2004] 1 WLR 2607 
 
R v Dallagher [2002] EWCA Crim 1903 
 
R v Doheny [1997] 1 CR App R 369  
 
R v George (No. 2) [2007] EWCA Crim 2722 
 
R v Robb [1991] 93 Cr App R 61 
 
R v Sally Clark (No 2) [2003] EWCA Crim 1020 
 
R v T [2010] EWCA Crim 2439 
 
Re.ǲAgent Orangeǳ Products Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) 
 
Sienkiewicz v Greif [2011] UKSC 10 
 
Sterling v Velsicol Clemical Corp., 855 F. 2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) 
 
Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405  
 
Thompson v United States, 533 F. Supp 581 (1981) 
 
Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board [2016] UKPC 4 (Privy Council) 
 Wilsher v Essex AHA [1987] [1988] AC 1074 (HL) 
 
XYZ & Others v Schering Health Care Ltd [2002] EWHC 1420 (Q.B.) 
 
Zamora v State 361 So.2d 776, 779 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1978) 
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Complex disease litigation is proving to be one of the most challenging areas of 
modern tort law, where the most difficult legal dilemmas are prone to arise. Most 
problems in this area arise at the causation stage of the negligence enquiry. This 
thesis aims to advocate reform in the UK legal approach to scientific and 
epidemiological evidence in the assessment of causation in complex disease 
claims. Conditions of modern living indicate that we can expect litigation for 
diseases caused by negligent exposure to hazardous substances to grow 
substantially in the foreseeable future. However, legal principles in this area are 
confused, and remain uninformed by the advances in modern biomedical 
understanding of disease.  
 
This thesis proposes the need for a more scientifically informed and evidence-
based approach to such claims. It suggests that epidemiological evidence has the 
potential to provide clarity to this area: potential that has often remained unused 
because of misconceptions about epidemiology that are widely prevalent in UK 
courts. This has led to courts undermining the potential probative value of such 
evidence, largely on the grounds of its inability to provide absolute proof about 
specific causation. The thesis will illustrate that misconceptions about science in 
general, particularly the Ǯmyth of scientific certitude,ǯ1 lies at the heart of the 
devaluation of epidemiology as evidence of specific causation in UK tort law. This 
myth is particularly problematic because disease causation is an especially 
                                                        
1 D Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts (Oxford University 
Press 2008) 162 
 2 
uncertain area of science, and it is impossible to achieve a rational 
understanding of this area in the absence of a probabilistic framework of 
reasoning.  
 
It is important to note at the outset that the main focus of this thesis is on the use 
of epidemiology in toxic tort litigation. The fundamental feature of toxic torts is 
that these concern claims that an injury (typically, a disease rather than a 
trauma) was caused by exposure to a toxic agent.2 However, the arguments this 
thesis makes about inherent causal uncertainties (and about the value of 
epidemiology in assessing causal mechanisms) apply equally to all diseases 
regardless of whether they were caused or worsened by toxic exposure, medical 
negligence, or any other means. Thus, where relevant to our discussion of the 
legal approach to disease causation, the thesis will occasionally cite cases where 
the disease resulted from clinical negligence rather than exposure to toxins. For 
purposes of simplicity, the word Ǯdiseaseǯ and Ǯillnessǯ are used synonymously in 
the rest of the thesis. This thesis also uses the word Ǯinjuryǯ as another synonym 
for disease or illness, in keeping with traditional legal terminology.  
 
Causal connections between disease, death and modern forms of risk are 
complicated, and scientifically uncertain causal connections constitute one of the 
most difficult aspects of modern civil liability.3 Etiological uncertainties about 
                                                        
2 SC Gold, MD Green and J Sanders, ‘Epidemiologic Evidence in Toxic Torts’ in M Freeman and M 
Zeegers (eds), Forensic Epidemiology: Principles and Practice (Elsevier 2016) 28 
3 L Khoury, Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability (Hart Publishing 2006) 3 
 3 
disease often make it difficult for claimant victims of complex disease to satisfy 
the Ǯbut forǯ causation requirement of the negligence analysis. As a result, 
claimants and defendants frequently adduce scientific evidence to support their 
contentions about causation in such claims. However, a review of UK caselaw 
shows that courts make a number of serious errors in the assessment and 
application of scientific evidence. Arguably, nowhere is this more apparent than 
in the UK judicial approach to epidemiology.  
 
Epidemiology is a scientific discipline that focuses on research into the causes of 
disease. As such, it has much potential to aid the assessment of factual causation 
in disease litigation: indeed, it might seem almost tailor-made for the job. 
However, courts in the UK have demonstrated a degree of scepticism about such 
evidence that occasionally verges on hostile. Epistemic confusion on part of the 
law has led to epidemiological evidence being wrongly dismissed as invalid for 
the purposes of proving legal causation.4 Epidemiology is still struggling to gain 
proper recognition within the UK legal context. This is in stark contrast to 
jurisdictions with greater experience of toxic tort litigation such as the USA, 
where courts not only accept, but actually prefer epidemiological evidence 
where causal disputes arise.5 It is an unfortunate reality that such evidence in UK 
tort law remains under-utilised, and where utilised, often misapplied.  
 
This thesis examines the reasons for the judicial objections to epidemiology, and 
finds that these are based in wider misconceptions about science and medicine. 
                                                        
4 A Broadbent, Philosophy of Epidemiology, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013),162. 
5 Gold et al (n 2) 30   
 4 
It will trace the legal misconceptions about epidemiology to three separate 
underlying areas of confusion in the law, each of which will be taken up for 
discussion individually in different chapters of this thesis:  
 
(i) The legal failure to understand the inherently uncertain and 
inconclusive nature of science and scientific evidence in general 
(uncertainty that is, for biological reasons, even more pronounced 
when it comes to evidence about disease causation). Most of the legal 
objections to epidemiology, as we will examine in the thesis, pertain to 
the perceived epistemic deficiencies of epidemiological inferences, 
and stem from the fact that it cannot provide conclusive proof of 
specific causation. Lawyers, it appears, may have to have failed to 
grasp the fundamentally probabilistic nature of all scientific 
knowledge. 
(ii) The lack of judicial clarity about the scope and purpose of the 
causation element of the negligence enquiry, leading to significant 
infusion of normative considerations into the factual causation 
analysis; and  
(iii) The inability of the rigid, deterministic Ǯbut-forǯ test to deal with the 
complex and probabilistic evidence about disease causation.  
 
This thesis will contend that the traditional legal test approach to factual 
causation is fundamentally unsuited to disease litigation. Increasing scientific 
evidence suggests that disease causation is complex and multifactorial. Further, 
 5 
because disease-causing agents work on dynamic and variable biological 
systems, their effects are not always universal, linear or entirely predictable. A 
more rational approach to complex disease claims urgently requires, this thesis 
contends, legal principles that are more congruent with scientific and medical 
understanding of disease. This would allow courts to give due consideration to 
empirical evidence in the assessment of causation. This thesis will thus also 
propose a new legal test for disease causation that is can take better account of 
probabilistic empirical evidence, and which is a better ǲfitǳ for this area of the 
law.  
 
Chapter 1 will discuss basic aspects of epidemiology and its problematic 
interaction with UK tort law. It will briefly outline the primary aims of 
epidemiology, and will then outline the prevalent judicial views about 
epidemiology as expressed in UK caselaw, primarily in two cases: the Scottish 
Court of Session judgment in McTear v Imperial Tobacco6 and the UK Supreme 
Court judgment in Sienkiewicz v Greif.7 Both these cases expressed some 
remarkably dismissive views about its potential probative value in the 
assessment of specific causation. The chapter will draw out three distinct but 
related misconceptions about epidemiological evidence that, in the view of this 
author, most hinder its effective use in the law. These misconceptions, in 
summary, are that:  
 
                                                        
6 [2005] CSOH 69 
7 [2011] UKSC 10 
 
 6 
1. ǮEpidemiological causal inferences are based primarily on observation 
rather than on experimentation, which has dubious scientific validity as 
this can only show associations, and can never shed any light on 
causationǯ;  
2. ǮEpidemiology derives its data from population studies, thus can only ever 
constitute ǲgeneralǳ evidence about causation, which is entirely irrelevant 
to specific causation. In other words, Ǯgeneralǯ evidence cannot tell us 
anything about what might have happened in a particular individual case.ǯ 
3. ǮEpidemiological inferences of causation rest almost entirely on a 
statistical relative risk (RR) value; that is, on an RR>2. An RR>2 is 
sufficient to infer causation, and any RR<2 negates causation.ǯ (This is 
now applied in legal contexts as a rigid and mechanistic Ǯdoubling of the 
riskǯ test. When courts do consider epidemiological evidence, they almost 
entirely focus on whether the RR is greater than 2, which is now equated 
to an establishment of causation on the balance of probabilities.)  
 
In order to clearly demonstrate why these beliefs about epidemiology reflect 
fundamental errors, it is essential to first clarify the underlying general legal 
misconceptions about science and causation (particularly disease causation). 
The next three chapters will proceed to explore these broader legal 
misconceptions. After doing so, the thesis will then return, in the concluding 
chapter (Chapter 5) to the specific legal objections to epidemiology outlined in 
Chapter 1, and will subject each of these to more thorough scrutiny, in order to 
illustrate why they are unfair. 
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Chapter 2 will explore the nature of scientific reasoning, particularly the judicial 
myth of scientific certainty, which it will contend has led to much wrongful use of 
science in the law. The legal ideal of science as being able to provide absolute 
proof leads to a variety of erroneous legal outcomes. This chapter hopes to de-
mystify science and the scientific enquiry for lawyers. It also underscores that it 
is vital for courts to modify its expectations from science, and to learn better 
ways of assessing the relative scientific merits of different kinds of expert 
evidence, selecting the most appropriate expert, and evaluating the potential 
flaws in the scientific testimony adduced by litigating parties. It is entirely 
desirable- and essential- to examine scientific data critically, and to be mindful of 
its methodological limitations and caveats. However, the existence of some 
methodological limitations does not make all data worthless. Conclusions based 
on limited data are a vast improvement upon conclusions based on nothing but 
conjecture and intuition.  
 
It is also important to note that this thesis does not place the blame for the 
problematic law-science interactions entirely on lawyers. Scientists giving 
evidence in courtrooms have also occasionally displayed poor practices such as 
going beyond their expertise or presenting subjective opinion as scientific fact. 
There is much mutual mistrust and misconceptions on both sides, and scientists 
have not always been transparent about the potential for error in their 
courtroom assertions. Scientists acting as expert witnesses also need to modify 
some aspects of their practice.  
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The next chapter (Chapter 3) will discuss these issues more specifically in the 
context of disease causation. It will first outline the problems in the legal 
approach too causation, such as the inflated role of causation in the negligence 
analysis. Causation is often seen as synonymous with liability, and this results in 
courts basing factual causation decisions on normative, intuitive or Ǯcommon-
senseǯ notions of justice: in other words, to answer factual questions in ways that 
accord, not necessarily with the actual facts, but with judgesǯ preferred overall 
outcome. These are not, this thesis contends, matters of factual causation. The 
factual causation enquiry must be objective and guided by empirical evidence, 
and this thesis strongly advocates the value of epidemiological evidence in aiding 
this assessment. The chapter will then highlight the complexities of disease 
causation, by exploring current biomedical evidence about the causes of disease. 
It will aim to show why rigid tests for causation do not work in this area of the 
law.     
 
Chapter 4 will explore the traditional legal test for factual causation (the but-for 
test), as well as the exceptional alternative tests for factual causation that have 
been applied to disease claims. The Ǯbut forǯ test is clearly unable to deal with the 
causal complexities of disease. Unfortunately, most diseases can be caused in so 
many different ways, through so many different combinations of events, that the 
requirement to establish Ǯbut-forǯ causation for some of the most disabling 
illnesses is likely to tie scientists and courts in knots for the foreseeable future. 
There is little prospect of a satisfactory resolution under current legal principles. 
This has led to the formulation of a number of somewhat haphazard exceptional 
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tests for factual causation that courts have devised on a piecemeal basis to deal 
with immediate dilemmas. The chapter will outline the applications of the 
exceptional tests: the Ǯmaterial contribution to injuryǯ test, the Ǯmaterial 
contribution to riskǯ test and the Ǯdoubles the riskǯ test. It will contend that the 
material contribution test for causation, despite the heavy criticism it has 
received, is at least a more appropriate fit for dealing with complex disease than 
the Ǯbut forǯ test, as it is much better to take account of probabilistic causation. 
However, the confused way in which the exceptional tests are applied, and the 
arbitrary criteria that restrict them to a few select diseases are dissatisfactory. 
As the potential unfairness of the but-for test becomes increasingly apparent in a 
range of debilitating diseases, it will become increasingly harder for the law to 
justify restricting the exceptional approach in this way, by making fine (and 
somewhat artificial) distinctions between diseases. Most major diseases have 
uncertain, complex causal mechanisms. The law must urgently re-evaluate its 
simplistic rigid, approach to disease causation, and this chapter will propose a 
more flexible, probabilistic test of general applicability to disease litigation.  
 
Chapter 5 will then clarify a better and more coherent role for scientific evidence 
generally, and epidemiological evidence more specifically, in the law. It will 
return to the judicial objections to epidemiology raised in chapter 1, and will 
take each misconception up for a detailed analysis in the light of the preceding 
discussions about science and disease causation. This chapter will explain how 
epidemiologists make causal inferences through complex statistical and non-
statistical methods. The chapter will then suggest a range of strategies that could 
help lawyers utilise scientific evidence more effectively in legal contexts, as well 
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as ways in which epidemiological evidence could be better applied in disease 
contexts. This chapter will also contend that the law may usefully be able to 
borrow from evidence-based medicine, which routinely involves the application 
of population evidence to diagnostic and treatment decisions for individual 
patients. 
 
This thesis acknowledges that epidemiology (like all scientific disciplines) has 
potential for error. Epidemiological studies can vary in quality, and some 
scientific studies can have very dubious validity. Thus, such evidence must be 
considered with balance and nuance, and in the context of all other available 
evidence. Further, such evidence cannot be determinative of causation or 
liability: it must be used only to guide, rather than to decide, the legal outcome. 
However, none of these problems constitute sufficient grounds to reject 
epidemiological evidence as proof of specific causation. To reject this evidence 
on such grounds as UK courts cite would mean that most forms of scientific 
evidence (including forensic testimony) should also be rejected in legal settings.  
 
For the foreseeable future, partial and qualified evidence about disease causation 
is the best that we can hope for, at least in the present state of human evolution. 
It is crucial for the law to frame principles that can accommodate empirical 
evidence from disciplines that have proven their credibility through their 
achievements. Epidemiological evidence is, as Broadbent points out, often the 
only evidence that can help prove that the wrong sued for was the cause of the 
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harm suffered.8 If the law continues to dismiss this evidence due to 
misconceptions about science, it Ǯcommits itself to finding falsehoods more often 
than facts.ǯ9  
 
The aim of this thesis is to make the case that if used judiciously, epidemiology 
can add much rationality and robustness to the assessment of factual causation 
in disease litigation. Legal debates about epidemiology suggest that courts are 
unaware about the extent to which medical and clinical decision-making relies 
on data gathered from population studies. ǮGeneralisedǯ evidence is not 
irrelevant for specific cases; but the ability to weigh and apply it in this way does 
require an ability to reason under conditions of uncertainty. As some legal 
scholars have already pointed out, there is an incoherence in the English 
common law of causation when the uncertainty in scientific evidence is 
represented in probabilistic terms. This incoherence arises primarily from an 
adherence to legal principles that are not compatible with the pragmatism of 
epidemiology.ǯ10 This thesis will thus also propose an alternative test for factual 
causation in disease claims that is better able to accommodate the pragmatism of 
science.  
 
Lord Phillips demonstrated the extent of the judicial misconceptions about 
science and medicine when he stated in the important Supreme Court judgment 
in Sienkiewicz v Greif : 
                                                        
8 A Broadbent, Philosophy of Epidemiology (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 163 
9 ibid 180 
10 C Miller, ‘Causation in Personal Injury: Legal or Epidemiological Common Sense’ (2006) 26 Legal 
Studies 544, 545 
 12 
When a scientific expert gives an opinion on causation, he is likely to do so 
in terms of certainty or uncertainty, rather than probability. Either medical 
science will enable him to postulate with confidence the chain of events that 
occurred, i.e. the biological cause, or it will not. In the latter case he is 
unlikely to be of much assistance to the judge who seeks to ascertain what 
occurred on a balance of probability.11 
 
 
The rest of this thesis will aim to demonstrate the multiple layers of errors that 
are contained in this pronouncement.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
11 Sienkiewicz v Greif [2011] UKSC 10 at [9] (Lord Phillips) 
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CHAPTER 1 
EPIDEMIOLOGY AND ITS CURRENT STATUS IN UK TORT LAW 
 
Exponential technological and industrial advances in the last two centuries (not 
always accompanied by proportionate concerns about the impact of these on 
human health) have resulted in the fact that many people have been exposed, 
often for long periods, to substances or factors that are now known to be toxic. 
Khoury12 points out that while technological advances have led to great progress 
for humankind, there has also been a price to pay for this. We do not yet know 
many long-term effects of many of the innovative processes and substances that 
are used in new technologies. Further, because of the complex nature of disease 
causation, these long-term harms may only become manifest many years or 
decades later. We are currently discovering more and more adverse impacts of 
developments that were initially thought harmless. These have led to an 
exponential rise in claims for negligently caused diseases in recent decades.  
 
The sources of potentially toxic substances in our world today are multiple and 
varied: including industrial and motor-vehicle emissions, contamination of water 
by chemical spills, hormones added to animal feed, pesticide residues in food and 
drinking water, household products containing chemicals,13 pharmaceutical 
products, and substances used in the manufacturing and building industry. 
Much legal attention in this area has focussed on pharmaceutical products, such 
as Diethylstilbestrol (DES) and the Thalidomide litigation. However, the range of 
                                                        
12 L Khoury, Uncertain Causation in Medical Liability (Hart Publishing 2006) 1 
13 ibid 
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substances that present risks to health is far broader than this. Growing 
industrial power has magnified the potential for large-scale accidents and 
massive exposure to toxic, environmental and other hazards.14 The Bhopal Gas 
Tragedy, one of the largest industrial disasters in human history, led to not only 
devastating immediate consequences, but to an unprecedented scale of residual 
contamination as well as long-term disease, disability and congenital 
malformations, that continue to damage both the environment and the health of 
victims even today. Since the 1960s and 1970s, there has been increasing 
scientific research focus on the health impact of chemical and physical agents 
such as volatile organic compounds, metals, particulate matter, pesticides and 
radiation.15  
 
One of the most well-known examples is the vast body of litigation for diseases 
resulting from asbestos, a material which we now know to be a causal factor in 
the development of many malignant and fibrotic diseases of the lung and 
pleura,16 including asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma. Asbestos has been 
used extensively in the construction and manufacturing industries since several 
decades, but awareness of its danger to human health began to rise around the 
1950s and 1960s. However, its use continued to be quite extensive even after 
this, although employers were required to take measures to protect employees 
who faced exposure to asbestos. Peto et al17 point out that asbestos use in 
                                                        
14 A Porat and A Stein, Tort Liability Under Uncertainty (OUP 2001) 3 
15 I Hertz-Picciotto, ‘Environmental Epidemiology’ in KJ Rothman, S Greenland and TL Lash (ed), 
Modern Epidemiology (Lippincott, Williams and Wilkins 2008) 599 
16 CB Manning, V Vallyathan, and BT Mossman, ‘Diseases Caused by Asbestos: Mechanisms of Injury 
and Disease Development’ (2002) 2 International Immunopharmacology 191, 191   
17 J Peto, A Decarli, C LaVecchia, F Levi and E Negri, ‘The European Mesothelioma Epidemic’ (1999) 
79 British Journal of Cancer 666-672  
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Western Europe remained high until 1980, and substantial quantities are still 
used in several European countries: Europe, they note, is in the grip of a Ǯmesothelioma epidemicǯ. Although this is a worldwide concern, it should be of 
particular concern in the UK: a recent study commissioned by the UK Health and 
Safety Executive has identified Britain as having the highest mesothelioma 
death-rate in the world.18  
 
 Given this scenario and the future projections, it is imperative for UK tort law to 
develop a coherent, principled strategy to deal with negligence claims for 
diseases allegedly caused by toxic exposures. Unfortunately, however, the 
challenges of establishing causation (an essential component of liability in 
negligence) in disease claims have led to a bewildering array of haphazard legal 
approaches towards the causation analysis in UK tort law. Disease causation is 
one of the most uncertain areas of science, and current medial models stress the 
complex and multifactorial nature of most diseases.19 Thus the need for scientific 
and medical evidence is particularly pressing in disease and toxic tort claims, but 
the legal assessment of such evidence in UK law is often confused, displaying 
poor judicial understanding about some key aspects of science and disease 
causation.  
 
Epidemiology, with its primary focus on researching the causes of disease; as 
well as its multifactorial statistical and analytical tools, would seem to have 
much to offer to this assessment. It is only relatively recently that 
                                                        
18 J Peto and C Rake, Occupational, Domestic and Environmental Mesothelioma Risks in Britain: 
Research Report (Health and Safety Executive No. 696, 2009) 
19 As will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis  
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epidemiological evidence has started to be adduced in disease and hazardous 
substance litigation in the UK, in order to assess whether an exposure to 
particular factor caused the disease in question.  Lasagna and Shulman point out 
that courts in the US view epidemiological evidence not only as valuable, but as 
crucial to the establishment of causation in disease litigation.20 Many claimants 
in the US today find that their claims might be dismissed without epidemiological 
evidence to support their arguments about causation.21 However, the situation is 
very different in the UK: the application of epidemiology in UK courts has been 
fraught with difficulty, much of it arising from judicial scepticism about whether 
epidemiological evidence is valid for aiding the analysis of specific causation.22 
Courts express a variety of doubts about its utility in personal injury litigation; 
questioning its methods, relevance and epistemic validity.23 They also display 
substantial confusion about how to evaluate and apply such evidence to the 
causal analysis. On the few occasions that courts have explained the reasons for 
this scepticism, the objections appear to largely centre around its inability to 
conclusively prove specific causation, and the perceived lack of scientific rigour of 
some of its methods. However, the consequent rejection of epidemiological 
evidence as proof of specific causation on such grounds suggests the judicial 
belief that conclusive proof is possible in other sciences: in other words, from the 
myth of scientific certainty. This thesis contends that the UK legal devaluation of 
epidemiology is unfair and unjustified, if (as all available evidence indicates) it is 
founded on the overtly probabilistic nature of epidemiological reasoning around 
                                                        
20 L Lasagna and SR Shulman, ‘Bendectin and the Language of Causation’ in KR Foster, DE Bernstein 
and PW Huber (eds), Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law (MIT Press 1993) 110-111 
21 ibid 116 
22 A Broadbent, Philosophy of Epidemiology (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 162 
23 C McIvor, ‘The Use of Epidemiological Evidence in UK Tort Law’ in S Loue (ed) Forensic 
Epidemiology in the Global Context (Springer 2013) 55  
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causation. Judges seem to lack awareness about the fundamentally uncertain 
nature of all science. Further, such criticisms also make it obvious that courts in 
the UK have little awareness about the complexities of disease causation, and 
about the increasingly probabilistic medical models that are emerging from 
recent research.   
 
This chapter aims to introduce the basic principles of epidemiology, and to 
outline the current legal UK position towards epidemiological evidence. It 
analyses the caselaw that illustrates judicial views about epidemiology, and tries 
to delineate, from judicial pronouncements, the various specific problematic 
beliefs that courts have about this branch of science. The ultimate aim of this 
thesis will be to demonstrate why these judicial beliefs, and the resultant 
undermining of epidemiology, are erroneous. However, the thesis traces the legal 
misunderstandings about epidemiology in causal disputes to underlying 
misconceptions about wider issues than just epidemiology. It argues that 
misconceptions about epidemiology actually arise from misunderstandings 
about science as a whole, disease causation in particular, and rigid, confused 
legal approaches to causation in UK tort law. In order to clearly demonstrate 
why the judicial objections to epidemiology outlined in Chapter 1 are erroneous, 
it is necessary for this thesis to first clarify some fundamental issues about these 
wider topics that the law needs to grasp more clearly in order to develop a more 
rational approach to disease litigation. Thus, having introduced the problematic 
judicial beliefs about epidemiology in Chapter 1, the next three chapters of the 
thesis will focus on underlying legal misconceptions about science and disease 
causation. The thesis will then return, in Chapter 5, to a more thorough scrutiny 
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of the epidemiological issues raised in Chapter 1, and will illustrate why the 
devaluation of epidemiological evidence is fundamentally flawed.  Section 1 
begins with a preliminary introduction to epidemiology as a scientific discipline, 
and offers a brief summary of the aims, impact and methodology of 
epidemiology. Section 2 describes the current position of epidemiology in UK 
law. Judicial views about epidemiology remain rather vaguely articulated, but on 
the few occasions when courts have discussed it, the attitude towards 
epidemiology has been characterised mainly by substantive confusion about 
basic epidemiological concepts,24 as well as by marked scepticism about its 
validity in proving specific causation.  Section 2.1 will discuss in particular two 
recent cases which illustrate this: McTear v Imperial Tobacco25 and Sienkiewicz v 
Greif.26 Section 2.2 will describe, by way of contrast, the approach US courts take 
towards epidemiological evidence in the assessment of specific causation. 
Epidemiology is not only valued in US courts, but is sometimes seen as almost 
crucial to the assessment of disease causation. Section 3 will then delineate the 
various problematic assumptions about epidemiology that are highlighted by the 
caselaw, that in the view of this author hinder the effective use of such evidence. 
 
SECTION 1: What is epidemiology: aims, scope and impact 
Epidemiology is the study of the distribution and determinants of disease, 
health-related states, and events in human populations.27 Greenland and 
                                                        
24 C McIvor, ‘Debunking Some Judicial Myths About Epidemiology and its Relevance to UK Tort 
Law’ (2013) 21 Medical Law Review 553, 553-555 (hereafter, McIvor, ‘Debunking…’) 
25 [2005] CSOH 69 
26 [2011] UKSC 10 
27 S Greenland and KJ Rothman, ‘Measures of Occurrence’ in KJ Rothman, S Greenland and TL Lash 
(ed), Modern Epidemiology (Lippincott, Williams and Wilkins 2008) 32 
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Rothman28 note that this definition of epidemiology also includes physiologic 
states such as blood pressure, psychological states such as depression, and 
positive outcomes such as disease immunity, all of which can form the subject 
matter of epidemiological studies.  
Although there are other disciplines, such as clinical medicine, which also share 
the same interest in health and disease, there are some central aspects of study 
that are unique to epidemiology. One key difference between epidemiology and 
clinical medicine is in the method of study: the focus in epidemiology is on 
gathering data about disease causation by studying population distributions.29 
This, as we shall examine in detail later,30 is amongst the factors that have most 
hindered the legal application of epidemiological evidence; and given rise to the 
greatest doubt about its potential probative value in the assessment of specific 
causation. The second key aspect of epidemiology is that it relies primarily on 
observation rather than experimentation to gather data. This has also aroused 
legal scepticism about its epistemic validity and credibility as a science, due to 
the seeming legal view that good science must involve experiments.31  
 
Epidemiological studies then statistically analyse this data collected from 
research populations through observational research methods. Thus, statistics 
are a very important research tool for epidemiologists, but contrary to what 
many UK lawyers believe, they are only one of the many analytical tools that 
epidemiologists use. Epidemiological inferences of causation, as we will see 
                                                        
28 ibid 
29 Greenland and Rothman (n 16) 32 
30 Explained further below, section 3.2 
31 Explained further below, section 3.1 
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below in section 1.1 and in Chapter 5 of this thesis, are based on a number of 
complex quantitative and qualitative analyses. The Bradford Hill factors, outlined 
below, are an example of an important further non-statistical analytical process 
that epidemiologists use to scrutinise observational data, in order to rule out 
erroneous or false-positive inferences of causation.   
1.1: Contribution to medicine and health 
One of the primary objectives of epidemiologic research is to obtain valid and 
precise estimates of the effects of a potential cause on the occurrence of 
disease.32  When epidemiologists seek to identify Ǯdeterminantsǯ of a disease, the 
determinants they are primarily interested in are the causes of the disease. 33  
Although epidemiology could in theory use these methodologies to study many 
different subject matters, its traditional focus has centred primarily on health 
and disease.34 It is, therefore, potentially extremely relevant to legal disputes 
around disease causation. 
Although very few of us realise it, the results of epidemiological studies make 
headlines more often than most other sciences.35 Rising public interest about 
health and environmental issues has resulted in findings from epidemiologic 
studies receiving constant attention in the news and media. It is rarely given the 
credit that it is due, however, and remains poorly recognised. As Dr. Ben 
Goldacre, physician and senior researcher at the University of Oxfordǯs Centre 
for Evidence-Based Medicine bemoans in his bestselling book ǮBad Scienceǯ: ǮThe 
                                                        
32Greenland and Rothman (n 16) 32 
33 Broadbent (n 11) 3 
34 Broadbent (n 11) 3  
35 ibid 1 
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process of obtaining and interpreting evidence isnǯt taught in schools, nor are the 
basics of evidence-based medicine and epidemiology, yet these are obviously the 
scientific issues that are most on peopleǯs minds….Science coverage now tends to 
come from the world of medicine.ǯ36 Epidemiology has played a crucial role in 
enhancing our understanding about infectious disease, role of genetic factors in 
illness, drug efficacy and side effects, and the impact of nutrition, environmental 
factors and social factors on health. This has been invaluable for improving 
public health, including through the development of prevention and vaccination 
programmes, and of new treatments. Yet, people do not hear about 
epidemiology, or if they do, have little idea about what it is, or of how it is 
relevant or useful it is to them.  
The development of epidemiology as a science is a relatively recent 
phenomenon, and the growth of this discipline occurred through a process of 
gradual evolution. Following World War II, the randomized controlled trial 
(hereafter, the RCT) began to evolve as the gold-standard methodology for 
gathering data about disease causation. Simultaneously, the British 
epidemiologist Sir Austin Bradford Hill (who was also one of the foremost 
proponents of the RCT) carried out, along with Richard Doll, a landmark study 
based in observational methods demonstrating the links between smoking and 
lung cancer.37 Subsequently, multiple epidemiologic studies were carried out to 
corroborate their findings that also confirmed the strong evidence for causal 
connections between smoking and lung cancer. This led to the publication of the 
Surgeon Generalǯs landmark report, Smoking and Health, in the United States in 
                                                        
36 B Goldacre, Bad Science (Harper Perennial 2009) 334 
37 R Doll and A Bradford Hill, ‘Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung’ (1950) 2 British Medical Journal 
739 
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1964.38 Sir Austin Bradford Hill also developed, in view of the methodological 
concerns, proposals for implementing more systematised and justifiable 
methods for making causal inferences from observational research.39 His 
seminal work led to the formulation of a list of factors or guiding criteria that 
should be considered when attempting to determine whether an observed 
association maybe indicative of causation:40  
 Strength of association, i.e. the magnitude of the risk ratio 
 Consistency of the epidemiological and clinical data showing similar 
findings in different populations in diverse studies 
 Specificity of the effect of exposure, i.e. that the causal factor should lead 
to only one disease 
 Temporality of the appearance of results of exposure, i.e. that exposure 
precedes the onset of disease 
 Biological gradient of the increase in intensity, increase in level and 
duration of the effects of exposure, i.e. a dose relationship; 
 Plausibility: whether there is an association with known biologic facts 
about the pathophysiology of the disease or reaction. This is dependent 
on the state of scientific knowledge at the time the data is being analysed 
and collated. It may be inadequate to explain associations that may in fact 
be causal and, conversely, may be unable to provide a realistic estimate of 
the probability of such an association not being causally related. 
                                                        
38
 United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Smoking and Health: Report of the 
Advisory Committee to the Surgeon General (Public Health Service Publication 1103, 1964)  
39 SS Coughlin, Causal Inference and Scientific Paradigms in Epidemiology (Bentham 2010) 3 
40 AB Hill, ‘The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation’ (1965) 58 Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of Medicine 295, 295-300. For a detailed explanation of these, see KJ Rothman, S 
Greenland, C Poole and TL Lash, ‘Causation and Causal Inference’ in KJ Rothman, S Greenland 
and TL Lash (ed), Modern Epidemiology (Lippincott, Williams and Wilkins 2008) 26-30 
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 Coherence: Whether there is general coherence of theories and evidence 
of the natural history of the material disease and associated exposure; 
 Experimental evidence: Objective experimental models to investigate links 
between exposure, association and subsequent causality 
 Analogy: This requires assessing whether there is any evidence or 
observations on analogous cases. For example, is there an analogous 
scenario that implies similarities between things that are otherwise 
different such a different drugs causing birth defects? If thalidomide can, 
so might other drugs with similarities in structure and pharmacologic 
properties. 
 
Since then, epidemiology has played a vital role in helping to improve public 
health outcomes and our understanding about the causes of disease. Community 
intervention trials of fluoride supplementation in water that were carried out in 
the 1940s have led to widespread primary prevention of dental caries; and great 
strides in understanding and preventing cardiovascular disease resulted from 
the Framingham Heart Study, an epidemiologic follow-up study that started in 
1949 and which continues to provide valuable findings more than 60 years after 
it first began. 41  
1.2: Limitations and conceptual issues  
Unlike many other scientists, notes Broadbent, epidemiologists are not primarily 
interested in using their data to discover Ǯlaws of natureǯ or develop theoretical 
                                                        
41 KJ Rothman, S Greenland and TL Lash (ed), Modern Epidemiology (Lippincott, Williams and 
Wilkins 2008) 1  
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frameworks: their overriding concern is with causation.42 There are a number of 
conceptual and methodological challenges that the Ǯrelatively youngǯ43 science of 
epidemiology faces in its quest for better recognition, such as, for example, its 
primary reliance on observational rather than experimental methods to gather 
data (as noted earlier), the lack of a central theory, its focus on population 
thinking, and its relative lack of domain sensitivity. 44 At a number of points 
during the history of epidemiology, these conceptual challenges have led to deep 
internal disagreements and controversy amongst epidemiologists. Rothman, 
Greenland and Lash45 cite the example of profound differences that arose in the 
epidemiological world in 1978, about whether exogenous estrogens are 
carcinogenic. Epidemiologists debating this issue were unable to agree about 
some of the basic and fundamental aspects of their discipline, which the authors 
view as a sign that the methodologic foundations of the science had not yet been 
established at that stage.  
However, the last third of the 20th century has seen rapid growth in the 
understanding and synthesis of core epidemiologic concepts and their 
theoretical underpinnings.46 These developments, note Rothman et al, were 
accelerated by the tremendous increase in epidemiological activity in recent 
decades, such as large-scale studies of major health concerns such as 
cardiovascular disease, and the discovery of the link between smoking and lung 
cancer. These were notable milestones in the evolution of epidemiology, and led 
to refinements and improvements in study design and statistical methodology. 
                                                        
42 Broadbent (n 11) 3 
43 Rothman et al (n 30) 2 
44 For a more comprehensive review of this, and other general challenges, see Broadbent (n 11) 3-9  
45 Rothman, Greenland and Lash (n 30) 2 
46 ibid 
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However, despite its many discoveries that have transformed public health, 
epidemiological data (like all scientific data, whether observational or 
experimental) has its limitations. Further, epidemiological studies are highly 
variable in their quality and robustness. Assessing the problems with the use of 
epidemiologic evidence about the linkages between the anti-nausea drug 
Bendectin and congenital anomalies, Lasagna and Shulman47 outlined the 
various difficulties affecting the validity of the epidemiological data. Some 
significant issues included recall bias (i.e. mothers of deformed babies were 
more likely to remember correctly the use of drugs during pregnancy), the fact 
that it is easy to miss modest increases in rates of congenital anomalies unless 
very large numbers of subjects are studied, and the fact that repeated dredging 
up of epidemiologic data will predictably turn up spurious correlations by 
chance.  
These issues do not, however, make epidemiological evidence worthless: if it did, 
then all science would be worthless, as all empirical sciences have 
methodological limits and potential for error. If these judicial observations about 
the probabilistic nature of epidemiological evidence for assessing specific 
causation were simply a caution against placing excessive weight on such 
evidence, and an argument in favour of a more nuanced approach to scientific 
testimony, it would be difficult to argue with the substance of the criticism. The 
problem arises only in the UK judicial tendency to undermine and dismiss 
epidemiology because of its lack of certainty and Ǯproofǯ. Epidemiologists have 
developed study designs that are more sophisticated, and better able to control 
                                                        
47 Lasagna and Shulman (n 9) 102-103 
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sources of error such as confounding and bias in their data. Epidemiology is now 
much more than simple surveys of incidence and associations: a fact that US 
courts increasingly recognise and value.48 However, awareness about this 
progress and about the refinements in epidemiological methods does not yet 
appear to have filtered through to courtrooms in the UK. Although this thesis 
advocates a larger role for epidemiology in UK tort law, it asserts at the same 
time that judges must be mindful of the potential for error in epidemiologic (and 
other scientific) studies: an inflated perception of the probative value of any 
science is as damaging to the cause of justice as the opposite attitude of 
undermining the value of science.49  Although a detailed evaluation of all of the 
internal challenges epidemiology faces is outside the scope of this thesis, we will, 
in this chapter (section 3) and then later in greater detail in Chapter 5, examine 
two epistemic issues that have particular import for this thesis, as they give rise 
to particular legal anxieties about the use of epidemiological evidence: the extent 
of epidemiological reliance on observational research methods, and the focus on 
population data.    
SECTION 2: Epidemiology in UK courtrooms 
In comparison with the USA, courts in the UK have so far had limited experience 
of toxic tort claims.50 Cases relying on epidemiological evidence form a minority 
of those personal injury cases in which causation is disputed, notes Miller.51 But 
these cases do require lawyers to reveal their own understanding of probabilistic 
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concepts. Miller points out the tendency to incoherence in the English common 
law of causation when the uncertainty in scientific evidence is represented in 
probabilistic terms: incoherence arises primarily from an Ǯadherence to legal 
principles which are not compatible with the pragmatism of epidemiology or, for 
that matter, lay understanding of causation.ǯ52 The legal use of epidemiologic 
evidence is subject to a variety of errors: this includes substantive errors (such 
as the belief that an RR>2 equates to causation on the balance of probabilities); 
as well as errors about epidemiological methods that cause overarching doubts 
about its ability to illuminate the legal causal enquiry. These will be explored in 
Section 3, below.  
Overall, courts appear to feel that epidemiological inferences are simply based 
on Ǯstatisticsǯ, and therefore have virtually no bearing on an individual claims. 
This has led to a tendency to undermine such evidence. Courts tend to give 
greater credence to testimony provided by medical doctors (even when their 
testimony is either almost entirely subjective, or heavily influenced by 
epidemiological research), rather than epidemiologists, in the assessment of 
disease causation. For example, in Novartis Grimsby Ltd. v Cookson,53 the court 
preferred the doctorǯs testimony to that of the epidemiologist, even though the 
issue fell directly within the specialism of the latter, and despite the fact that the 
scientific basis for the doctorǯs testimony remained unexplained and tenuous. 
Novartis involved a claim for bladder cancer, and the dispute arose because there 
were two potential causes: occupational exposure to carcinogenic dyes, as well 
as the claimantǯs smoking. Experts gave conflicting testimony about the likely 
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causal links between the occupational exposure and the cancer. The defendantǯs 
expert was an epidemiologist who was a specialist in the causes of bladder 
cancer, and had published a great deal of research in the area. His opinion was 
that the levels of occupational exposure were so low that the claimantǯs smoking 
was more likely to be the main cause. The claimantǯs expert was a clinician, a 
consultant urologist, who testified that in his opinion, the occupational exposure 
was more likely to be the main contributing factor, and also provided some 
numerical percentages to indicate the likely contribution of each factor. 
However, he provided no scientific bases for these numerical figures he had 
presented. The Court of Appeal did not ask for the evidence behind medical 
expertǯs testimony, and accepted his figures to rule that causation was 
established. (This tendency to accord some experts greater status than others, 
and to use the wrong heuristics in evaluating scientific evidence, will be explored 
in detail in Chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 2.3: a crucial issue because it has played a 
significant role in the judicial undervaluation of epidemiological evidence).  
This section will begin (in 2.1) with an overview of some key UK cases where 
courts have expounded their views about epidemiology and its relevance for the 
legal analysis of disease causation. These cases are important because they help 
understand the reasons for the UK judicial scepticism. Section 2.2 will examine, 
by way of contrast, the approach towards epidemiological evidence in US law, 
which must be understood also within the context of its general approach 
towards scientific evidence in disease claims. This section highlights that US 
courts place greater responsibility on judges to properly assess the reliability of 
scientific evidence generally (through clear admissibility criteria), and also have 
significantly more regard for epidemiological evidence than UK courts do (while 
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appreciating both its strengths and limitations).  
    
2.1: Judicial perceptions of epidemiology:  
Two important cases that help illustrate the issues that obstruct the legal use of 
epidemiology are the Scottish case of McTear v Imperial Tobacco Limited54 and 
the Supreme Court decision in Sienkiewicz v Greif.55 The cases involved causal 
disputes around the claimantsǯ lung cancer and mesothelioma respectively. 
Although epidemiological evidence has been adduced in a number of other cases, 
these two cases will be taken up for particular discussion because members of 
the judiciary discussed, at some length, not just the evidence placed before them, 
but their general views about epidemiology and its potential probative value for 
assessing disease causation in legal contexts. (Interestingly, Sienkiewicz was 
decided largely on the basis of common-law and statutory principles governing 
mesothelioma claims, and epidemiological evidence did not play any role, as it 
was not adduced by either of the parties. However, this case is illuminating for 
the purposes of our discussion because their Lordships took the opportunity, 
obiter, to advance their views about epidemiology and its relevance to specific 
causation).56   
2.1.1 McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd57 
This claim was brought by the widow of a lung cancer victim against the 
manufacturer of the cigarettes her husband smoked. Her contention was that 
                                                        
54 McTear (n 14) 
55 Sienkiewicz (n 15) 
56 McIvor, ‘Debunking…’ (n 13) 562 
57 n 14 
 30 
smoking had caused her husbandǯs cancer, and that the cigarette manufacturers 
were negligent in manufacturing and selling them to members of the public 
knowing that they could cause lung cancer. The claimant brought expert 
witnesses (epidemiologists and doctors) in order to show the overwhelming 
epidemiological evidence for the causal links between smoking and lung cancer. 
The manufacturers admitted that the evidence for the causal link between 
smoking and lung cancer was strong enough to have been accepted by the World 
Health Organization, the UK government and the US government. However, the 
court held (despite the overwhelming epidemiological evidence about the links 
between smoking and lung cancer) that the claim failed to satisfy the causation 
requirement. One reason advanced for this was that no amount of Ǯgeneralǯ 
evidence could be sufficient to establish causation in the specific individual claim 
at hand. Following a long and elaborate discussion about epidemiology, its 
methods and core concepts, Lord Nimmo Smith then proceeded, surprisingly, to 
not only outrightly reject the possibility that epidemiological evidence could 
offer proof of specific causation, but also rejected it as sufficient to prove general 
causal links between smoking and lung cancer (Miller notes, as an interesting 
related point, that: ǲQuite apart from public understanding of the strength of the 
link between smoking and lung cancer, it is somewhat ironic that a Scottish judge 
should come to a contrary conclusion at a time when the Scottish Parliament was 
passing legislation which, to protect public health, would ban smoking in public 
placesǳ).58 Further, citing with approval the submissions of the defendantǯs 
expert, Lord Nimmo Smith astonishingly stated that not only could epidemiology 
not prove individual causation, but that it could not even provide information on 
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the likelihood that an exposure produced an individualǯs condition. The 
population attributable risk was, in His Lordshipǯs view, simply a measure for Ǯpopulationsǯ and therefore did not even imply a likelihood of disease occurrence 
within an individual: 
It is accordingly sufficient in my view to state that I accept, for the reasons 
given by him… that epidemiological evidence cannot be used to make 
statements about individual causation. The information provided in an 
observational epidemiology is generally such that it can neither confirm nor 
refute a causal relationship, particularly when the exposure in question is 
not specifically associated with a certain condition... Epidemiology cannot 
provide information on the likelihood that an exposure produced an 
individual's condition. The population attributable risk is a measure for 
populations only and does not imply a likelihood of disease occurrence 
within an individual, contingent upon that individual's exposure.59 
Lord Nimmo Smith dismissed overwhelming epidemiological evidence about 
general causal links between smoking and lung cancer for the purposes of 
assessing causation in the specific claim despite accepting overwhelming 
evidence that suggested the general causal link might be as high as 90%. The 
Courtǯs approach in McTear, notes Turton, virtually amounted to requiring 
certainty.60 In any event, his Lordship maintained, no general causal links were 
sufficient to prove that smoking had caused that particular individual claimantǯs 
lung cancer.  
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Courts, this case illustrates, can draw sharp lines between what they term proof 
of Ǯgeneral causationǯ and that of Ǯspecific causationǯ- in this instance, viewing 
them as utterly irrelevant to each other. Although population and individual 
evidence are not the same thing, to view them as so utterly disconnected and 
dichotomous entities is extraordinary. It is difficult to believe that His Lordship 
was apparently unaware about how much current medical and scientific 
knowledge, and how many of our day-to-day, individual decisions about a 
number of specific issues, are based on statistical, Ǯpopulationǯ data. This level of 
disdain for probabilistic epidemiological evidence is startling, and a deeply 
worrying indication of the depth of judicial ignorance about science and 
scientific thinking. This myth of good science, and good evidence as having to 
possess the quality of ǲcertaintyǳ underlies much of the erroneous legal approach 
to epidemiology. The myth of scientific certainty and its operation in UK law will 
be explored at length in Chapter 2.    
2.1.2 Sienkiewicz v Greif61 
This was a recent Supreme Court case that was brought by the daughter of a 
woman who had died from mesothelioma, against her motherǯs employer.  The 
deceased had been exposed to asbestos at her workplace by her employer, but 
there was an additional complicating factor in regard to causation: she had also 
had a significant background exposure to asbestos in her environment due to the 
location where she lived. Statistical evidence indicated that the tortious exposure 
at the workplace had increased her risk of contracting mesothelioma by only 
18%. The trial judge had dismissed the claim on the grounds that causation had 
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not been established on the balance of probabilities. However, the Supreme 
Court held that normal rules of causation did not apply in mesothelioma claims, 
and therefore the defendant was liable. In keeping with common law principles 
established in the earlier case of Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.,62 all 
that was needed to satisfy causation in claims for mesothelioma caused by 
asbestos was proof of a material increase in risk. (A review of the alternative or 
exceptional approaches for factual causation, and the causal reasoning applied in 
situations of evidentiary uncertainty such as mesothelioma, will be presented 
later in detail in Chapter 4 section 2).   
 
Although epidemiological evidence was not at issue in Sienkiewicz,63 as neither 
the claimant nor the defendant had submitted epidemiological evidence, the 
court entered into an obiter discussion of their view of the application of 
epidemiology to such claims.  The Supreme Court broached this topic, as 
McIvor64 points out, mainly in response Lady Justice Smithǯs view expressed in 
the Court of Appeal that the Ǯdoubling of the riskǯ test should operate as the 
default test for causation in evidentiary gap cases. The Supreme Court disagreed 
with this approach, but then thought it was necessary to cast doubt on 
epidemiology as a whole in order to explain why.65   
 
Lord Phillips made several references to the purported lack of robustness and 
reliability of epidemiology.66 Many other members of the Supreme Court, such as 
                                                        
62 [2002] UKHL 22.  
63 Sienkiewicz (n 15) 
64 McIvor, ‘Debunking…’ (n 13) 562  
65 ibid 562-563 
66 Sienkiewicz (n 15) at [97]-[99] and [101]-[103] (Lord Phillips) 
 34 
Lord Mance and Lord Kerr, echoed the attitude of general scepticism. Lord 
Phillips also discussed the statistical measures that epidemiological inferences of 
causation are based on and propagated, as McIvor points out, the myth put 
forward by Mackay J in XYZ v Schering67 and frequently repeated in toxic tort 
contexts, that epidemiologists treat evidence of a 'doubling of the risk' as 
adequate proof of causation.ǳ68 Further:69 ǮIn a set of comments apt to cause 
great offence to epidemiologists, Lord Kerr even goes so far as to suggest that 
epidemiology lacks credibility as a scientific discipline:ǯ 
There is a real danger that so-called "epidemiological evidence" will carry a 
false air of authority. It is necessary to guard against treating a theory 
based on assumptions as a workable benchmark against which an estimate 
of the increase in risk could be measured.70 
 
Section 3 below will examine the specific methodological issues that courts have 
alluded to in their discussion of epidemiology, and the fundamental (erroneous) 
assumptions about epidemiology that are illustrated particularly by these two 
important cases.  
2.2: US judicial approaches to epidemiology: the contrast with UK 
Within the US, there has been a steady growth in hazardous substance litigation 
since the early 1980s, and thus a growing use of scientific expert evidence. This 
includes the Bendectin litigation,71 toxic tort cases involving radiation 
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exposure,72 the Agent Orange litigation,73 swine flu vaccination74 and cases 
involving contamination of water supplies.75 Epidemiological evidence is 
frequently admitted as proof of specific causation in such litigation, and is 
accorded a great deal more respect than in the UK. 
The US approach to epidemiology presents a stark contrast to that seen in UK 
tort law. Note Lasagna and Shulman:76 Ǯ..(A)n expanding body of US law openly 
acknowledges the importance of epidemiological evidence, particularly as a 
foundation for expert evidence where no direct evidence is available on the issue 
of causation. In Brock v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.77 (which involved birth 
defects allegedly stemming from the drug Bendectin), the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that epidemiologic studies constitute ǲthe most useful and conclusive type of 
evidence.ǳ The court went on further to emphasise that in cases of this type, ǲspeculation unconfirmed by epidemiologic proof cannot form the basis for 
causation in a court of law.ǳ78 
However, the respect for epidemiological evidence in US courts is not founded on 
any illusions that it is a Ǯperfectǯ science: courts appear to value epidemiology 
even as they are able to engage with methodological limitations and weaknesses. 
The court in Brock also displayed a growing judicial willingness to scrutinize the 
expert evidence more closely. Courts took an active role in examining whether 
the foundations of the evidence placed before them were adequate and 
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sufficient, raising questions about such methodological issues as Relative Risk 
(RR) and confidence intervals. This occurred even as courts acknowledged that 
epidemiological evidence could have methodological limitations, and were able 
to engage with this. 79 In Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.,80 the court 
showed impressive awareness of the need for discrimination in the application 
of epidemiological evidence, distinguished between different forms of 
epidemiologic research, and pointed out that each differed in the evidentiary 
weight it could add to questions of causal connection.81 This case drew a 
distinction between uncontrolled case studies or case-series reports, which it 
viewed as simply identification or surveys of disease incidence and ǲnot formal 
epidemiologic investigations,ǳ and contrasted these with more sophisticated 
epidemiological study designs such as cohort studies and case-control studies.82 
Designs such as cohort and case-control studies are, the court opined, ǲǲthe most 
informative investigations used to test specific etiological hypotheses and to confirm and quantify degrees of health risk related to causal exposures…ǳ83 
 
The approach to epidemiology in US courts must, however, be understood in the 
context of the generally more informed approach towards scientific evidence, 
where courts are exhorted to assess the reliability of evidence, but are directed 
to take into account a range of factors when making this assessment. Since the 
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Supreme Court decision in Daubert84 in 1993, US courts now have an important Ǯgatekeepingǯ role to play in assessing the admissibility of scientific expert 
evidence. The Daubert decision charged courts with "the task of ensuring that an 
expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task 
at hand."85 The Ǯreliabilityǯ test was formulated partially in response to rising 
concerns about Ǯjunk scienceǯ86 being freely admitted as courtroom testimony in 
toxic tort litigation, that were attributed in turn to the lax admissibility standards 
that had ensued from the earlier US Court of Appeals decision in Frye v United 
States.87  
The legal issue in Frye pertained to the admissibility of evidence of a systolic 
blood pressure test. In deciding whether such evidence could be admitted, Frye 
formulated the Ǯgeneral acceptanceǯ test, which simply requires a litigating party 
to demonstrate that the scientific theory or technique on which their expert 
relies has been endorsed by a substantial majority of specialists in his or her 
field. 88 Although widely applied, note Heffernan and Coen,89 the Frye general 
acceptance test was controversial, as it often became the cloak for an enormous 
variety of judicial practices: it was Ǯmalleable enough to be pursued with rigour, 
applied perfunctorily as a matter of form, or sidestepped altogether.ǯ Popular 
judicial sleights of hand, they point out, included limiting the scope of the test to 
the so-called hard sciences (as opposed to so-called soft sciences such as mental 
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health)90; defining the relevant field of expertise so narrowly that a general 
consensus among experts is easy to reach; and simplifying the judicial task by 
relying on peer review and publication as the exclusive yardsticks for general 
acceptance. These are issues that continue to plague the application of scientific 
evidence in UK courtroom settings, and are magnified because there is little 
guidance for courts about the admissibility of such evidence. This leaves courts 
often applying the wrong criteria to assess the weight of the testimony placed 
before them: Chapter 2 (section 2) will discuss general errors in the UK legal 
approach towards scientific evidence.  
Daubert was one of many by the claims brought against the pharmaceutical 
company that had manufactured the anti-nausea drug Bendectin. The claimants 
were children who had been born with limb defects, and whose mothers who 
had consumed the drug during their pregnancy. The US Supreme Court upheld 
the claim, and formulated a new standard for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence, holding that rigid Ǯgeneral acceptanceǯ rules such as that in Frye were 
unsatisfactory. Emphasising that the inquiry into the reliability of expert 
evidence is a flexible one, Justice Blackmun suggested a non-exhaustive list of 
factors for courts to take into account when determining admissibility: • whether the theory or technique can be tested; • whether the theory or technique has been tested; • whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and 
publication; • whether the theory or technique has a known or potential rate of error; 
                                                        
90 A distinction that will be explored further (Chapter 2 section 1.3) 
 39 
• whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted within the 
relevant scientific community.91 
The Daubert decision, note Heffernan and Coen, revolutionised expert 
evidentiary practice: the validation standard holds sway not only in the federal 
courts, but also in the majority of the states.92 Subsequently, the Supreme Court 
has further clarified the reliability test for admissibility in the cases of General 
Electric Co v Joiner93 and Kumho Tire Co v Carmichael.94 The current version of 
the test is codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, as amended in 2000. The rule 
contains the following core requirements: (i) the evidence must be helpful to the 
factfinder; (ii) it must be based on sufficient facts or data; (iii) it must be the 
product of reliable principles and methods; and (iv) the expert must have 
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.95 However, 
this test has also led to its own problems: most significantly, the rigid and over-
enthusiastic applications of the reliability test, whereby each piece of scientific 
evidence is subjected to individual scrutiny and often rejected if it, on its own, 
fails to meet all the requirements of Rule 702.96 This rigid and Ǯatomisticǯ97 
approach extends to the use of epidemiology, and has occasionally led to the 
prioritisation of epidemiologic evidence over other forms of toxicity evidence.98  
The First Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the more recent case of Milward v 
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Acuity Specialty Products99 has, however, further offered further clarity about the 
use of scientific evidence. Milward clarifies that the gatekeeping role of the court 
is limited to ensuring that the expert testimony is supported by evidence and 
sound scientific reasoning, and that questions concerning the relative 
persuasiveness of competing opinions fall within the exclusive remit of the jury: 
as such, the First Circuit draws a clear distinction between admissibility and 
weight.100           
The legal approach to disease causation in the UK may benefit from emulating 
such an approach: both in the responsibility placed on judges to scrutinise the 
reliability of scientific testimony (requiring some basic judicial understanding of 
the science),101 as well as in the enlightened acknowledgement of the value of 
probabilistic epidemiological evidence.  However, it is important to clarify that 
this thesis does not advocate that courts should go to the opposite extreme of 
insisting that epidemiological evidence must always be adduced to prove disease. 
Sometimes epidemiological evidence may simply be unnecessary, unavailable, or 
less useful than other kinds of evidence. Which evidence is the best is not a 
question that can be answered by rigid rules: in science, context is all-important; 
and what is best in one situation could well be pointless in a different situation. 
The crucial point this thesis makes is that the assessment of factual causation 
should rest, simply, on the best available evidence.   
 
SECTION 3: Misconceptions about epidemiology 
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Crucially, the cases in Section 2.1 above show that most of the objections to 
epidemiology pertain to its overtly probabilistic nature: that it is unable to 
provide conclusive proof of specific causation. The singling out of epidemiology 
for such judicial criticism, on grounds of the uncertain nature of its conclusions, 
reflects the legal illusion that probabilistic reasoning is unique to epidemiology 
as a scientific discipline, and the corollary that other sciences are capable of 
providing more certain or conclusive evidence. The excessive (arguably, over-
inflated, as Chapter 2 will later discuss) weight given to other forms of scientific 
evidence in other legal contexts, for example in criminal law, demonstrates this. 
Judges who rather uncritically welcome DNA/fingerprint expert evidence to 
secure convictions in criminal law seem, by contrast, rather untroubled by the 
degree of subjectivity and uncertainty in the interpretation of such data.   
 
Broadbent distils, ǲfrom the rather convoluted jurisprudence and commentary 
on the topicǳ, 3 main attitudes towards epidemiological evidence in proof of 
specific causation:102 
 Epidemiological evidence is irrelevant to proof of specific causation. Lord 
Nimmo Smith took this line of reasoning in McTear v Imperial Tobacco 
Ltd103  
 Where only epidemiological evidence is available, normal causation rules 
may sometimes be relaxed, so increase in risk can satisfy the causation 
element; and 
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 That the threshold for proof of specific causation using epidemiological 
evidence is an RR (Relative Risk) greater than 2. 
This thesis focuses on three judicial beliefs about epidemiology, which in the 
view of this author most significantly hinder its application and appropriate use 
in litigation. All of these judicial beliefs, this thesis contends, are based in 
erroneous or incomplete understanding of scientific evidentiary models, 
especially the evidence about disease causation. Thus it is particularly unfair and 
unfortunate that these have led to a rejection of this form of empirical evidence 
that could be invaluable to the law. Subsections 3.1-3.3 below will briefly outline 
the three problematic judicial beliefs about epidemiology that prevent its 
effective legal application. 
3.1: ǲEpidemiology can only show associations, never causation? 
One of the most significant problems arises from the fact that epidemiology 
relies substantially on data drawn from Ǯobservationalǯ methods, rather than 
from experimental research. Generally speaking, the more controlled the 
conditions under which a study is conducted, the less the potential for error, 
confounding, and bias in the results. Epidemiologists, however, largely tend to 
use observational use study designs (such as, for example, cohort studies and 
case-control studies) to gather data about exposures and outcomes, and use this 
data to make hypotheses about causation. 104 (There are, as Broadbent notes, 
some exceptions to this, such as RCTs, where epidemiological researchers might 
divide subjects into groups and then actively intervene: for example they might 
administer pharmaceutical drug treatments to one group, and a placebo to the 
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other, in order to assess the effect of the drug on the disease in question. Even 
here, however, because of the research and ethical restrictions which studies 
involving human participants are subject to, the situations where such research 
is possible, and the extent to which researchers can control the Ǯexperimentǯ, is 
restricted).  
This Ǯnonconformity to standard philosophical images of scienceǯ105 appears to 
have diminished the legal regard for epidemiology. Lord Nimmo Smith 
emphasised somewhat disdainfully in McTear that ǮThe information provided in 
an observational epidemiology is generally such that it can neither confirm nor 
refute a causal relationship.ǯ106 Lord Dyson noted in Sienkiewicz v Greif that 
epidemiological methods can only establish associations between alleged causes 
and effects, which are insufficient to conclusively prove causation.107 Lord 
Phillips alluded to the methodological problems with epidemiological research 
that limited its reliability.108 The dismissiveness towards observational research 
is not restricted to legal settings, and the scientific world has had a similar 
tendency, for a long period, to view observational research as somehow inferior 
in epistemic validity.109 This is because of the intrinsic limitation of 
observational data: no matter how many times we observe an association 
between two events we suspect to be causally linked, we cannot know for certain 
that one causes the other, or that the same association will occur the next time.  
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However, it is naïve to dismiss observational data without due consideration of 
its value, and without understanding the practical reasons why scientists need 
different methodologies. While it is certainly true that scientists should select the 
most stringent methodologies they can, there are situations where 
experimentation or heavily controlled research conditions are impossible for 
practical reasons. Toxic tort and disease-related research is an important 
example. It is, for various good reasons, often impossible to experiment by 
intentionally administering suspected hazardous substances to a study 
participant.  Many other branches of science e.g. physical sciences, chemistry etc. 
are often less subject to similar constraints, because the focus of the research is 
often on chemical substances or physical objects. Rigid and blinkered 
perceptions of science that hold that strictly controlled experimentation is 
always the Ǯgold standardǯ often puts at a disadvantage sciences that focus on 
subjects where experimentation is more difficult (astronomy is another example 
of such a science). Epidemiology appears to have drawn the short straw in this 
flawed Ǯhierarchyǯ of sciences (for a detailed discussion see later, Chapter 2, 
section 1.3).   This judicial undermining of observational research will be taken 
up for detailed discussed in Chapter 5 (s 2.1).  
3.2: ?Population studies are entirely irrelevant to ?specific? causation?  
The second major legal objection to epidemiological evidence is that 
epidemiologists derive their knowledge primarily from the study of populations. 
UK courts appear to have concluded that ǲgeneralisticǳ evidence is almost 
disconnected from individual cases, and has practically no relevance to the 
causation question in the specific claim at hand. This view is also supported by 
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some legal academics. Wright110 argues, for example, that population or Ǯgeneralǯ 
evidence can never illuminate the question of specific causation, and that this 
assessment always requires Ǯparticularisticǯ evidence. See reiterates his view that 
such evidence cannot establish whether the factor in question caused disease or 
injury in a specific individual.111  
Lord Nimmo Smith took this dismissal of epidemiology to an extraordinary 
extreme, stating that not only could epidemiology not prove causation, but also 
that it could not even provide information on the likelihood that there was a 
causal connection.112 Thus, in his opinion, measures such as RR (Relative Risk) 
and attributable fractions only applied to populations. This is an odd and naïve 
view. Population studies may not provide proof or certainty about what happens 
in every specific instance, but to even deny that they can provide robust 
information about likelihoods and probabilities is difficult to defend as a logical 
stand. There is undoubted truth in the judicial observation that it is necessary to 
exercise caution when extrapolating from population data to individual cases. 
This, however, should simply indicate a need for nuance when assessing data 
from population studies. While it is certainly true that what is true of the 
majority of the population is not necessarily true of every single individual 
within it, neither is it true that data drawn from populations provide no 
information at all about what might have happened in an individual instance. To 
state that facts we know to be true of the general population tell us nothing 
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about specific individuals is, as Broadbent rightly puts it, a non-sequitur: such 
reasoning would require us to Ǯignore great swathes of advice about not just 
epidemiology, but about health, nutrition, house prices, and the prospects of 
survival upon leaping from a third-storey window!ǯ113 
Populations are ultimately composed of individuals:114 a Ǯpopulationǯ is not some 
mythical being conjured out of the ethers. Thus it is at least sometimes possible 
to make inferences about an individual on the basis of information we have 
about the population of which that individual is a member.115 This epistemic 
concern on part of courts appears to be related to a vague distaste for making 
legal decisions on the basis of statistical evidence, with the concomitant belief 
that because epidemiology studies populations, its causal inferences are based 
on no more than the statistics. Lord Phillips in Sienkiewicz uses the word 
epidemiology interchangeably with the term Ǯstatistical analysisǯ116 and opines, 
later, that it therefore cannot illuminate the further question of whether these 
statistical associations demonstrate a causal relationship.117  Several other 
members of the Supreme Court in the same case expressed the view that reliance 
on population data or on statistical measures such as associations and 
correlations in order to assess what happened in the specific case was illogical, 
unfair, and even, almost, dehumanising. Lord Phillips118 cited a variation of the 
famous Blue Bus Paradox119 in order to make the point that using statistics in 
legal decision-making could lead to arbitrary outcomes. Lord Mance, in the same 
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case, cautioned that the law needed to concern itself with the rights and wrongs 
of situations, and that individuals and companies must ǲnot be treated like 
statistics.ǳ120  
The epidemiological method has been referred to somewhat disparagingly by a 
section of lawyers as ǲnaked statisticsǳ121 (it is unclear what exactly this term 
means, or, as Miller wonders,122 what the other types are). We assume this term 
encapsulates the legal idea that epidemiologists simply put observational data 
through statistical programs, and mechanistically apply numerical criteria in 
order to infer (or reject) causation. However, as McIvor123 points out, this is 
quite simply untrue: epidemiologists are more than just statisticians. They use 
statistics as a tool for analysis of data, but also use a variety of other 
sophisticated techniques to determine whether the associations indicate a causal 
effect. The idea that epidemiological inferences are no more than statistical 
measures seriously misconceives epidemiological inferences of causation, a 
complex reasoning process that will be explored in in Chapter 5 (section 1).   
Miller argues that the judicial aversion to statistical evidence in establishing 
causation stems from a Ǯvain search for a certainty that can somehow finesse he 
problem of induction.ǯ124 The Supreme Court case of Sienkiewicz v Greif shows, in 
Millerǯs view, that courts still remain equally immune to developments in the 
worlds of science, epidemiology or other legal jurisdictions such as the US that 
have vastly revaluated their views about epidemiological evidence. The McTear 
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reasoning, that insists on absolute proof of specific causation, would imply that 
almost any disease claim should fail for want of causation, and that all previous 
cases that have imposed liability for diseases allegedly caused by exposure to 
harmful substances are wrong: because such certainty of proof in complex 
disease claims is rare enough to be near impossible.  
Wrightǯs125 exaggerated idealisation of Ǯparticularisticǯ evidence, to the exclusion 
of all other considerations such as context, practicality, or robustness of the data 
is irrational and illogical. Particularistic data (such as eyewitness testimony) can 
also be inherently unreliable. Further, in disease litigation, there is often no 
particularistic evidence available. No expert can ever be certain that the patientǯs 
smoking played a causative role in their disease: a tumour caused by smoking 
looks no different, on a scan, from that caused by genetic or other factors. In 
most disease causation disputes, Ǯgeneralǯ evidence may well be all we have, and 
to reject the best available evidence in the futile quest for certain evidence is 
illogical and futile.  The fervor for particularistic evidence has led to a tendency 
to accept assertions from experts who often offer no more than subjective or  Ǯguessworkǯ opinions about the claimant. Unfortunately, courts might end up 
favouring, under such an approach, evidence from experts who make less-than-
honest assertions about specific causation over those who offer more 
transparent and well-grounded (but nuanced) testimony. All of these issues will 
be explored at greater length in Chapter 5 (section 2.2). 
3.3: ?Epidemiologists infer causation from RR values, and RR>2 is causation 
on the balance of probabilities?: 
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Broadbent126 notes that there are two important epidemiological measures that 
are employed to measure the strength of associations while assessing potential 
causation. These are the relative risk (RR) and the attributable fraction (AF) or 
attributable risk. The relative risk (RR) is well-known in the law, and is a 
measure of how much more common a given condition is among people who are 
subject to a given exposure than among those who are not. It is calculated as: 
RR= risk among exposed/risk among unexposed 
The AF is the proportion of a disease burden within a population that is ǲattributableǳ to a given exposure. This is calculated as: 
AF = (risk among exposed - risk among unexposed)/risk among exposed127  
 In addition to the above measures, epidemiologists also use a variety of other 
statistical as well as qualitative methods to assess data. However, lawyers appear 
to have focused exclusively on RR values, and this value has become 
synonymous, in legal minds, with epidemiological inferences of causation. This 
has led to a further mistaken idea within the legal profession that 
epidemiologists infer a causal link between an agent and an outcome based on 
relative risk thresholds alone, and see causation as established when the RR 
value is greater than 2. The result is a mantra-like insistence on an RR>2 as a 
magical number that confers instant significance and respectability on 
epidemiological inferences of causation, and this is often sufficient for courts to 
conclude that causation is established on the balance of probabilities. On the 
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other hand, any RR value that is below 2 is dismissed straightaway as negating 
causation.  
 
However, the interpretation of the RR value is more complex, and depends on 
context and background, much like all numerical data in science (a general issue 
that will be discussed in Chapter 5 section 3.2). Further, this view misrepresents 
that epidemiology uses such simplistic criteria to infer causation does the 
discipline a disservice. Lord Phillips states in Sienkiewicz that where RR exceeds 
2, the Ǯstatisticalǯ likelihood is that the particular exposure was the cause of the 
disease. As McIvor points out,128 this statement, coming as it does after Lord 
Phillipsǯ earlier statement that epidemiology is concerned with the question of 
statistical associations and not with the question of whether such associations 
demonstrate an underlying biological relationship,129 implies the belief that 
epidemiologists would not look any further than the statistics when formulating 
their conclusions about causation. In fact, epidemiologists do not treat an RR>2 
as automatically indicative of causation, and do not base findings of causation on 
RR rates alone.130 This view of epidemiology has been translated, in its legal 
application, into the Ǯdoubles the riskǯ test for causation: the idea that an RR>2 
equates to proof of causation of 51% or more, or in other words to proof on the 
balance of probabilities. Lady Justice Smith in Novartis131 treated the Ǯdoubles the 
riskǯ test as an application of the standard Ǯbut forǯ test on the balance of 
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probabilities. The claim in XYZ & Others v Schering Health Care Ltd132 failed 
because the RR value was computed at just below 2, and the claimants did not 
contest that it was necessary to have established an RR>2 to enable their claim 
to succeed.  
 
The law has made a serious error in its reading of epidemiology, and in the way 
it has applied this to the legal question. As Broadbent notes,133 the RR value is 
not determinative: the significance of the epidemiological evidence depends on 
the context. An RR>2 can be sufficient for proof of specific causation where there 
is no other evidence, but may not be sufficient if there is other evidence against 
that proposition. Similarly, an RR<2 does not disprove causation. Further, it is 
illogical to apply RR in this mechanistic way to conclude causation on the balance 
of probabilities.  
 
By contrast, at least some US courts must be credited for taking a more flexible 
and informed approach to RR values, as well as for rejecting the atomistic 
approach to data. Viewing several pieces of toxicity evidence in conjunction with 
the epidemiologic evidence, the court in Oxendine imposed liability in a claim 
where the RR value was between 1.3-1.8. The court concluded it was satisfied 
that all the evidence put together with the epidemiological evidence (including in 
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vivo and in vitro studies) was sufficient to establish causation on then balance of 
probabilities, even though the RR value was less than 2.134  
 
Chapter 4 (section 2.3) and Chapter 5 (section 2.3) will further elaborate on the 
problems with the view that epidemiological inference of causation are based 
just on an RR>2, as well as the problems with the doubling of risk test. 
 
SECTION 4: Facilitating legal clarity about the value of epidemiology: the 
importance of clearer understanding of science and disease causation 
Unfortunately, the overtly probabilistic nature of epidemiology has led UK courts 
to devalue and dismiss sciences such as epidemiology that offer robust evidence 
of general causal links. This thesis will attempt to show that none of the concerns 
about epidemiology that courts have expressed so far constitute valid grounds to 
dismiss its credibility as a science, or its probative value in the assessment of 
specific causation.  
 
A key contention of this thesis is that that the myth of scientific certainty is 
central to the to the misconceived and sceptical judicial attitude towards 
epidemiology. The judicial pronouncements cited above illustrate that UK courts 
appear to have fundamental misconceptions about science in general, and about 
what scientific evidence can realistically provide to the legal enquiry. Science, as 
a whole, is fundamentally probabilistic and uncertain. The misalignment 
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between the myth and reality is even more magnified in disease litigation, 
because disease causation is one of the most uncertain areas of science. A 
sensible approach to disease litigation can only be formulated when the law 
learns to use probabilistic evidence about causation with greater rectitude.  
 
Specifically, this thesis locates the scepticism about epidemiology in UK tort law 
within three broader problematic contexts, each of which will be taken up in 
turn in the next three chapters of this thesis:  
(i) Judicial ignorance about the basic philosophy scientific reasoning. Of 
particular concern is the fact that courts seem to think probabilistic 
reasoning is unique to epidemiology, when in actuality it is a defining 
feature of science in general. The Ǯmyth of scientific certaintyǯ is a 
matter of serious concern, not just in disease litigation, but also in 
many other areas of the law where judges frequently and routinely 
rely on scientific evidence to aid their decision-making. It leads to 
poor use of expert evidence and errors in judging how much weight a 
piece testimony deserves. Chapter 2 will elucidate the issues and 
misconceptions that plague the law-science relationship. 
(ii) Lack of conceptual clarity around the role and scope of the factual 
causation requirement in negligence: This will be examined in Chapter 
3. The judicial tendency to see causation as synonymous with liability 
has led to an excessive infusion of normative considerations into the 
factual inquiry. Judicial anxiety to retain discretion over the outcome 
of the causation analysis seems to prevent the causal enquiry from 
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being carried out with any rationality or objectivity. This thesis 
strongly disputes the idea that causation is a normative issue. 
Causation analysis should be accorded a narrower place in the overall 
liability analysis but should be carried out with due regard for the best 
available empirical evidence about factual matters. 
(iii) The rigid and deterministic Ǯbut forǯ test, that aligns poorly with 
increasingly probabilistic scientific models of disease causation: The Ǯbut forǯ test has proven unsatisfactory in many situations in recent 
decades, and it is no accident that these have most often occurred in in 
disease disputes. This will be taken up for detailed discussion in 
Chapters 3 and 4. Disease causation is complex, and most major 
diseases can be caused through a number of different combinations of 
events. Thus, science can only provide probabilistic evidence of the 
likely contribution of a causal factor. However, the Ǯbut forǯ test is too 
rigid and deterministic to be able to accommodate this. This leads to 
courts sometimes formulating odd exceptional causal tests, in a 
piecemeal fashion, in order to avoid the injustice of the Ǯbut forǯ test. 
This thesis contends that a coherent legal approach to disease claims 
requires a more flexible, principled test for disease causation. This will 
not only bring the law more in line with modern medicine and science, 
but will also help courts to better utilise probabilistic evidence from 
science and epidemiology.   
After clarifying these broader areas of misconception, the thesis will then return, 
in Chapter 5, to the judicial misconceptions about epidemiology outlined in this 
chapter, and will explain why these are wrong in light of the preceding 
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discussions about science and disease. Through these discussions, this thesis 
seeks to demonstrate that epidemiology, used wisely, can contribute valuable 
evidence about specific causation.  It will also acknowledge, however, that a good 
deal of discrimination and judgment is crucial when using scientific evidence in 
legal settings.135 As Feldschreiber, Mulcahy and Day136 point out, statistical and 
epidemiological methodologies measuring associations and causal relationships 
can be highly useful and practical, but the methodology is only as good as the 
integrity, comprehensiveness and quality of the data used. Databases can be 
erroneous (deliberately or inadvertently), and this can lead to false assumptions 
as to causation of injury and adverse events. Applying such evidence to real-
world questions thus requires some basic legal felicity with scientific and 
probabilistic methods. Dawid cautions that Ǯ(d)ata, even scientific data, never 
speak for themselves: before we can sensibly interpret the data it is vital to know 
and take account of the nature, protocol and properties of the study which the 
data resulted from.137 To believe that there are hard and fast rules by which 
medical science can use biostatistical and epidemiological data to draw definitive 
conclusions about disease causation is an oversimplification138 and will lead to 
wrong conclusions. At the same time, it is crucial not to overstate the differences 
between law and science. As Soar notes, despite the number of divergences, the 
law is no stranger to scientific inquiry: science, like the law, has its own 
philosophy, and lawyers use scientific notions and theories in everyday legal 
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practice.139 Wilson140 points out that what a criminal investigator does is not 
very different to the process of scientific fact-finding: investigators, he observes, 
form a subjective hypothesis determining how to progress a crime scene, and, 
like in science, may not know how partial their evidence is, or what evidence is 
missing. Trials require subjective judgment, and evaluating subjective 
probability is simply what scientists call the Bayesian approach. At the same 
time, cautions Wilson, even subjective investigations must be rational, and can 
be aided by research and inductive logic- all of which can only suggest, but never 
ensure truth.141 While experimentation is the scientific ideal, there are many 
cases where it is simply not available, be it for pragmatic, economic or ethical 
reasons, and recourse to pure observation becomes a pragmatic necessity.142 
Most knowledge about disease causation rests, therefore, on observational data, 
as experimentation involving deliberate administration of suspected disease-
causing agents to assess causal links is clearly impossible. The question that 
requires closer examination is not which is the more superior form of evidence, 
but the oft-repeated claim that epidemiological or general evidence is never 
sufficient to establish specific causation:143 for, as authors such as Broadbent ask, 
does epidemiological evidence have a role to play in the assessment of specific 
causation when it is the only evidence we have to prove causation?144 
 
This thesis will seek to illustrate that it does. 
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CHAPTER 2 
SCIENCE AND THE LAW: THE LEGAL MYTH OF SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY 
 
Causal inference about disease is only a special case of the more general process 
of scientific reasoning.145 One of the main propositions of this thesis is that the 
problematic legal approach to medical and epidemiological evidence in disease 
causation disputes does not occur in a vacuum, but is symptomatic of broader 
misconceptions the law holds about science. Amongst the most pernicious of these 
misconceptions for disease litigation, in the view of this author, is the legal myth of 
scientific certainty. Many lawyers appear to view the ideal science as a deterministic 
inquiry that must provide certainty to the legal question. The myth of scientific 
certainty, it is contended, is particularly important in this context because it has 
caused epidemiology to be devalued in UK law for its perceived epistemic 
deficiencies, due to its overtly probabilistic evidence about specific causation, as we 
saw earlier in Chapter 1. Observational epidemiologists, as Rothman et al note, 146 
often face the criticism that proof is impossible in epidemiology, and that 
epidemiologic causal relations are only suggestive. This view seems to reflect an idea 
that proof is possible in other sciences. Unfortunately, they point out, causal relations 
derived from other methodologies such as experimentation are also only suggestive, 
as we shall see later in Chapter 5 (section 2.1).  
 
The law tends to take a deterministic view of the world: it operates under the 
assumption that there are fixed, universal laws of nature, and that all events have 
clear, linear causal mechanisms. Thus, in the legal view, ‘good science’ should ideally 
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be able to uncover these fixed laws, and provide a clear, certain answer to questions. 
In fact, science is a much more probabilistic and uncertain enquiry than lawyers 
believe. It is vital for lawyers to recognise that all scientific inference is probabilistic, 
including in disciplines such as physics, medicine and forensic sciences: fields which 
often tend to find much more favour with the law, due to inflated perceptions about 
their ‘conclusive’ nature. This is tragic, because honesty about the uncertainty in 
one’s conclusions may actually be a characteristic of better science, as Berger and 
Solan point out: ‘Junk science has no place in the legal system. But when a scientist 
says, "I'm not sure, but the data are suggestive," the scientist's words are not 
necessarily a telltale sign of junk science. On the contrary, they may be a sign that 
real science is occurring. The Supreme Court's Daubert trilogy appears to have 
allowed the continuation of junk science, while denying individuals their day in court 
when their proof includes real science at a state of incomplete knowledge. The 
solution, we believe, must lie in the legal system, judges and lawyers alike, 
recognising what it means to be a gatekeeper with respect to scientific truth. And that, 
in turn, requires the legal system to come to understand just what it is that scientists 
do.’147  
 
This chapter is an attempt to help clarify to lawyers what scientists do. It explores the 
wider issues surrounding the law-science divide as they touch upon the factual causal 
assessment in disease litigation. It will examine how scientists make inferences; with 
the ultimate aim of helping lawyers attain a clearer understanding about how to apply 
scientific evidence in disease causation disputes. The focus of the discussion about 
science here is therefore on the epistemic and methodological aspects of the scientific 
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inquiry rather than on the history or metaphysical aspects of science, as much of the 
judicial confusion around epidemiological evidence in the UK centres on epistemic 
concerns (as noted earlier in Chapter 1). Scientists use a range of reasoning strategies, 
but courts have a somewhat hazy understanding of the purpose or strengths and 
deficiencies of these. Thus the law tends to apply rigid and over-simplified rules to 
assess scientific evidence, which leads to various legal errors.  
 
Scientific inference is, this chapter argues, ultimately not very different from 
ordinary, or ‘common-sense’ inference: this is a term that many courts and judges 
express approval of in explaining their approach to causation, as we shall see later in 
Chapter 3 (section 1). The law however, usually employs this term in order to justify 
largely subjective decisions about causation. In science, on the other hand, the term 
means something different, and is much more than ‘common sense’ as judges use the 
term. As the eminent philosopher of science Karl Popper explains, although scientific 
knowledge is the result of the growth of common sense knowledge, it is at the same 
time an enlargement of common sense: it attempts to go beyond, or get rid of, what 
Popper calls the “pseudo-psychological or subjective method of the new way of 
ideas.”148 Science is, as Popper puts it, ‘common sense writ large.’149  
 
Section 1 will examine the differences between law and science in their approach to 
proof, knowledge and certainty: differing perspectives that come even sharply into 
contrast when science is relied upon to answer factual disputes in litigation.150  
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Subsection 1 will highlight that these misconceptions have led to failure to correctly 
assess and apply scientific (particularly epidemiological) evidence to questions of 
disease causation. The legal view of the certainty as the ideal of knowledge is out of 
step with current scientific understanding about the world. Such misconceptions have 
led to differences in legal regard for what the law sometimes calls ‘hard sciences’ and 
‘soft sciences’. Hard sciences include disciplines such as physics, chemistry and 
biology/medicine, which are seen as certain, and therefore as highly valued and 
epistemically valid. Disciplines such as epidemiology appear to be categorised within 
UK judicial systems as ‘soft sciences’, which are treated as less valid and valuable. 
Subsection 1.3 of this chapter will explore ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences, and will find the 
differences between them are much less marked today than when this terminology 
first originated around 200 years ago. It will illustrate this by examining two 
disciplines that are particularly valued in the law for their perceived “hardness”: 
physics and medicine. Science as a whole, even in disciplines such as physics that 
were once perceived to be highly deterministic, is moving towards realisation of 
fundamental, insurmountable uncertainties. It is now imperative for lawyers to grasp 
how use and apply probabilistic reasoning and evidence.  
 
Section 2 will explore the legal errors that have resulted from this myth of scientific 
certainty. This thesis argues that this myth of ‘good science as certain’ has led to 
erroneous applications of epidemiological evidence (Chapters 1 & 5), as well as to the 
adoption of unrealistic and simplistic tests for factual causation in complex disease 
litigation (Chapters 3 and 4). This chapter will first examine the impact of this myth 
about science more broadly in the law. Misconceptions about science have wide legal 
ramifications, and lead to a range of errors, across different branches of the law, and 
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across jurisdictions. It has caused courts to discriminate between different scientific 
disciplines, and to accord different value to different sciences, depending on the 
extent to which they are seen to provide certainty. Given that all sciences are 
probabilistic and have potential for error, this inevitably leads to legal errors. Such 
errors can occur both when scientific evidence is over-valued, and becomes the 
defining factor for a legal decision, as much as when it is undervalued and 
underutilised, leading to unacceptably subjective decision-making, as the discussion 
of the dichotomy between approaches in civil and criminal law (subsection 2.1) will 
show. 
 
Section 3 then explains how scientists make inferences. It begins by exploring some 
philosophies of science, and the role of inductive and deductive reasoning. It 
concludes that there is no universal philosophy of science, but that one unifying 
characteristic of science appears to be the probabilistic nature of scientific reasoning. 
It then examines the reasoning strategies that scientists actually use to make 
inferences from evidence. In particular, this chapter seeks to demystify the process of 
scientific reasoning, and illustrates why scientific inference ultimately rests on 
‘common-sense reasoning’. However, this term in science has a significance that the 
law fails to appreciate. Most importantly, scientists proceed on the basis that common 
sense reasoning is that which is guided by verifiable facts and evidence, subjected to 
scrutiny, and rigorously justified. The law could usefully learn from this approach. In 
the absence of such rigorous justification, ‘common sense’ can easily become no 
more than personal hunches and intuition. There are numerous examples of this 
occurring in the law. One example is the legal approach to factual causation in 
complex disease litigation, as we shall see later in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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In focusing on legal misconceptions about science, this thesis does not, however, 
suggest that all problems lie entirely on the part of the law. Scientists who provide 
expert testimony also need to improve their understanding about how legal questions 
differ from scientific study, and about the differing goals of the law. Further, 
scientific experts need to be more transparent in courtroom situations about the 
limitations of their evidence and expertise. These will be explored briefly in section 2 
of this chapter, and again in Chapter 5 (section 3.4). 
 
SECTION 1: The law-science divide  
 
The exponential pace of scientific and technological advances means that courts 
increasingly have to examine scientific evidence to resolve disputes. They are 
required to grapple with complex, and often contradictory, expert testimony, and have 
to make decisions about the relative scientific merits and validity of these. There is no 
denying the scale of the issue, or the growing ‘scientisation' of the factual inquiry’.151  
As Damaska noted in 1997: “Let there be no mistake. As science continues to change 
the social world, great transformations of the factual inquiry lie ahead for all justice 
systems. These transformations of factual inquiry could turn out to be as momentous 
as those that occurred in the twilight of the Middle Ages, when magical forms of 
proof retreated before the prototypes of our present evidentiary technology”.152 
Unfortunately, law and science have tended to approach each other in a rather baffled 
and mistrustful way so far. Their interaction has variously been described as ‘an 
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uncomfortable alliance’153, or as an ‘uneasy relationship’,154 and the erroneous use of 
scientific evidence in courts raises concerns that the legal system may lack the 
necessary knowledge to correctly evaluate such evidence.   
 
A recent academic commentary on the law and science points out that: 
Law and science are entirely separate institutions, with distinct approaches to 
identifying what is important to consider or study, to the methodologies 
brought to bear on those subjects deemed relevant, and to the objectives or 
goals of the entire enterprise. At the same time, these two venerable 
institutions intersect in a multitude of ways. When they do meet, however, 
each does so on its own terms, or… from its own perspective. From the 
scientist’s standpoint, law very often suggests hypotheses of interest or 
permits the application of hypotheses to new and salient contexts. From the 
law’s standpoint, science very often supplies the brute facts integral to legal 
decision making or policy formation or creates new matters that legal doctrine 
must address. In short, when law and science intersect, the two institutions 
continue to maintain their separate methods and objectives, with each eyeing 
the other for its own purposes.155 
 
There are, naturally, many differences between law and science, for they have 
different purposes and goals. The two disciplines differ considerably in the degree of 
certainty with which they are required to formulate their conclusions. The search for 
‘truth’, it is generally agreed, does not serve the same aims for the two disciplines, 
and may not be subject to the same constraints and requirements.156 Haack notes the 
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‘real tensions between the goals and values of scientific enterprise and the culture of 
the law.’157 She cites some salient divergences, for example:  
- science is investigative while the culture of the legal system is adversarial  
- science searches for general principles while the legal focus is on particular 
cases;  
- the scientific enterprise is pervasively ‘fallibilist’ (open to revision in the light 
of new evidence), while the law aims to arrive at prompt and final resolutions;  
- science pushes for innovation while the law focuses on precedent;  
- the aspirations of science are essentially theoretical while the law is inevitably 
oriented to policy; 
- the scientific system is informal, problem-oriented and pragmatic, while the 
legal system relies on formal rules and procedures.  
 
The crucial need is not, of course, for them to be similar (for each discipline has its 
own unique task to perform). The crucial need is only for both disciplines to be able 
to identify a realistic approach to their common task in the courtroom, and to develop 
a shared perspective about achieving this. This reconciliation, however, requires both 
disciplines to at least develop some basic mutual understanding of each other’s goals 
and methods, and to modulate their approach when working together. It is imperative 
for the law to develop a more realistic and sophisticated understanding about science 
and the scientific method. The law needs a clearer realisation that no claim asserted as 
‘scientific’ will have any absolute claim to conclusive certainty, no matter how robust 
the discipline, or how eminent the expert who asserts it. The use of research can 
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usually suggest the truth (to varying degrees of certainty), but cannot ensure truth.158 
At the same time, more accountability must also be required of scientists who act as 
expert witnesses. Juries and courts can find science and statistics very persuasive, and 
this calls for responsible communication on part of scientific experts. It is thus 
crucially important for scientists to be more transparent about the subjectivity in their 
testimony where it exists, and to recognise how the objectives that drive the legal 
enquiry are very different to those that drive scientific enquiry.    
 
1.1 Magnified impact on disease litigation  
 
The differences between science and the law have been particularly prone to cause 
difficulties in disease litigation.159 There has been, over the last few decades, an 
explosion in negligence claims for diseases allegedly caused by toxic substances, and 
establishing causation under existing legal principles has become a fraught and often 
incoherent exercise. The thorny issue of disease causation is one that courts can no 
longer afford to ignore. This frequently requires that scientific (e.g. medical and 
epidemiological) evidence be adduced to aid the causal assessment.  
 
As Justice Jay notes in a recent extrajudicial lecture: 
Most legal problems touching on the world of science in the civil law tend to arise in 
connection with medical and related issues, by which I mean issues which touch on 
the human body and mind. We lawyers are in the business not of proving the theory of 
evolution…but in arguing about and deciding whether a claimant’s personal injuries 
should be compensated in a court of law. It is in the rough and tumble of this work 
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that the law often has to rely heavily on scientific opinion, and in doing so needs to 
understand its methodology, the evidence it uses, and the standards it typically 
applies.160 
 
The specific scientific issues and complexities surrounding disease causation will be 
explored in greater detail in Chapter 3. However, it is important to note at the outset 
of the discussion about science that disease causation is even more susceptible to 
problematic legal applications of science, because disease causation is one of the most 
uncertain areas of science, and because there is a considerable difference between 
approaches taken towards causation in medicine and in the law.161  
 
1.2: Unrealistic legal expectations from science: 
 
‘…I would suggest that nothing is regarded as proven in science in the sense 
in which that term is understood and deployed in the law… science never rests 
on its laurels; proof in science is elusive as the grapes of Tantalus.’162 
-Justice Jay 
 
“Mention science to lawyers” one commentator notes, “and their minds become 
besieged with chaotic images of schoolroom antics in a Chemistry class on a Friday 
afternoon”.163 Judges on the whole, Faigman believes, have very little training in, 
knowledge of, or inclination to learn science.164 Partly, this divide is a product of the 
law’s unrealistic expectations about the power of science. 
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Byers emphasises that the misconceived illusion of absolute certainty in science has 
had noxious consequences for both societies and individuals.165 The lay understanding 
of science, he notes, is too simplistic and inadequate: it is important to develop a more 
sophisticated understanding of what science is, and what it can and cannot do for 
us.166 The law is no exception. In general, lawyers turn to science in the hope that 
scientists will be able to provide certainty to the legal enquiry, and will be able to 
answer the very black-and-white (and often simplistic) questions the law asks. This is 
problematic because science is intrinsically uncertain, and based on research methods 
that inevitably possess limitations and flaws167 (anyone who has checked a weather 
forecast knows this basic lesson, observes Faigman168). The singling out of 
epidemiology for such judicial criticism, on the grounds that it can never conclusively 
prove causation, suggests a judicial belief that conclusive proof, free of 
methodological and epistemic caveats, is possible in most other scientific disciplines. 
There is a yawning disconnect, argue Dawid et al, between how the law defines 
expert proof and the ability of science validly to supply such proof.169 Yet the law 
continues to  ‘construct legal doctrines, either with utter disregard for what scientists 
might be able to say about the facts relevant to those doctrines, or in light of a folk 
understanding of the science that might bear on those relevant facts.’170 Courts 
regularly, and in the face of contrary evidence, prefer the scientifically naïve view that 
scientific findings are categorical and certain.171 
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Many academic commentators note that while the sciences are familiar and 
comfortable with uncertainties and undetermined aspects of evidence, ‘legal systems 
demonstrate discomfort with uncertainty. The law operates as though there is one 
correct explanation to be discovered.’172 The idealised legal view of science appears 
to operate on the ‘myth of scientific certitude’,173 which refers to the idea that 
scientific disciplines are defined by laws drawn from simple mathematical 
relationships with apparently universal applicability. Broadbent attributes this to a 
phenomenon he terms the ‘long shadow of physics’174: the belief that physics has 
fixed, universal, mathematically precise laws that are capable of explaining and 
predicting all observed physical events. Unfortunately, as section 1.3 below will 
discuss, this illusion of certainty and predictability in the laws of physics has also now 
been shattered by twentieth century discoveries Burk points out: “The law seems to 
exhibit an odd sort of love-hate relationship with matters of complex science: 
although the legal community is reluctant to grapple with the substance of such 
matters, it apparently yearns for the ‘certainty’ that science can provide.”175 
Courtroom situations are particularly designed to exaggerate the mistrust between the 
two disciplines. A report of the National Research Council in the US observes that 
science and technology seek knowledge through an open-ended search for expanded 
understanding, and scientific conclusions are subject to revision, while the law 
demands definite findings of fact at given points in time. However, as the report 
points out, ‘when the two disciplines encounter each other in the courtroom, the 
differences between them are magnified. The legal tradition of adversarial 
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proceedings necessarily contrasts with the generally more ‘co-operative ethic of 
science.’176 Scientists tend to express their conclusions much more tentatively than 
lawyers want them to. This can cause much mutual frustration in courtrooms: for 
scientists (when, for example, they are pushed to frame their evidence in ways that 
they do not fit with the science), and for lawyers (when scientists do not provide the 
unambiguous, black-and-white answers the law wants, and thinks they can 
provide).177 The reasons behind this scientific urge to identify flaws in the data will be 
re-visited in section 3, when we discuss the philosophy of science, particularly the 
influence of Popper’s view of ‘falsification’ as the goal of scientific thinking (section 
3.2.2). 
 
There are signs that the law may be starting, at long last, to recognise this problem. In 
his recent thoughtful Richard Davies QC Memorial Lecture about the problems in the 
legal application of scientific evidence, Justice Robert Jay concedes that the law ‘may 
be based on a deterministic view of the natural world.’178 Many members of the 
judiciary, Justice Jay acknowledges, believe that science deals in the currency of 
objective, irrefutable proof.179 This leads to the idealised view of science as a 
discipline that is able to provide fixed and conclusive findings, and the value attached 
to different forms of scientific testimony depends on the extent to which they are able 
to conform to this idealised view.    
 
This has led to false dichotomies about science in legal minds, reflected in a tendency 
to either over-value or devalue evidence from different disciplines. Some sciences 
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that use laboratory and/or ’gold-standard’ randomised control methods (often referred 
to as ‘hard’ sciences, such physics, chemistry, and biology/biomedical research) are 
effectively treated as certain and conclusive. In contrast, evidence from other sciences 
that do not formulate universal laws or use laboratory-based methods has little value 
in the eyes of the law. UK courts often point to the probabilistic reasoning of 
epidemiological evidence as proof of its lack of epistemic validity and reliability.180  
The devaluation of epidemiology reflects the judicial belief that proof absolute is 
possible in other sciences: an idea derived from the perceived determinism of sciences 
such as physics. 
 
Determinism is founded on the outdated belief that there is, as Professor Hawking 
puts it, ‘a one to one correspondence between initial states and final states’181: if you 
know the state of the universe at some time in the past, you can predict it in the future; 
and if you know its state in the future, you can calculate what it must have been in the 
past.’ However, as scientific discovery expands, scientists themselves are beginning 
to question this archaic distinction between hard and soft sciences.182  As ‘hard’ 
sciences become more uncertain about ideas they once thought established beyond 
doubt, and as ‘soft’ sciences’ get better at using more rigorous scientific methods, all 
sciences appear to be converging towards probabilistic models of reality. Physicists 
are encountering evidence suggesting that even events in the physical world cannot be 
fully measured or predicted due to significant unknown, random, or untestable 
variables. Newer discoveries, and modern research, rather than removing 
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uncertainties, appears to be increasing them. Probabilistic reasoning appears to be an 
increasingly universal aspect of all sciences.  
 
It appears that epidemiology, for UK courts, falls within the second category, with 
frequent judicial references to its lack of experimental methodology, and the fact that 
it only studies populations and the mistaken view that it deals only in ‘naked 
statistics.’183 But do the ‘hard’ sciences do better at providing the security and 
certainty that the law appears to yearn for? We explore, as an example, the field of 
physics. Later, in chapters 3 (section 2) and 5 (section 4.2), we will also examine 
certainty in the field of medicine (as courts usually tend to view both physics and 
biomedicine as ‘hard’ sciences), in order to explore this question. 
 
1.3 Hard and soft sciences: the ‘long shadow’184 of physics 
 
God does not play dice (with the universe). 
-Albert Einstein, c. 1944 
 
Not only does God definitely play dice, but He sometimes confuses us by throwing 
them where they can’t be seen.185 
 
-Stephen Hawking, 1999 
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This distinction between hard and soft sciences arose around 200 years ago from the 
world of science, initially as a way of distinguishing between natural and social 
sciences. The traditional underlying assumption at the time was that sciences are 
arranged in a hierarchy, with developed natural sciences such as physics at the top, 
and social sciences such as sociology at the bottom.186 The traditional belief is that 
hard sciences are characterised by rigour and objectivity, in contrast to soft sciences.  
 
There are, of course, differences between the many different disciplines that call 
themselves ‘science’. Some fields of science are more advanced or “mature,” and 
others so undeveloped and speculative that one would ‘hesitate to call them sciences” 
at all’.187 Examples of disciplines that are frequently accused of masquerading as 
‘sciences’ on the basis of no or unacceptably weak evidence include homeopathy and 
chiropractic.188 This thesis does not suggest that all assertions that call themselves 
‘scientific’ should be accorded equal weight: quite the contrary. Nuance and a critical 
approach is crucial when assessing scientific evidence. This author only argues that 
the assessment of science should be based on more accurate criteria, which is only 
possible if lawyers have a more accurate understanding of science and its methods. It 
is dangerous, it is submitted, to value sciences depending on how much they promise 
certainty: such promises often turn out to be either illusory, or, more rarely, 
disingenuous.  
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As Haack189 points out, the core business of science is inquiry: and scientific inquiry 
is tentative and fallibilist. Its core values are intellectual honesty and willingness to 
share evidence; and its procedures are problem-oriented and pragmatic. Thus any 
attempt to assess the extent to which a discipline is ‘scientific’ must, most 
importantly, examine the extent to which it adheres to these principles. The short-
sighted hierarchy of sciences based on certainty fails to take account of 
ins7urmountable differences that arise due to the nature of the subject matter 
examined by different sciences. It is time for the law to abandon outdated and 
superficial criteria when assessing scientific disciplines, such as whether the 
discipline formulates mathematical laws or whether its conclusions were tested in a 
laboratory, and to develop a more sophisticated understanding of what constitutes 
‘good’ science.  There are many complex reasons why experimental, laboratory 
methods are more appropriate for some sciences (such as physics) than for others 
(such as epidemiology): reasons that have little to do with lack of objectivity or 
robustness. 
 
The legal tendency to sometimes devalue evidence from so-called soft sciences is 
based in poor understanding of their epistemic value as well as of the inherent 
limitations of different fields of study. Even if we were to accept that physics offers 
universal, irrevocable laws, most sciences apart from physics do not study fixed states 
of matter in the physical world, and it is thus unfair to measure the worth of sciences 
which study more diverse and dynamic systems in the currency of ‘certainty’ and 
‘determinism’. How, for example, can the incredible variability and complexity of 
human behavior ever be captured within fixed, predictable laws and proven 
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conclusively in a laboratory in the same way that the velocity of a pebble can be 
demonstrated to be dependent on its mass? Rosenberg similarly points out that the 
science of biology studies much more complex, adaptable and diverse living systems, 
and despite many efforts by biologists in the early days of scientific determinism it 
has proved impossible to identify universal, irrevocable biological laws similar to 
Newtonian physical laws.190  
 
Further, scientists themselves are increasingly beginning to question this hierarchy, as 
greater doubt creeps in about the certainty and stability of the ‘hard’ sciences, and 
social sciences examine their theories with increasing rigour and better 
methodologies.191  The law, however, remains rather spellbound by this hierarchy, 
and continues to operate on a binary view of the scientific world. Lawyers often tend 
to view different disciplines as belonging to one camp or the other (soft or hard), 
rather than on a continuum.192 American courts indicated in Frye,193 for example, that 
the admissibility test for scientific evidence only applied to hard sciences (a rule 
which held until Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc 194 subsequently 
clarified that the definition of science covers both categories of sciences).  
 
Newton’s discovery of laws of motion in 1687, first published in the Principia 
Mathematica, stated that the motion of all objects was governed by a small number of 
simple, mathematically expressible and perfectly exceptionless laws.195 These laws 
were deterministic: given the position of the planets at any one time at all, the 
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physicist could calculate their position at any past time and any future time.196  
Newton’s theory, which viewed that space and time are absolute, laid the foundations 
for the idea, first articulated by the French scientist Laplace, that science was a fixed, 
deterministic inquiry: scientific determinism became an achievable goal for a period. 
This idea, as Professor Stephen Hawking points out, remained the official dogma 
throughout the 19th century.197  
 
However, twentieth century developments in physics and the mathematics, such as the 
discoveries of quantum mechanics, have shaken these Newtonian beliefs. The 
formulation of Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle,198 published in 1926, first pointed 
out that it is impossible to accurately measure both the position and the speed of a 
particle: an insurmountable obstacle to being able to fully measure and predict the 
natural world. If the Uncertainty Principle set limits on how much it was possible for 
scientists to know even about the present state of the world let alone about the 
future199, this uncertainty was compounded several times by the subsequent, more 
recent discovery of black holes.200  Professor Hawking describes the impact of the 
discovery of black holes on determinism: ‘even this limited predictability 
disappeared, when the effects of black holes were taken into account. The loss of 
particles and information down black holes meant that the particles that came out 
were random. One could calculate probabilities, but one could not make any definite 
predictions.’  
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These twentieth century discoveries now establish that at the level of sub-atomic 
matter , there are no universal or exceptionless laws. The laws seem to be inescapably 
indeterministic so that ‘we appear to be fundamentally forbidden from deriving 
detailed specific predictions about all molecular and supramolecular events.’201 This 
indeterminism is not limited just to physics. Byers202 uses the physiological blind spot 
from biology as a metaphor to demonstrate how our knowledge is necessarily always 
incomplete, as all perception is ultimately filtered through human brain and human 
senses. The blind spot refers to the place in the visual field that corresponds to the 
lack of light-detecting photoreceptor cells on the optic disc of the retina where the 
optic nerve passes through it. Since there are no cells to detect light on the optic disc, 
explaines Byers, a part of the field of vision is not normally perceived, but the brain 
fills in with surrounding detail and with information from the other eye, so that we are 
unaware of the blind spot: ‘It seems incredible to us that our perception is incomplete 
in this way, and goes against our conviction that the world we perceive is coherent 
and complete.’ 
 
Rosenberg points out that these recent discoveries suggest a conclusion even beyond 
simply stating that we cannot things with certainty: discoveries in quantum mechanics 
are leading physicists to the idea that, ‘at the fundamental level, the principle of same 
cause, same effect, is invariably violated.’203 Sir Stephen Hawking sums up the 
essential uncertainty of the scientific quest, and the futility of the yearning for 
conclusive proof in science:   
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‘It seems that even God is bound by the Uncertainty Principle, and cannot know both 
the position, and the speed, of a particle. So God does play dice with the universe. All 
the evidence points to Him being an inveterate gambler, who throws the dice on every 
possible occasion… Thus, the future of the universe is not completely determined by 
the laws of science, and its present state, as Laplace thought. God still has a few 
tricks up his sleeve.’204  
 
It is time, perhaps, to let the sun set on the ‘long shadow’ of physics. 
 
1.4 The implications for disease causation 
 
Developments in the sciences are often interconnected, and thus events in the world 
of physics have import for our discussion about scientific evidence about disease 
causation. Rosenberg points out, for example, that the relatively brief spectre of 
scientific determinism of Newtonian mechanics for a while raised the specter of 
determinism in human behavior and biology as well.205 Biological scientists, during 
the heydeys of scientific determinism, studied the hypothesis that the brain and 
humans are no more than complex collections of molecules or matter: aiming to 
identify how these ‘collections’ might behave in accordance with self-same laws.206 
However, the realm of the biological proved to be beyond the reach of the physical, 
and beyond the reach of Newtonian determinism: biological systems display a level of 
complexity, diversity and adaptation207 that makes it impossible to identify fixed, 
universal laws that govern their operation.  
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The judicial reluctance to accept that epidemiological findings can be good, if 
probabilistic, evidence for specific causation seems rooted in the belief that a ‘good’ 
science is one that can offer certain, unequivocal answers. However, as the above 
section has argued, the more science progresses, the further it appears to be moving 
away from such ideas of certainty and proof: probabilistic models seem here to stay, 
at least for the conceivable future. This is even more important in disease causation, 
where the chances of identifying causal relationships that are certain and linear is 
even more remote than in physics. If this goal of ‘same cause, same effect’ is now no 
longer even believed to be true in physics, then to expect to find such laws in 
biological realms, with their incredible ‘complexity, diversity and adaptation’, as 
noted earlier, is a doomed quest.  
 
SECTION 2: Legal errors stemming from myths of scientific certainty: extreme 
attitudes towards scientific evidence  
 
This thesis argues that the legal failure to recognise the probabilism inherent in almost 
all sciences has led to unfair scepticism towards epidemiological evidence, on the 
grounds that it cannot provide certainty about specific causation. The attitude towards 
epidemiology is in stark contrast with the uncritical acceptance accorded to many 
other forms of scientific testimony in other legal contexts. The use of forensic 
evidence in criminal law is an example.  
 
The absurd result of this dichotomous judicial attitude is that probabilistic evidence 
from epidemiology, which is much more transparent about its limitations and error 
rates, is rejected in civil litigation, which imposes a lower burden of proof (i.e., proof 
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on the balance of probabilities). On the other hand, subjective forensic evidence such 
as fingerprint and eyewitness testimony is given an inflated role in decision-making in 
criminal trials, which impose a higher standard of proof (i.e. beyond reasonable 
doubt). Judicial attitudes towards science can fluctuate between extremes of excessive 
deference towards scientific findings or complete dismissal of their validity for legal 
purposes. Both extremes can lead to errors, and the case of R v Sally Clark208 
(discussed in section 2.2 below) illustrates the tragic consequences of this. 
 
The dichotomy towards scientific evidence in UK law is analogous to Haack’s 
analysis of the misconceptions about science. Professor Haack209 classifies confusions 
about the capabilities of science into two types, which she terms the ‘scientistic’ and 
the ‘anti-scientific’ approaches: the former refers to a tendency to display an 
‘exaggerated deference towards science’ and an ‘excessive readiness to accept as 
authoritative’ any claim made by the sciences, while the anti-scientific view is 
characterized by an exaggerated kind of suspicion of science, ‘an excessive readiness 
to accept every kind of criticism of science and its practitioners as undermining its 
pretensions to tell us how the world is.’  
 
The contrast between the near-hostile judicial approach towards epidemiology in UK 
civil law (on the grounds that such evidence is subject to limitations), and the over-
valuation of forensic testimony to secure convictions in criminal law (despite its 
limitations) is visible evidence of this.  An associated problem is that courts are often 
unduly swayed by the perceived status of the ‘expert’, and the confidence with which 
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they state their assertions, rather than the scientific merit of their claim.210 Complete 
and uncritical acceptance of any evidence convincingly presented by an eminent 
expert (especially a medical expert)211 can cause scientific and statistical testimony to 
be given far too much weight in legal decision-making.  
 
Section 2.1: The dichotomous attitudes towards scientific evidence in civil 
and criminal law: 
 
The problems and errors in the legal applications of forensic scientific testimony are 
particularly well documented, both in the UK and in other jurisdictions such as the 
US.212 The increasing use of scientific evidence in fact-finding poses a challenge to 
the traditional principles, procedures and evidentiary rules of the criminal trial.213 
Concerns are expressed repeatedly about the miscarriages of justice that may have 
resulted from the lack of legal concern about the subjectivity inherent in many forms 
of forensic testimony.214 The U.S. National Institute of Justice notes that ‘several of 
the forensic sciences (such as handwriting analysis, fingerprints, firearms 
identification, bite marks, microscopic hair comparisons, and voiceprints) (have a) 
purported lack of a convincing scientific foundation...’215  
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However, this message appears to have been slow to have filter through to English 
law, where latent fingerprint evidence, for example, is routinely presented, against the 
best scientific advice, as positive identification.216 Many straightforward accident 
claims’ concurs Justice Jay, ‘are resolved solely on the basis of eyewitness evidence, 
which is almost always flawed because human memory is so unreliable. No one 
would claim this resolution to be scientific.’217  
 
Commentators repeatedly point out the unfair bias towards forensic scientific 
testimony. Edmond notes, for example, that in contrast to courts’ rejection of expert 
opinion on many other matters such as psychology, they have been highly receptive to 
the incriminating opinions of forensic analysts.218 He questions whether conventional 
admissibility standards, even in conjunction with trial safeguards, provide jurors and 
judges with the kinds of information required to rationally assess much of the 
incriminating expert opinion evidence routinely presented in criminal proceedings.219  
 
Heffernan and Coen220 raise concerns that even though scientific evidence is seen as a 
bulwark against traditional causes of miscarriage of justice such as fabricated 
testimony and coerced confessions, courts may have failed to spot that it is not 
infalliable: a failure that has ironically led to its own miscarriages of justice. 
Examples abound about the tendency to secure convictions in criminal law, without 
any recognition of the subjectivity of such evidence. In R v Dallagher,221 for example, 
an appellant was convicted for murder, a decision that was substantially based on the 
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relatively new technique of ear-print evidence. This decision was subsequently 
quashed because fresh evidence raised doubts about the validity of ear-printing as a 
forensic scientific technique. Heffernan and Coen222 cite high-profile cases such as 
Sally Clark (discussed in more detail in section 2.2 below) and Barry George223 as 
other examples.    
 
There are signs that courts are more recently beginning to pay more heed to this 
problem (as seen, for example, R v T, 224 where the Court of Appeal addressed 
questions of how forensic scientists and other expert witnesses should present their 
evidence in court, and what kinds and quality of data experts can properly draw on in 
formulating their conclusions). Redmayne, Roberts et al.225 see this judicial 
willingness to subject the expert evidence adduced in criminal litigation to searching 
scrutiny as commendable; despite the fact that the Courts’ reasoning about the 
statistical issues was substantively flawed and erroneous (in their view). However, 
this does not go far enough, and Edmond in a recent article observes that where 
forensic analysts are believed to possess special skills, aptitude or experience they are 
almost always allowed to testify.226.  
 
The case of R v Sally Clark (discussed below, section 2.2) is a tragic reminder of the 
seriousness of the issue, and the severity of the consequences of this ‘laissez-faire’227 
approach to scientific evidence in forensic trials.    
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Section 2.2 Over-valuing or devaluing testimony due to expert ‘status’   
 
Another consequence of the poor understanding about science is that courts can be 
excessively swayed by the perceived status and confidence of the expert. Reliability 
tends to be inferred from the relatively basic showing by the proponent of the 
evidence that the witness is a qualified expert.228 Courts also sometimes fail to 
differentiate between different scientific fields, and the limits of expert competence. 
Wilson points out a number of cases where higher academic qualifications in one 
discipline may permit admission of testimony in another discipline.229 Cases such as R 
v Robb,230 where an expert’s qualifications in modern languages was seen as 
sufficient to admit testimony from him in the field of phonetics; and R v Doheny,231 
where the prosecution was permitted to admit scientists to address both the biological 
and mathematical aspects of DNA evidence. 
 
Recognition of a field, Edmond points out, often operates as a proxy for a more 
informative inquiry into the value of techniques and opinions, a phenomenon which in 
Edmonds’ view, usually favours forensic scientists.232 The judicial bias towards 
clinical medicine is another example of this. Testimony from medical practitioners 
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seems to be particularly impressive to courts. This occurs even when practitioners 
make claims outside their area of expertise or without clarifying how they arrived at 
their conclusions, as may be recalled from the discussion of Novartis233 in Chapter 1 
(section 1), where courts preferred the doctor’s testimony over that of the 
epidemiologist, even though the issue fell directly within the specialism of the latter. 
The same phenomenon also led to errors in R v Sally Clark, discussed below. 
 
R v Sally Clark234 is a disturbing example of the potentially devastating consequences 
of uncritical over-valuation of scientific evidence presented by ‘eminent’ experts. The 
defendant in this case, who had lost two children in early infancy through sudden and 
unknown means, was accused of having murdered them. The prosecution’s case relied 
significantly (though not exclusively) on the testimony of Professor Roy Meadows, a 
distinguished paediatrician. Having wrongly dismissed the relevance of genetic and 
environmental factors to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), he estimated the 
likelihood of two sudden infant deaths in the same family as one in 73 million, an 
eventuality likely to occur, he testified, about once in every 100 years and further 
equated the likelihood to backing a long-odds outsider at the Grand National. Mrs 
Clark was convicted of murder and imprisoned, partially on the basis of this 
testimony. However, her conviction was quashed a few years later partly because of 
new evidence about natural causes that could explain the infants’ deaths: evidence 
that had been withheld from the jury by the expert witness pathologist. Further, the 
Court of Appeal found the statistical methods and language used by Dr Meadows in 
his testimony to be questionable (he was, as mentioned, a paediatrician, not a 
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statistician). The Court of Appeal opined that the 1 in 73 million figure was grossly 
overstated;235 and further that Professor Meadows’ ‘graphic reference’ to long odds 
winners at the Grand National was likely to have had a major impact on the minds of 
the jury. This case is now widely cited as an instance where an expert breached the 
duties both to give ‘objective unbiased opinion’ and to testify only in relation to 
‘matters within his expertise’236. The defendant, tragically, never recovered from the 
experience, developing serious psychiatric problems and alcohol dependency after her 
release from prison, and died in 2007 from alcohol poisoning. 
Heffernan and Coen237 contrast Clark with R v Cannings,238 also involving sudden 
infant deaths, in which a different kind of flaw rendered the evidence untrustworthy. 
The decision of the Court of Appeal to quash the appellant's convictions for the 
murder of her two infant sons was based largely on fresh evidence which suggested 
that multiple sudden infant deaths within the same family could be caused by genetic 
factors, a conclusion distinctly at odds with the prevailing expert opinion at trial that 
the likelihood of murder increased exponentially with the number of deaths within the 
same family. The Court of Appeal was at pains to stress that the experts had testified 
in good faith but acknowledged that on the subject of unexplained infant deaths, ‘we 
are still at the frontiers of knowledge’239 with the consequence that ‘what was 
confidently presented to the jury as virtually overwhelming expert evidence providing 
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the necessary proof that [the infant boys'] deaths resulted from the infliction of 
deliberate harm, should now be approached with a degree of healthy scepticism.’240 
 
 
Section 2.3: Failure to distinguish between fact and opinion testimony 
 
A further error that frequently arises in legal contexts is the failure to distinguish 
between factual expert evidence, and more speculative expert opinion. Scientific 
inference (as section 3, below, will discuss) almost always involves some degree of 
interpretation from evidence. However, the crucial qualification for an assertion to be 
called scientific is that it should based on unbiased empirical evidence: it is this that 
gives science validity and justificatory power. Unfortunately, scientific expert 
witnesses (particularly within an adversarial judicial system) can sometimes succumb 
to pressure to testify to conclusions that are poorly validated by any actual evidence, 
especially when it comes to ‘specific’ conclusions about the case at hand. In such 
circumstances, assertions (for example, about specific causation) become no more 
than dangerously subjective opinion: dangerous particularly because they masquerade 
as ‘scientific’ fact. The Law Commission published a consultation paper on this issue 
in 2009,241 recommending an overhaul of the law in this area, and identifying the 
issue as ‘a real, ongoing problem which demands an urgent solution.’242 The Law 
Commission Report that followed243 notes that the common law approach to the 
                                                        
240 ibid [156] 
241
 Law Commission, The Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and 
Wales: A New Approach to the Determination of Evidentiary Reliability (Law Com No 190, 2009) 
242 Edmond, ‘Legal versus Non-Legal..’ (n 66) 4-5 
243 Law Commission, Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales (Law Com No 
 87 
admissibility of expert opinion evidence is one of laissez-faire,244 with such evidence 
being admitted without sufficient regard to whether or not it is sufficiently reliable to 
be considered by a jury. This, the Law Commission points out, is particularly 
concerning where the evidence is presented as scientific, and thus more likely to be 
readily accepted.245  
 
The legal demand for ‘individualistic’ evidence causes this problem to arise 
frequently in disease litigation. The unfortunate judicial tendency to draw watertight 
distinctions between ‘general’ evidence drawn from populations studies and ‘specific’ 
evidence about the individual case leads to pressure on experts to pass off as scientific 
speculative assertions about the specific claimant, even where the only real evidence 
available is general, as ‘scientific’ testimony. (This is, in fact, one of most significant 
reasons that epidemiology has been devalued in UK law, as outlined in Chapter 1. 
The law has tended to discount ‘general’ evidence about causation offered by 
epidemiology, as it is not specific evidence about the claimant. Courts fail to 
recognise, however, that assertions about specific causation made by clinicians are 
often no more than the clinicain’s personal opinion, which are (ironically) evidentially 
backed only by the same ‘general’ evidence the court rejected as insufficient when 
proffered by an epidemiologist. Chapter 5 (section 2.2) will return to this issue of 
general and specific evidence, and will analyse why this odd legal view that the two 
forms of evidence are entirely disconnected is scientifically naïve and misconceived.   
 
The lack of ‘fit’ between lawyers’ expectations from science and what science can 
realistically deliver adds to the danger that courts may, in fact, be privileging the less 
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valid and reliable forms of testimony. Haack246 cautions that the adversarial character 
of the legal system tends to draw in as witnesses scientists who are ‘marginal’, i.e., 
more willing than most of their colleagues to give an opinion on the basis of less-
than-overwhelming evidence. Moreover, ‘the more often he serves as an expert 
witness, the more unbudgeably (sic) confident a scientist may become in his 
opinion.’247 A legal system that views certainty as a yardstick to measure the 
probative value of evidence, can very easily end up valuing confidently asserted 
(albeit less scientifically honest) testimony more than scientifically honest and 
reliable, but cautiously phrased testimony.   
 
Faigman et al248 cite the American case of Zamora v. State249 to illustrate 
misconceptions about science, and this case provides a useful illustration of our point. 
Here, a defendant under trial for murder attempted to plead the insanity defence, 
contending that he had killed as a result of ‘involuntary subliminal television 
intoxication’. This claim was based on the defence argument that television had a 
noxious effect on sociopathic children. To support this argument, the defence offered 
two experts. One, a psychologist, wanted to present robust research evidence about 
the effects of television on adolescents generally, while the other, a psychiatrist, 
testified that the specific defendant did not know right from wrong when he 
committed the act. The court preferred the latter psychiatric testimony, but excluded 
the first psychologist’s testimony, on the ground that this was only ‘general’ evidence, 
and was not speak about the specific defendant. The defendant was absolved from 
liability on the basis of the psychiatrist’s testimony. However, the valid general 
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research findings that were being offered by the psychologist constituted, in this case, 
the scientifically more robust form of evidence than the psychiatrist’s personal, 
subjective opinion. Thus, the more enlightened choice would have been to admit the 
first testimony for courts to consider as one factor in their ultimate decision. To accept 
as fact a piece of subjective testimony just because an expert is more willing to speak 
to the legal question, even when this involves speculations that have little backing in 
scientific evidence, can lead to ludicrous and unfair outcomes: especially when this is 
accompanied by rejection of robust evidence just because the expert is honest about 
the limits of their data.  
     
This thesis does not intend to deny the utility of expert opinion altogether. Expert 
opinion, as Cooke stresses, can, under certain circumstances, be a very useful source 
of data. 250 For example, it is frequently the case that there is no or little available 
evidence that maps specifically on to the legal question at hand. Where the only 
option would be subjective decision-making by a court that may have little 
understanding of related issues, it is far better to seek the assistance of an expert who 
is at least able to provide an informed opinion,251 and can extrapolate from what 
evidence is available (although, of course, this should only be used to inform, rather 
than decide, the legal outcome). However, it is not the same as expert knowledge: and 
the consequences of ignoring this distinction may be grave.252  
 
Given that opinion evidence may sometimes be vital to the legal inquiry, it is vital to 
recognise the distinction between fact and opinion, and it assessing how and when it 
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should be used in decision-making. As Cooke puts it, there is merit in asking if there 
are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ ways of using expert opinion evidence, rather than allowing 
great weight to be placed on the uncertain opinion of experts.253 Expert opinion about 
the specific case should only be admitted if it can be validly provided.254  
 
Further, crucially, opinion testimony must be expressed and understood as being what 
it is, rather than be falsely presented as an objective demonstrable fact.  Transparency 
on part of experts is vital to the correct use of expert testimony. Courts must be aware 
that an expert is making a judgment that is based primarily on their own interpretation 
of previous skill and experience, rather than on the basis of any specific evidence. 
However, this can only happen when courts cease to devalue probabilistic scientific 
reasoning, and when they grasp that all scientific conclusions have potential for error. 
Scientific evidence, as Faigman at al point out, should only be considered as one 
‘brick in the wall’255 of proof: it is not the wall. Scientists must be encouraged, rather 
than discouraged, to be transparent about the potential for error in their testimony, so 
that courts can weigh this testimony in a more nuanced fashion. The current legal 
climate tends to devalue expert witnesses and disciplines (epidemiology is an 
example) that are transparent about their error rates, and may unconsciously deter 
experts from being open about the potential for error in their conclusions. Error rates 
do not negate the utility of scientific evidence, but in fact allow more accurate 
assessment of how much weight to accord to it. The empirical uncertainties of factual 
statements, as Faigman asserts, are as important as the statements themselves, and 
should be part of the legal calculus.256  
                                                        
253 ibid  
254 Faigman, ‘Amateur Scientists’ (n 20) 1207-1208 
255 Faigman et al ‘Fitting Science...’ (n 6) 365 
256 Faigman, Constitutional Fictions (n 24) 162 
 91 
 
 
Section 2.4: Erroneous legal criteria for reliability of scientific evidence    
 
Beyond basic studies, Cranor257 raises the concern that courts may not understand the 
critical features of scientific reasoning, which causes them to adopt overly simplistic 
or misconceived indicators of reliability of evidence. This leads to several errors in 
using scientific evidence. One result of this is the tendency to ‘fetishise evidential 
hierarchies’.258 The judicial dismissal of epidemiological evidence about causation on 
the grounds that much of this derives from observation, rather than experimentation is 
an example of the law applying over-simplified ‘scientific’ rules to make evaluations 
of evidence (we will return to discussing the value of epidemiology, and of 
observational methods in greater detail in Chapter 5, section 2.1).  
 
Case studies is another form of evidence that is often disadvantaged in such an 
approach, often causing courts to lose out on valuable supporting evidence for or 
against an inference. As Cranor259 points out, what can make case studies good 
evidence about causation is ‘the analysis to which they are subjected, and the way 
scientists reason about them. Good case studies rest on a principle of diagnostic or 
non-deductive reasoning that is essential to all causal judgments.’ The same is true of 
observational methods, frequently used in epidemiological studies of causation, which 
have tended to be devalued by UK courts. Chapter 5 (section 2.1) will discuss the 
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utility of observational studies to the study of disease causation, and demonstrate why 
the UK judicial dismissal of their value is deeply flawed. 
 
This is related to a broader problem, which is that courts often tend to view or make 
judgments about individual pieces of scientific evidence, rather than viewing it in 
conjunction with the overall evidence. As an academic article co-authored by a 
physician and a legal scholar notes,260 ‘Courts tend to assess separately the reliability 
of each component of the evidence, rather than assessing the reliability of the “totality 
of the evidence” including all relevant clinical factors. In doing so, courts fail to take 
into account the complex inferential process that lies at the heart of clinical medical 
reasoning.’  
 
This is a frequent problem in jurisdictions such as the US, where courts have greater 
jurisdiction over admissibility of scientific evidence under the Daubert guidelines, 
and where relevant supporting pieces of evidence may be excluded from 
consideration altogether, because they were deemed individually inadequate. This 
violates, as Cranor261 notes, an important scientific principle, which is to “never throw 
evidence away” just because it does not provide sufficiently strong support for a 
theory: put together with other supporting relevant information, it can add 
significantly to the weight of the best available evidence. This is especially valuable 
where there would otherwise be no other evidence with which to tackle a question. 
This points to an ongoing legal failure to fully understand the process of scientific 
reasoning, which may be even more prevalent in UK courts, with the continued lack 
of clear guidance or direction to courts about reliability and admissibility issues.  
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SECTION 3: How scientists make inferences: scientific reasoning 
      
The importance of science in today’s world, and the regard it holds in modern society, 
cannot be overstated. Science's centrality to society's welfare marked the twentieth 
century, both in terms of posing dire threats and promising salvation, and this trend is 
likely to expand geometrically in the century ahead.262 To describe any claim as 
‘scientific’ instantly enhances its credibility and respectability. Science is what we use 
to understand the world and to understand ourselves.263 Science has come to define, in 
many people’s minds, ‘what is real and what is true’.264 However, it is important to 
remember that science has no absolute monopoly over ‘truth’. As scientists will be 
first to point out, ‘science is not a creed. It was not revealed to man by a superior 
deity. Science is a product of the human brain, and as such, it is always open to 
discussion and possible revision… It represents a logical summary of human 
knowledge, based on human observation and experience, both of which are always of 
limited range and finite accuracy.’265   
 
The belief in scientific certainty, Byers notes, has two aspects: first, the belief that a 
state of objective certainty exists and second, that scientific activities are methods 
through which this state can be accessed.266 The preceding sections of this chapter 
examined both these ideas, and illustrated that not only is science in its present state 
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unable to access or measure all variables with complete certainty, but also, further, 
that there are now increasingly fundamental doubts about the existence of absolutely 
fixed, irrevocable, universal laws of nature. 
 
Although this may sound disappointing to lawyers, this lack of certainty is not a fatal 
flaw for a scientist. Science is, ultimately, a methodical attempt to understand, 
quantify, reduce, or manage this uncertainty. Despite uncertainties and fallibility, 
science and scientific methods have transformed our world in ways that are 
impossible to enumerate. The assessment of disease causation, and the correct 
application of epidemiological evidence, would be aided by an accurate judicial grasp 
of the value of the probabilistic, but empirical, reasoning that science relies on.   
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Section 3.1: What is science 
 
The UK Science Council defines science as ‘the pursuit of knowledge and 
understanding of the natural and social world following a systematic methodology 
based on evidence.’267 The new Webster’s Dictionary defines ‘scientific’ as 
‘pertaining to science, using methods based upon well-established facts, thorough and 
accurate.’268 The scientific method, explains Klinkner, observes an empirical problem 
in a way that will allow inferences to be drawn about that phenomenon using 
investigative techniques such as observation, experimentation and the formulation and 
testing of hypotheses.269 
 
Bird270 cites the explanation of science provided by Judge William Overton, in the 
American case of McLean v Arkansas Board of Education, one of many cases where 
American courts had to decide whether creationism was a science. The court outlined 
the defining features of science (on the basis of which analysis Judge Overton, 
incidentally, ultimately rejected the contention that creationism is a “science”). A 
scientific theory, stated the court, needs to possess the following characteristics: 
 It is guided by natural law 
 It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law 
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 It is testable against the empirical world 
 Its conclusions are tentative 
 It is falsifiable (Karl Popper271 viewed this quality of falsifiability as a central 
feature of science, as we shall see later in section 3.2.2). 
 
 Thus, uncertainty and openness to refutation by contradictory evidence, far from 
being viewed a deficiency, is seen as one of the very defining features of a scientific 
theory (This is, it must be noted, a crucial point in relation to our discussion about 
how the legal view of scientific certainty is in stark contrast to the scientist’s view of 
science). Additionally, the explanatory principles of science must be testable. 
Anything that cannot be tested, many believe, is simply not within the realm of 
science.272 Testability it is also one of the factors that American courts must consider, 
under Daubert guidelines, when assessing the reliability and admissibility of scientific 
evidence.273 The concept of testability is however not the same as asking whether the 
theory has, in fact, been tested by experimentation. There may sometimes be practical 
reasons why a hypothesis cannot be tested experimentally, even though it is in theory 
testable. For example, the effects of a toxin on humans cannot, for obvious ethical 
reasons, be tested experimentally by administering this to human research subjects. In 
such situations, the pragmatic scientist will look for evidence through alternative 
methods such as observation, which even if untested, can still be founded on robust 
scientific principles. (This will be discussed further in Chapter 5, section 2.2, where 
we will use this to show that the legal devaluation of epidemiology because it does 
not use experimental methods to test causal hypotheses is thus unfair. This is not a 
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deficiency of epidemiology, but more commonly of the subject matter it examines in 
toxic tort and disease litigation).  
 
Over the centuries, philosophers of science have tried to answer questions about what 
makes scientific findings valid, and to formulate standards that would help identify 
good scientific explanations. They have considered whether scientific 
pronouncements ought to be causal, unified, nomological, statistical, deductive, 
inductive or any combination of these.274 The following section briefly outlines some 
schools of thought. 
 
Section 3.2: Philosophies of science 
Modern science began to emerge around the 16th and 17th centuries, when the 
knowledge demands of emerging technologies (such as artillery and transoceanic 
navigation) stimulated inquiry into the origins of knowledge.275 Since then, Kitcher276 
points out that the “scientific faithful” see the sciences as representing the apogee of 
human achievement, that have, since the seventeenth century, disclosed important 
truths about the natural world. Scientific ‘truths’ are credited for having enlightened 
us, by replacing old prejudices and superstitions; and for creating conditions in which 
people can lead more satisfying lives.277 Philosophers of science have widely 
divergent views about how scientific views are shaped, and about the processes by 
which scientists reason through their conclusions. This section is not an exhaustive or 
complete account of all the many different philosophies of science (which is outside 
the scope of this thesis), but is simply a brief description of some influential schools 
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of thought. The purpose of this section is to illustrate the diversity that characterises 
scientific reasoning, and to identify those aspects that help lawyers better apply 
scientific evidence. Almost schools of science, despite divergences, appear to agree 
about the uncertainty in science. Even a conclusion drawn from the most well 
replicated gold-standard research study cannot provide definitive proof that the 
conclusion is true. Our capacity to know the ‘truth’ is limited; both by human and 
natural limitations, and the best that science can do is to find ways of managing and 
minimizing this uncertainty.       
 
3.2.1: Inductivism:  
One of the early explorations of the inductivist scientific method was Francis Bacon’s 
Novum Organum.278 Induction is the form of reasoning that distinguishes the natural 
sciences such as chemistry and geology from mathematical subjects such as algebra 
and geometry, which rely more on deductive reasoning.279 Inductive reasoning is the 
process of making generalisations, or inductions, from (specific) observations to 
general laws of nature.280 Using inductive reasoning, the scientist reaches a 
conclusion, or theory, about the subject matter, and the data he or she uses to justify 
the theory is called the evidence. The strength of justification given by the evidence 
may vary. It may be very strong, or good, or very weak. Where the evidence is strong, 
the conclusions have a high degree of probability of being true, and where the 
evidence is weaker, the conclusions have a lower probability of being true.281 
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Deductive reasoning, by contrast, reasons from the general to the particular. Both of 
these reasoning strategies are used by people in everyday lives, including scientists 
and by lawyers. 
 
The problem in finding a complete justification for inductive reasoning is that no 
matter how strongly the evidence is shown to support a hypothesis, the logical, 
theoretical possibility of the hypothesis being wrong, or superseded by a rival theory 
with better evidence, can never be ruled out in inductive reasoning. This is because no 
matter how many times a proposition is tested and shown to be true, it is logically 
impossible to be absolutely certain we will have the same result next time it is 
tested.282 This is called the problem of induction: a problem that has occupied, and 
continues to occupy, a great many philosophers such as David Hume,283 John Stuart 
Mill284 and Karl Popper285 since the last two centuries at least.  
 
The 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume pointed out that a causal argument 
based on previous experience or observation represented nothing more than an 
assumption that certain events would in the future follow the same pattern as they had 
in the past. This, Hume pointed out in A Treatise of Human Nature,286 has no logical 
necessity, and cannot prove causal connections. Causal inference based on a mere 
association of events constitutes a logical fallacy known as post hoc ergo propter hoc 
(Latin for “after this therefore on account of this”). An example of the erroneous 
conclusion this could lead to is, for instance, inferring that the crowing of a rooster is 
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necessary for the sun to rise because sunrise is always preceded by the crowing.287 
Observers cannot perceive causal connections, but only a series of events.288  
 
Hume’s argument has for 250 years been treated as an argument for scepticism about 
empirical science, for it has been interpreted to mean that all conclusions about 
scientific laws, and all predictions science makes about future events, are 
unwarranted, owing to their reliance on induction.289 However, this, in Rosenberg’s290 
view, is a misinterpretation of Hume’s point. Hume’s own conclusion was different: 
as a person who acts in the world, he was satisfied that inductive arguments were 
reasonable. The problem his critique intended to highlight was not that there is no 
justification for inductive reasoning, but rather we have not yet found the right 
justification for induction.  
 
Unfortunately, this academic critique of the logical limits of inductive reasoning is 
something that courts have overstated and misunderstood, when they dismiss 
epidemiological causal inferences because they are based on observation and 
inductive reasoning, as we will see later in Chapter 5 (section 2.1). This is ironical, 
especially given that courts make much of their preference for pragmatic, common-
sense approaches to causation. The problem of induction is primarily a problem for 
scholars of logic, philosophy and epistemology: how to find an appropriate 
philosophical justification for a reasoning method that we all know to be reasonable, 
and that works for us in our everyday lives. This does not, however, hinder such 
knowledge from being invaluable in everyday practical decision-making. 
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As Rothman points out, inductive reasoning, with all its limitations, was a great 
improvement on prior ways of drawing conclusions about the world, for at least it 
demanded that a scientist make careful observations of people and nature, rather than 
appeal to faith, ancient texts, or authorities.291 Although inductive reasoning can never 
provide certainty, it can point out possibilities, and further testing of those 
possibilities constantly leads to great strides in scientific discovery. Edward Jenner’s 
discovery of the smallpox vaccine, which has had such a significant impact on human 
and public health, is an example of one such discovery made through inductive 
reasoning.  
 
So far as Hume’s assessment of the limits of inductive reasoning is a caution about 
the fallibility of knowledge, and a general warning against the dangers of too readily 
accepting any scientific assertion as the ‘truth’, it is sound criticism. Whilst deductive 
inferences are deemed true if the premises are accepted as true, inductive inferences 
are evaluated according to their contextual strengths and are a matter of degree of 
credibility: they cannot produce certain conclusions.292  
 
Conclusions from empirical sciences, unlike in mathematics, can never be proven or 
disproven with finality. As Bird293 notes, mathematical sciences do not study the 
natural world, and rely on deductive, rather than inductive, reasoning. The 
mathematician’s final conclusion (called a theorem) results from a chain of reasoning, 
each link of which proceeds by logic. This chain of reasoning, or proof of a theorem, 
does not come by degree: it either establishes the conclusion completely or fails to 
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establish it all. Mathematical proof is final, and cannot be refuted by subsequent 
evidence. As long as the initial premises are true, the theorem is true.294 Deductive 
reasoning is not specific to mathematics, however. It simply refers to a form of 
reasoning in which one begins with general premises and uses these to arrive at a 
general conclusion.  
 If all mammals are warm blooded (general premise) 
 And, horses are mammals (specific premise) 
Then it must follow that horses are warm blooded (specific conclusion).  
 
Clinicians regularly employ a combination of inductive and deductive strategies in 
everyday clinical work, in evidence-based medical models of practice, as do lawyers 
in the resolution of legal dilemmas. Although inferring specific causation on the basis 
of general evidence about causation does not represent ‘proof’ in the mathematical 
sense, because we have no guarantee that the initial premises (i.e. general evidence 
about causation) are always correct in every instance, they still represent the best 
evidence we have. As such, they are more likely to be fair than inferences drawn from 
no evidence at all.  Although UK courts have shown awareness that causation cannot 
be conclusively inferred from associations (as discussed earlier in Chapter 1, section 
3.1), they have missed the broader point that almost all scientific facts we accept as 
given are also ultimately tentative (to a greater or lesser degree).  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
294 ibid 7 
 103 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2: Refutationism 
Sir Karl Popper, who was one of the most vocal proponents of ‘refutation’ or 
‘falsification’ school, is described as being  ‘among the most influential of twentieth-
century philosophers of science.’295 The refutationist philosophy holds that a scientific 
theory can only be tested by attempting to falsify, or refute, it. Popper’s belief is that 
scientists should not seek positive evidence in favour of their theory, but should in 
fact actively seek negative evidence against their scientific hypotheses.296 Science, he 
proposes, advances by a process of elimination called “conjecture and refutation.”297 
Scientists form hypotheses based on conjecture and previous experience. Good 
scientists make predictions from a hypothesis and then compare observations with the 
predictions. Hypotheses whose predictions agree with the observations are 
“corroborated” only in the sense that they can continue to be used as explanations of 
phenomena. At any time, however, they may be refuted by further observations and 
may be replaced by other hypotheses that are more consistent with other observations.  
 
Popper argues that merely having a good body of empirical data and making 
generalizations from it can lead to wrong conclusions that can never be tested, and has 
sometimes led to the growth of pseudo-science (astrology and Freudianism, he 
believes, are examples of such pseudo-science).298 The refutationist school sees the 
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best science as one that constantly and actively seeks possible falsities in the 
hypothesis under consideration. Criticism of a theory is not seen as a criticism of the 
person who proposed it299, but as the defining characteristic of the scientific approach 
itself.  
 
Popper’s rather extreme stance regarding has generated approval and criticism in 
equal measure. Rosenberg sums up the rather uninspiring futility of Popper’s 
philosophy thus: ‘Good scientific method, and good scientists, should seek only to 
falsify hypotheses, to find evidence against them, and when they succeed in 
falsifying, as inevitably they will (until science is “complete”- a state of affairs we 
wont be able to realise we have attained), scientists should go on to frame new 
hypotheses and seek their falsification, world without end.’300 Many scientists point 
out that taken too far, this can be harmful to science. David Goodstein (Vive provost 
and distinguished professor of physics at the California Institute of Technology) 
cautions that The Popperian ideal would also be harmful to science if pursued, and it 
is crucial for every idea to receive the most vigorous possible advocacy, ‘just in case 
it might be right.’301 Science, he notes, can be an adversary process, with 
‘observations and data the tools of combat.’ 302 Haack opines that Popperian 
philosophy- eschewing verifiability, inductive logic, confirmation, supportive 
evidence, and reliability, and urging scientists to make highly falsifiable conjectures 
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and then test them to destruction- is thoroughly negative, and is a kind of ‘covert 
scepticism’.303  
 
 
3.2.3: Consensus and Naturalism 
 
Some 20th century philosophers of science, most notably Thomas Kuhn, dispute the 
logical empiricist view of science. Kuhn’s ‘historically oriented view of science’ 
describes science as a rather more creative undertaking, one that changes and 
develops in significant ways over time.304 Each natural science begins with a  pre-
paradigm period, where there is no universally agreed method of research, and then 
through ‘breakthroughs’ or momentous discoveries, evolves a conceptual paradigm. 
Kuhn emphasised the significant role played by the scientific community in judging 
the validity of scientific theories, holding that that the scientific assessment of the 
evidence may not be as dispassionate as the ideal suggests. When confronted with a 
refuting observation, Kuhn points out, a scientist faces the choice of rejecting either 
the validity of the theory being tested or the refutation. Observations that do not fit 
with a theory may sometimes just be treated as “anomalies” that may eventually be 
explained. In other instances, however, anomalies may lead to a complete 
overthrowing of an established scientific doctrine (the overturning of previous ideas 
in physics due to the discovery of relativity and quantum mechanics, discussed earlier 
in section 1.3, is an example of this). 
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The philosophic debate about Kuhn’s description has never fully resolved whether 
Kuhn only meant this as a descriptive account of what has historically happened in 
the world of science, or whether it was meant to propose what should happen. 
Thomas Kuhn’s basic claim, that theoretical paradigms affect the problems that  
scientists study and the answers they obtain is accepted by most of the scientific 
community, even scientific realists.305 However, Kuhn was criticised for taking this 
argument too far, because his ideas were sometimes interpreted as a suggestion that 
science as an irrational process. Others regretfully accept Kuhn’s description as a true 
of much of what passes for scientific activity, but not prescriptive for any good 
science. Kuhn himself, Rothman notes, was uncertain about how he intended his 
theory to be read: 
 
Are [my] remarks about scientific development…to be read as descriptions or 
prescriptions? The answer, of course, is that they should be read in both ways 
at once. If I have a theory of how and why science works, it must necessarily 
have implications for the way in which scientists should behave if their work 
is to flourish.306      
 
3.2.4: Bayesianism 
 
Reverend Thomas Bayes, in the 18th century,307 put forward a different view of the 
goal of science. The Bayesian approach represents a constructive attempt to deal with 
the dilemma that scientific laws and facts should not be treated as known with 
certainty. The logical problem that the Bayesian school `focuses on is that deduction 
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has limited scientific validity: following logical rules to make a deductive argument 
can provide no information about the truth or falsity of a scientific hypothesis unless 
you can be 100% certain of the truth of the initial premises of the argument. It 
highlights that scientific conclusions depend heavily on the person who supplied the 
initial certainties, which may vary across individuals, and thus will always have some 
degree of subjectivity.308 The best option therefore is to accept that complete certainty 
or “truth” is something that we can never find, and even if we find it can never know 
that we have found it. Therefore, the most rational option in this view is to focus on 
evaluating knowledge rather than truth; and estimating degrees of certainty or 
probability that our knowledge may be true. The French mathematician and scientist 
Pierre Simon de Laplace first give this view an applied statistical format, further 
refinements of which then culminated in the renowned Bayes theorem. 309  
    
The Bayesian approach, legal commentators note, can usefully be applied to the 
assessment of evidence in a trial context. Wilson, for example, draws a number of 
parallels between Bayesian approaches and forensic investigations.310 Bayes considers 
probability as measures of belief based upon knowledge, experience and information 
regarding the truth of a statement or an event whose truth or falsity is unknown.311 
Probabilities are not states of nature, but states of mind.312 In assessing which 
proposition is more probable, scientists attempt to elicit a single figure, the likelihood 
ratio. Bayes combines prior, or background, information with new information to 
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provide posterior probabilities. Case-specific facts not only change propositions, but 
also change the pertinent data.313  
 
Not everyone accepts the utility of drawing this distinction between belief and fact, 
and focusing on belief rather than fact.314 This philosophy has been criticised for 
diverting attention away from the classic goals of science, such as the discovery of 
how the world works, towards states of mind such as probabilities, or degrees of 
belief.315 However, Rothman points out that critics fail to recognise the importance of 
the scientist’s state of mind in determining what theories to test and what tests to 
apply.316 Most people reason poorly in the face of uncertainty. At the very least, 
subjective Bayesian philosophy provides a model for reasoning more soundly under 
uncertainty and, in particular, provides many warnings against being overly certain 
about one’s conclusions (Greenland 1998).317 The conventional process, Rothman et 
al contend, is informal, intuitive and ineffable, and therefore not subject to critical 
scrutiny; ‘at its worst, it often amounts to nothing more than the experts announcing 
that they have seen the evidence and here is how certain they are.’318 How they have 
reached these certainties is left unclear, and the process is not transparent: biases and 
prior prejudices can easily creep into expert judgments. No one, not even an expert, is 
very good at informally and intuitively formulating certainties that predict facts and 
future events well. Bayesian methods force the experts to “put their cards on the 
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table” and specify explicitly the strength of their prior beliefs, why they hold those 
beliefs, and defend those specifications against arguments and evidence.319   
 
 
 
 
 
3.3: Reconciling the philosophies 
 
As the above discussion shows, there is no universally accepted view of science, nor 
any universal explanation of how it works. Supporters of the scientific method view 
science as a continual quest for rationality, through engagement in free inquiry. On an 
idealised view, scientists engage in a dispassionate, unbiased search for knowledge, 
show no bias towards their own theory, and resist attempts to hobble investigations 
for the sake of any moral, political, or religious agenda.320 However, observers such 
as Kuhn disagree with this notion of a pure science that stands free of moral, political, 
and religious values, and contend that there is always some value judgment involved. 
Further, critics of science argue, there is no objective notion of “the evidence”: 
decisions about which “scientific conclusions” to accept are always made on the basis 
of moral or political values.321 Debates still rage in scientific circles about whether 
scientific research represents true underlying realities of the natural world or merely 
represents constructed accounts of observed events. Scientific realism proposes that 
science represents “truth”: but truth does not imply that scientists can say 
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unambiguously or with certainty that the world operates in a particular fashion.322 
Rather, the world operates in particular ways and science (with greater or lesser 
precision) endeavours to describe that world. Realists believe that scientific methods 
provide a lens through which the world can be described, even if only imprecisely. 323  
 
Byers believes that seeking a single definition or philosophy is a mistake, because this 
quest assumes that science is monolithic, when in fact it actually carries within it 
diverse tendencies.324 Fortunately our task here is much more modest: it is only to 
identify the fundamental aspects of science that can help us make better use of it in 
legal settings. The general consensus about science that emerges from all these 
debates appears to be that the scientific method is simply a set of tools that help us 
make sense of an uncertain world, by employing reasoning strategies that are not so 
different from ordinary common-sense reasoning, in addition to, most centrally, 
rigorous verification of empirical facts and evidence. Further, rigid, hierarchical 
approaches to scientific evidence are flawed: different approaches and forms of 
evidence work better in different background circumstances. Learning how to use 
probabilistic evidence is crucial for the proper legal use of science.  
 
3.4: How scientists make inferences: commonalities between legal and 
scientific reasoning 
 
The whole of science is nothing more than a refinement of everyday thinking. It is for 
this reason that (the physicist)…cannot proceed without considering critically a much 
more difficult problem, the problem of analysing the nature of everyday thinking. 
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-Albert Einstein325 
 
This chapter has highlighted that the legal failure to understand the nature of scientific 
reasoning has led to many judicial errors in the use of scientific evidence (section 2, 
above). This section attempts to clarify to lawyers how scientists make inferences. 
This process is not altogether dissimilar to the methods used by lawyers. Nonetheless, 
there are also many ways in which the methods of law and science differ significantly, 
and this author views this as a positive thing: it means that scientific evidence, used 
appropriately, has something useful to add to the legal inquiry.  
  
Scientific reasoning is not a mystical process. There is no mode of inference, no 
“scientific method” exclusive to the sciences and guaranteed to produce true or more 
empirically adequate results.326 As the Nobel laureate physicist Percy Bridgman put it, 
“the scientific method, as far as it is a method, is nothing more than doing one’s 
damnedest with one’s mind, no holds barred.”327 Haack notes that ‘just like anyone 
seriously trying to figure something out, scientists make informed guesses at the 
answers, work out the consequences of these informed guesses, seek out evidence to 
check how well these hold up, and use their judgment about how to proceed from 
there.’328 The point at which evidence becomes strong enough for an inference to be 
accepted, or weak enough to be rejected, is not dictated by hard-and-fast rules or 
bright-line delineations. It was this very anxiety that rigid rules would become a 
substitute for judgment based on the totality of the evidence that led the 
epidemiologist Sir Austin Bradford Hill to strongly emphasise that the Bradford Hill 
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factors for causation were meant as considerations only, not as criteria (see Chapter 1 
earlier, section 1.1). Haack proposes the term Critical Common-Sensism as a more 
flexible, less formal, but more realistic view of the standards for solid evidence and 
rigorous inquiry.329 Scientific inquiry, she asserts, is not categorically different form 
any other kind of enquiry, only more so:330  
Scientific inquiry is continuous with the most ordinary of everyday empirical 
inquiry. There is no… ‘scientific method’ exclusive to the sciences… it is 
what the rest of us do when we really want to find something out. Make an 
informed conjecture…check how it stands to the best evidence we can get, and 
then use our judgment whether to accept it.331   
 
However, while the scientific enquiry is a common-sense enquiry, it is also something 
more: it is ‘common sense writ large’, as Popper puts it.332 Science is always based on 
evidence that has been subjected to scrutiny. Scientists reason through problems by 
constantly testing and questioning their findings, so that less reliable inferences can be 
sifted out. The conclusions are therefore capable of clear justification, and are 
significantly more likely to be accurate than reasoning that relies on intuitions, 
hunches, opinion and speculation. It is this quality of science that can make it 
invaluable to the assessment of factual aspects of the legal inquiry, for science has 
refined its methods for the empirical scrutiny of facts with more rigour than any other 
discipline: this is, indeed, the business of science. ‘The principal advantage of 
scientific methods is not that they eliminate researchers’ biases, only that they help to 
control and reveal the biases that do exist.’333 While biases can, and do, infect the 
explorations of scientists, scientific methods are designed and employed to limit that 
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bias as much as possible.334 Scientific methods permit the development of a body of 
knowledge about the world that does not depend on the cultural background or values 
of its progenitors.’335  
 
Justice Robert Jay’s recent extrajudicial lecture suggests that some members of the 
judiciary may be starting to now recognise some sources of the law-science divide, as 
well as the value of this uncertain science. Proof in science, he points out, does not 
mean certainty: 
  
…proof (to the extent that this term has any validity in science) means something 
along the lines of a consensus having emerged in the scientific community that a 
particular hypothesis or proposition may now be regarded as solidly grounded. That 
proposition does not have to be true; it is simply the best available explanation, the 
best that science can do for the time being. Because there is sufficient common 
ground, the hypothesis becomes transmuted into something more robust: call it a 
statement of principle, or a theory of general application that has sufficient evidential 
ballast. Thirdly, science speaks in terms of degrees of confidence, not proof. Put 
another way, an expression of scientific opinion should be couched in terms of the 
amount of evidential support for it, rather than—as the law prefers—in any binary 
fashion.336  
 
Scientific inferences evolve through a complex and integrative reasoning process that 
is best defined as ‘inference to the best explanation’337 Cranor338 refers to this 
reasoning as ‘the foundation of virtually all scientific inferences’, noting that it is 
widely used by scientific bodies such as the WHO, in healthcare and clinical decision-
making, and by methodologists. This requires scientists to carry out a complicated 
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and exhaustive inquiry in order to verify their theory and rule other possible 
inferences or explanations. Before arriving at an inference, about causation or 
anything else, scientists must consider a list of plausible explanations for observed 
events, then rank rival explanations according to their plausibility, discern what other 
evidence might be available, consider all relevant information bearing on possible 
explanations, and only then arrive at their own inference which must be justified.339 
Thus, “atomistic”340 approaches to evidence (referred to in section 2.4), are erroneous. 
Since scientific consensus is achieved from the totality of the evidence after many 
repetitions of the same result, even pieces of evidence that are insufficient in 
themselves can add to or support the totality of the evidence. The law must cease to 
examine pieces of evidence in isolation from each other. To do so may cause valuable 
and relevant evidence to be discarded, or the opposite danger that overarching 
inferences may be drawn from one eminent study that could turn out to be wrong. 
This is what led to the much-publicised1998 scandal surrounding the links between 
the MMR vaccine and autism. Much media publicity was generated by this theory, 
based on a study by Dr. Andrew Wakefield and colleagues that was published in the 
presetigious medical journal, the Lancet. The study failed to be replicated by later 
research, and subsequent investigations showed that the research was fraudulent, 
leading to a retraction of the study.341 This shows the scientific fallacy of being overly 
persuaded by very few sources of information. Decisions must be made on the totality 
of the evidence: factors such as further replication, and a body of supporting evidence 
are crucial for drawing sounder conclusions.  Epidemiologists, as we shall see in 
Chapter 5 (section 1), also use similar complex processes to make inferences about 
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causation: such inferences are not lightly made from a few simple observed 
‘correlations’, as some judicial analyses of epidemiology seem to suggest.  
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4: Science and evidence in the analysis of disease disputes 
 
Buchanan at al342 point out  that as science, in the 20th century, was disabused both 
practically and theoretically of its purely deterministic notions of the laws of nature 
(discussed above, section 1.3), traditional concepts of causation have also dissolved in 
many ways during the last century. In Rosenberg’s view, so fundamental is the 
indeterminism indicated by recent discoveries in quantum physics, that ‘at the 
fundamental level, the principle of same cause, same effect, is invariably violated.’343 
Linear causal models relying on notions of single, necessary causes are not 
substantiated by current evidence. If the principle of ‘same cause, same effect’ is now 
no longer even believed to be true in physics, then the expectation for this principle to 
operate in biological realms, with their incredible ‘complexity, diversity and 
adaptation’344 is a doomed quest. 
 
The law, however, remains attached to deterministic approaches towards causation, 
even though these are repeatedly proving inadequate in disease litigation, as we shall 
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see in Chapters 3 and 4. As the next chapter will illustrate, the majority of diseases do 
not stem from a single, necessary cause but rather from multiple causes- there is, 
usually, a constellation of causes that is responsible for a disease.345 Sufficiency and 
even necessity in terms of disease causation is generally only partial; and biomedical 
causation is more commonly probabilistic.346 These issues, and the lack of fit between 
concepts of causation in the law and medicine will be discussed at length in Chapter 
3. Broadly speaking, scientific models of causality can be classified into deterministic 
models, probabilistic models and quasi-deterministic models.347 
 
4.1 Deterministic and Probabilistic Models of Causation in Science:  
 
Deterministic models of causation hold that events have specific causes, and if these 
causes are present at certain points or time periods then the events will follow.348 By 
contrast, the probabilistic model of causation349 defines a cause as an event A such 
that it makes the occurrence of another event (B) more likely than if A had not 
occurred.350  In other words, the event A may be said to be a probabilistic cause of 
event B, if, given the occurrence of A, the probability of the occurrence of B is higher 
than the probability of B if A had not occurred.351 The central idea behind 
probabilistic theories of causation thus is that causes change the probability of their 
effects; an effect may still occur in the absence of a cause or fail to occur in its 
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presence. Thus smoking is a cause of lung cancer, not because all smokers develop 
lung cancer, but because smokers are more likely to develop lung cancer than non-
smokers.  
 
A probabilistic model of causation allows uncertainty or ignorance about when an 
event will occur. It allows us to reason about events when we are unsure about what 
has happened, what will or what would happen, and even about how events lead to 
one another. As Sloman puts it, all we have to know is how likely events are and how 
likely they are to be caused by another: causes don’t always have to produce their 
effects, they only have to produce them sometimes.352  
 
Cartwright proposes that both these models represent only partial reality, contending 
that reality may be more accurately represented in the model of ‘causal pluralism.’353 
This is based on the view that there is no single account of what a cause means, but 
instead multiple concepts of cause. We are used to thinking of causation as one thing, 
Cartwright explains, but maybe causation works differently in different systems: 
“what causes are…can vary from one kind of system of causal relationships to 
another.”354 Thus, causal pluralism rejects any attempt to define cause in terms of 
‘necessary and ‘sufficient’ conditions.355 It is thus probable, as Coughlin concludes, 
that both probabilistic and deterministic models of causation have something to offer 
for thinking about the nature of causality.356 If we accept that there are different kinds 
of causation with different features (e.g. probabilistic and deterministic causation), 
                                                        
352 Sloman (n 205) 36-37 
353 N Cartwright, Hunting Causes and Using Them (Cambridge University Press 2007) 11-22 
354 ibid 
355 J Reiss, ‘Third Time’s a Charm: Causation, Science and Wittgensteinian Pluralism’ in P Illari, F   
Russo, J Williamson (eds.) Causality in the Sciences (Oxford University Press 2011) 907-920 
356 Coughlin (n 203) 8-10 
 118 
then we must consider which methods are appropriate for which kind of causation.357 
Chapter 3 will explore the approach to causation in tort law, and will contrast this 
with models of causation in medicine. It will cite current evidence about disease to 
argue that the legal approach to causation seems inappropriate for assessing complex 
disease claims, at least.  
 
Scientific evidence indicates that it is pointless to look for certainty about disease 
causation: it does not exist. The only pragmatic, common-sense question to ask of 
inferences about causation is: is it a reasonable conclusion, based on the best evidence 
we have? Epidemiology, with its fundamentally probabilistic philosophy and 
methods, may be best placed to answer probabilistic questions of disease causation 
(although, as with anything in science, to go to the other extreme and impose a rigid 
requirement for epidemiological evidence would also be fallacious. Epidemiological 
evidence can be very valuable and helpful, but is not necessary in all disease 
scenarios.  
 
4.2: The value of an uncertain science: the rationale for scientific evidence 
in legal decision-making    
 
‘…the idea is that we interpret the input from our senses in terms of a model we make 
of the world. One can not ask whether the model represents reality, only whether it 
works.’ 
-Professor Stephen Hawking358 
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The description of science in this chapter, as a discipline characterised by varying 
degrees of uncertainty, may sound disappointing to some lawyers who like answers in 
clear, black-and-white terms. As we saw through the preceding discussion in this 
chapter, probabilistic reasoning, including the use of general evidence to answer 
specific questions, is integral to all scientific methodology, despite the fact that this 
process is neither fail-safe nor foolproof, and does not deliver cast-iron guarantees. 
No matter which branch of science, and no matter how well-designed and rigorous a 
scientific research design, conclusions in an empirical study will always have some 
limitations, flaws, and potential for error. Scientists accept this, and constantly 
attempt to find best ways of reasoning in the face of uncertainty. Science does not 
satisfy the innate human desire for the security that certainty can provide. We do not 
fully yet understand how to fully epistemically and philosophically justify many of 
the methods used in empirical science. Thus it is important to address the question of 
why, then, should the law turn to this uncertain science for clarity? 
 
Scientific inferences, as section 3.4 above discussed, are not infallible. Yet they are 
empirically tested, scrutinised, actively criticised and capable of being falsified. They 
are therefore capable of clear justification, and are significantly more likely to be 
accurate than reasoning that relies on intuitions, hunches, opinion and speculation. It 
is this quality of science that can make it invaluable to the assessment of factual 
aspects of the legal inquiry, for science has refined its methods for the empirical 
scrutiny of facts with more rigour than any other discipline.  
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The epistemic validity of the scientific reasoning can best be proven by applying 
Professor Hawking’s pragmatic yardstick:359 with all of its limitations and 
uncertainty, it is impossible to deny this one fact about science: it works. As Einstein 
once stated: ‘If you wish to learn from the theoretical physicist anything about the 
methods which he uses, I would give you the following piece of advice: Don't listen 
to his words, examine his achievements.’360  
 
Although tentative, uncertain conclusions are the best science can offer, these have 
transformed our world and day-to-day lives in ways that are impossible to enumerate 
or quantify. Most medical procedures and treatments that routinely save lives, and 
most of the technological advances that we rely on several times an hour to carry out 
our day-to-day routines, begin from the use of probabilistic research methodologies 
that constantly evolving and being further refined. As Professor Dawid, a statistician 
at the University of Cambridge, puts it: “Some may think of the clinical trial as a very 
poor example of ‘science’. It appears to be a very blunt instrument, making no 
enquiry into the pharmacological or psychological processes whereby aspirin might 
influence the sensation of a headache. It is, effectively, a black-box approach, perhaps 
more akin to engineering than science. Well, let us not fight over nomenclature. The 
important thing is that this empirical black-box approach does deliver the desired 
results, allowing us to predict what might happen in future administrations of aspirin. 
361
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The term “scientific” has become an all-purpose term of epistemic praise, notes 
Haack, and has come to mean data that is strong, reliable and “good.”362 Science is 
not, however, sacred: like all human enterprises, it is fallible, imperfect, uneven in its 
achievements, often fumbling, sometimes corrupt, and of course incomplete.363 
Respect for the scientific method should not be based on illusory certainty, but on 
what it has done for us: science is epistemologically distinguished, Haack reiterates, 
by its achievements.364  Despite the fact that science is not conclusive, over centuries 
scientists have developed a vast and powerful array of tools and techniques: including 
ever more cunning research designs, and ever more sophisticated mathematical and 
statistical techniques: all of which, despite ‘untidiness’ have made it possible to get 
better evidence, assess where the evidence leads; and overall to extend and amplify 
unaided cognitive processes.365  
 
The law-science debate has, Professor Haack feels, always tended to prompt 
complaints both about the ‘venality and dishonesty’ of scientific witnesses, as well as 
of the scientific ignorance and credulity of lawyers and judges.366 This author submits 
that the differences may actually be a lot less marked than evident on the surface, and 
that much of the mutual mistrust may be attributable to lack of knowledge and 
understanding, and thus resolvable by appropriate clarification.  While there are 
indeed many differences, there are also fundamental similarities in how the two 
disciplines look at evidence and reason through data: commonalities that may remain 
hidden unless one looks under the surface. Despite the seemingly large number of 
divergences, the law is fundamentally no stranger to scientific inquiry. Science, like 
                                                        
362 Haack Defending Science (n 65) 18 
363 ibid 19 
364 ibid 23 
365 Haack, Evidence Matters (n 13) 86 
366 ibid 79   
 122 
the law, has its own philosophy, and lawyers also use scientific notions and theories 
in everyday legal practice.367 Wilson notes that the processes a criminal investigator 
uses is not very different to the process of scientific investigation: investigators form a 
subjective hypothesis determining how to progress a crime scene, and may not know 
how partial their evidence is, or what evidence is missing.368 Blackstone’s exhortation 
to the prospective lawyer “to lay the foundations of his future labours in a solid 
scientific method” illustrates that rationality and empiricism are also prized in the 
law.369  
 
Lawyers need to grasp the practical limitations of scientific discovery, and develop 
greater ease with probabilistic reasoning from the best available evidence. Correct use 
of scientific evidence requires lawyers to recoginse that scientific evidence is, as 
Faigman et al put it, a brick in the wall of proof, but it is not the wall: in other words, 
‘it need only be probative, it need not prove the case.’370 Expert testimony must be 
considered in a more nuanced and contextualized way, within the totality of all the 
available evidence, to decide overall liability. The role for evidence in the law, as 
statisticians Taroni and Aitken put it, is not to verify which assertion is the ultimate 
truth, but only to decide whether the evidence points to the claimant’s, or the 
defendant’s assertion as being the more probable.371 It is all too easy to confuse the 
epistemologically ideal with the best that is practically feasible, but it is necessary to 
work within the confines of practical constraints that cannot be overcome.372 The 
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choice to use the best available scientific evidence in assessing a question is, it is 
submitted, not really a choice. It is not perfect evidence, but the law can have no 
justification for trivialising, or altogether discounting, the best available evidence for 
factual questions about disease causation.  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
DISEASE CAUSATION: 
CAUSATION IN LAW, CAUSATION IN MEDICINE, AND A CALL FOR 
CONGRUENCE 
 
In 1950, William Prosser described causation as a Ǯtangle and a jungle, a palace of 
mirrors and a maze.ǯ373 That it remains in the same state today is not to the lawǯs 
credit. Causation is a notoriously complicated stage in the analysis of negligence. 
Along with damage, duty, breach and remoteness, it must also be shown that the 
conduct in question caused the damage complained of. In recent years the most 
difficult and controversial cases in personal injury law and in tort law generally, 
have concerned causation.374 This thesis will try to demonstrate that a lack of 
understanding about how to deal with probabilistic evidence has led the law to 
overcomplicate some causal issues and to create controversial exceptional tests, 
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that are, it is argued, ultimately unnecessary. Causation analysis has frequently, 
and justifiably, been accused of being incoherent and confused.375  
 
Complex disease litigation is especially prone to bewildering causal dilemmas. 
Most legal problems touching on the world of science, as Justice Robert Jay 
observes, tend to arise in connection with medical and related issues.376 Giesen 
observes that establishing the Ǯcausal connection between medical negligence 
and the injury complained of is probably the most difficult task in medical 
malpractice litigation (as indeed in many negligence actions).ǯ377 This chapter 
aims to explore those aspects of the law of causation that hinder the effective use 
of scientific and epidemiological evidence in toxic tort litigation, rather than to 
provide a complete doctrinal account of the philosophical, metaphysical and 
legal dilemmas of causation. It explores the contrast between legal and medical 
views about causation, and focuses on the more specific impact of the law-
science divide (explored earlier in Chapter 2) on toxic tort litigation. 
 
The chapter will highlight two main issues related to factual causation that, in 
the view of this author, prevent appropriate application of scientific evidence to 
the causation enquiry. The first issue is the significant infusion of normative 
considerations into the causation analysis, which prevents an objective judicial 
assessment of factual causation. The second issue (which will be introduced 
here, and then explored in greater length in Chapter 4) pertains to the rigid 
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current legal test for causation, which does not fit with the increasingly 
probabilistic nature of scientific evidence about causation, as explored earlier in 
Chapter 2. The law tends to take a deterministic view of the world,378 and of 
causation, with its emphasis on but-for or necessary/sufficient causes. However, 
current medical evidence (explored in section 2 of this chapter) indicates that 
disease causation is multifactorial, complex, and frequently stochastic. This 
chapter argues that the misalignment between law and science (particularly 
their deterministic and probabilistic views, respectively, of causation) is 
magnified in disease litigation, and causes a great deal of incoherence in the law 
of causation. Most inconsistencies in causation principles have arisen from 
courtsǯ attempts to deal with situations of evidentiary uncertainty, which occur 
when traditional legal causal questions cannot be answered by the available 
evidence. (The word Ǯnormativeǯ, it must be clarified, is used here to refer to the 
recourse to intuitive notions of justice and fairness in the assessment of factual 
causation. This is similar to Fumerton and Kressǯ379 use of the term, where they 
define Ǯnormative considerationsǯ as the consideration of factors such as 
good/bad, should/should not, right/wrong, or desirable/undesirable in 
assessing factual causation. Thus this term as it is used is in this thesis is 
narrower than the term Ǯpolicyǯ reasoning, which is a broader concept that can 
include considerations such a distributive justice etc.). 
 
Unfortunately, rather than reflecting on why medical science is repeatedly 
unable to answer legal questions about disease (while it satisfactorily uses the 
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same evidence to achieve great progress in diagnosis and treatment in the real 
world), or taking the opportunity to examine the Ǯfitnessǯ of archaic legal tests for 
causation, courts have dealt with the difficulties by formulating haphazard Ǯexceptionalǯ causation principles on a case-by-case basis. The boundaries, 
justification, and applications of these exceptional tests are often unclear. This 
creates further confusion in causation principles. Courts appear to have 
sometimes responded to the dilemmas by throwing their hands up in despair at 
the very concept of causation, and seem content to apply the rather inverted 
logic that if the imposition of liability seems fair, then causation is, somehow, 
thereby established. This thesis submits that to so detach causation from factual 
objectivity, and to turn it into such a normative and subjective inquiry, damages 
the law. Such an approach defeats the fundamental corrective justice principles 
of tort law, and renders the causation analysis a meaningless, opaque exercise.  
 
It is now imperative, it is submitted, for the law to grasp that many of the 
challenges in establishing factual causation in claims for diseases resulting from 
toxic exposures do not stem from failures of science that will soon be rectified by 
more evidence. Rather, most difficulties stem from misalignment of deterministic 
legal models of causation with increasingly probabilistic scientific causal models 
of disease. The problems are further exacerbated by the fact that the law does 
not fully recognise the extent of its misconceptions about science. Lord Phillipsǯ 
speech in Sienkiewicz v Greif380 illustrates the extent to which the myth of 
scientific certainty is prevalent within the judiciary: 
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When a scientific expert gives an opinion on causation, he is likely to do so 
in terms of certainty or uncertainty, rather than probability. Either medical 
science will enable him to postulate with confidence the chain of events that 
occurred, i.e. the biological cause, or it will not. In the latter case he is 
unlikely to be of much assistance to the judge who seeks to ascertain what 
occurred on a balance of probability.381 
  
The reality of how a scientific expert actually thinks about causation, is, of 
course, very different, as we saw earlier in Chapter 2. However, courts continue 
to use rigid legal models of causation, seemingly in the belief that the ideal 
scientific evidence should, and very soon will, provide certainty.  This leads to a 
judicial tendency, particularly within UK tort law, to devalue probabilistic 
scientific evidence about disease (as seen in sceptical UK judicial approaches 
towards epidemiological evidence). Unfortunately, the best that science may 
ever be able to offer, in the absence of miraculous eyewitness testimony about 
chemical and molecular processes going on inside human organs and cells, is 
probabilistic evidence, which even if not certain, has empirically proved its value 
by its achievements. It is difficult to justify the legal disregard for the best 
available empirical evidence in assessing factual causation.    
 
Section 1 outlines the problems in the current approach to causation in tort law. 
It focuses on two particular aspects that, in the view of this author, hinder the 
effective legal use of scientific evidence in this area. The first, explored in section 
1.1, is the judicial tendency to view causation as a normative issue, and to arrive 
at causal conclusions depending on where courts feel overall liability should fall. 
                                                        
381 ibid [9] (Lord Phillips) 
 128 
This normative, backwards analysis of factual causation stems from two further 
areas of confusion. Section 1.1(a) discusses the first: the judicial tendency to 
conflate the two-step analysis of causation (Ǯfactual causationǯ and so-called Ǯlegal causationǯ) into one single, often subjective, analysis. Section 1.1 (b), 
highlights the second issue: lack of clarity about the role of the causation 
enquiry. Causation is often seen as synonymous with overall liability. This in turn 
leads to a judicial reluctance to assess factual causation objectively, as courts 
appear reluctant to give up their discretion in regard to causal conclusions. To 
deny due importance to robust assessment of factual connections is to detach 
tort law from its primary goal of corrective justice, this thesis contends. Section 
1.2 then outlines the second problem in the current law of causation: 
deterministic legal tests for causation that do not fit with probabilistic scientific 
evidence. The traditional but-for test, it is submitted, is often too rigid and 
simplistic to assess causation in all but the most straightforward disease claims, 
due to the multifactorial and variable etiology of many diseases. (This issue will 
be explored at greater length in Chapter 4). Medicine and the law view causation 
from different perspectives, which is why medical and epidemiological evidence 
often do not directly map on to legal questions. Jost notes that medicine is 
primarily interested in causation in a practical, scientific, sense.382 Medicine 
seeks to understand the ǲcauseǳ of a disease in order to facilitate treatment (or to 
improve public health and prevent disease). However, because tort and criminal 
law are concerned with attributing responsibility, they must focus on the 
particular conduct of particular persons, and judgments of attribution are driven 
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at least as much by policy considerations as by scientific investigation.383 
However, this thesis argues that the infusion of these issues into the assessment 
of causation, which is a scientifically complex matter already, causes untold 
confusion in the law of causation. Vital as matters such as responsibility, 
morality and personal conduct are to the law, these must be separated out from 
the assessment of factual causation (which requires objective and fact-based 
analysis), and analysed separately.  
 
Section 2 examines, by way of contrast with the legal approach to disease claims, 
disease causation from the medical perspective. It aims to illustrate the nature of 
disease in order to later develop the argument that deterministic legal 
approaches are a poor fit for assessing causation (in this area of the law, at least). 
It examines current medical literature in order to demonstrate some 
fundamental issues about disease that lawyers need to grasp. Through this, it 
aims to make the argument (which will be more fully developed in chapter 4), 
that it is vital for the law to take a more informed approach towards the 
probabilistic scientific evidence in this area. The majority of major diseases, 
evidence suggests, arise from complex, multifactorial causal events rather than 
the simplistic single-cause model that current legal principles might have more 
easily dealt with. Mesothelioma-type diseases (which the law tends to view as 
exceptional in terms of evidentiary uncertainty about etiologic mechanisms) are 
not so rare or unusual at all. Many complex diseases are, in fact, even more 
causally uncertain than mesothelioma, because mesothelioma at least has one 
clearly identified single, necessary, but-for causal factor (i.e. asbestos exposure). 
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This is not the case with many other major complex diseases, which can arise 
from many different combinations of a set of factors.  Thus this thesis thus 
further contends that the deterministic, necessity-based, Ǯbut forǯ test repeatedly 
causes problems in disease litigation because it is fundamentally unsuited to the 
assessment of disease causation. 
 
Section 3 argues that better integration of legal and scientific approaches in this 
area is now imperative, and examines the futility of the legal idea that better 
scientific evidence will very soon often solve all problems by offering conclusive 
evidence about disease causation. A number of commentators have eagerly 
anticipated the day when science exposes the presumed deterministic 
mechanism of toxic causation for all to see.384 However, this may be misplaced 
optimism. For example, Professor Steve Gold uses sophisticated genomic and 
molecular research about disease causation to argue that actually the opposite is 
true: at the highest magnification, ǲcertainty dissolves into probability.ǳ385 (This 
could be likened to the epistemic trajectory of physics, where the same 
surprising lesson seems to be emerging from modern quantum discoveries. It 
appears that more scientists discover, the less certain they are of their laws, or of 
the predictability of the universe: as explored earlier in Chapter 2386). The very 
deterministic questions the law asks regarding disease causation, however, 
suggests that the current legal approach is simply not flexible enough to cope with 
these different possibilities suggested by current medical knowledge.387 As the 
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potential unfairness of the but-for test becomes increasingly apparent in the 
context of a range of serious and debilitating diseases, it will become harder for 
courts to justify restricting the exceptional approach to a few selected diseases. It 
is time for the law to re-evaluate its simplistic Ǯbut forǯ test for causation, at least 
so far as disease litigation is concerned. Chapter 4 of this thesis will discuss in 
detail the problems with the but-for test in this area of the law, and will suggest a 
more principled approach to causation that better aligns with scientific evidence.   
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 1: Causation in tort law: obstacles to the proper application of 
science  
 
1.1: Normative assessment of factual causation 
 
It is axiomatic that there must be a causal link between the negligence and the 
claimantǯs injury before liability can attach to a defendant.388 A plethora of legal 
theories about causation abound in the literature.389 These range from broad-
based views about causation encompassing cause-in-fact as well as proximate-
cause issues, which equate causation with legal liability,390 to Ǯlegal realismǯ391 
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(causal minimalist) theories which insist that the only causal issue is the simple 
factual issue of whether the defendant's conduct actually contributed to the 
plaintiff's injury, to efficiency theories which view causation requirements as 
subordinate to the simple efficiency purpose of the law.392  
 
Despite its overarching centrality to the doctrine of negligence, the word Ǯcausationǯ often appears to mean very different things to different legal minds. 
As Wright puts it: in all of tort law, there is no concept that is as pervasive and 
yet elusive as the causation requirement, which relieves a defendant of liability if 
his tortious conduct was not a cause of the plaintiff's injury.393 Much of the 
current incoherence in causation arises because there is little clarity or 
consensus about what the causation analysis should focus on, and the role it 
should play in the overall negligence enquiry. Courts often tend to equate 
causation with overall liability, and this has infused an unacceptable degree of 
normativity into the causation analysis. Partly this is because the principles of 
causation are now so out of step with causal models of disease, that courts are 
compelled to twist causation principles in order to arrive at the desired outcome. 
Causation analysis is often equated with the question of whether the defendant 
should be fixed with legal liability at all, with courts often basing this analysis on 
such extensive issues as blame-worthiness, economics, morality and the various 
undefined issues collectively termed as ǲpolicyǳ (as discussed earlier in the 
context of Fumerton and Kressǯ definition of a normative approach to 
                                                                                                                                                              
391 William L Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (4th edn, West Publishing Co. 1971) 236-238 
392 See, e.g., P Burrows, ‘A Deferential Role for Efficiency Theory in Analysing Causation-based Tort 
Law' (1999) 8 European Journal of Law and Economics 29 
393 Wright (n 17) 1737 
 133 
causation,394 policy is a partly overlapping, but broader concept than the term Ǯnormativeǯ as used in this thesis). Beever explains the distinction between policy 
and principle:  
 
Principleǯ refers to the rules and doctrines of the law itself… ǮPolicyǯ, on 
the other hand, can be defined only negatively. ǮPolicyǯ is everything apart 
from principle. For example, policy has been held to include issues of 
distributive justice, social morality, economic efficiency, public opinion 
and so on. But it is impossible to define the content of these terms exactly, 
because people disagree on what constitute the rules and doctrines of the 
law.395  
 
Beever strongly proposes that Ǯpolicyǯ reasoning has no role to play in the 
negligence analysis at all. This thesis, however, does not take a position in this 
debate about the general role of policy in legal decision-making. It simply 
contends that these are not matters of factual causation, or indeed, of causation 
at all. Causation analysis, which can only have any useful purpose as a tool to 
guide the court in arriving at decisions, turns (under normative approaches) into 
an enquiry where the answers are formulated depending on what decisions 
courts have already arrived at. This can turn causation into a redundant and 
meaningless element of the negligence enquiry. Courts appear to be resorting to 
a retrospective analysis of causation, and incoherent principles are an inevitable 
result, as exemplified in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,396 discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4.   
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This thesis does not assert that normativity has no role in the administration of 
justice, only that these are not matters of causation. As Beever397 points out, the 
causation requirement in negligence has a unique purpose to fulfill: while other 
negligence matters such as standard of care, duty, remoteness and defences fit 
together in a unified normative enquiry, causation is different. Causation is not 
an artificially created or legal concept. It is morally arbitrary. To say that 
causation is in any way ǲa normative enquiry or a policy matter is to imply that 
our judgments or preferences for deciding liability determine the fundamental 
nature of the universe; as if, were human beings not to exist, or were the law to 
be abolished, the fundamental nature of the universe would changeǳ.398 As 
Prosser puts it:   
 
Whether proper construction of a building would have withstood an 
earthquake, whether reasonable police precautions would have 
prevented a boy from shooting the plaintiff in the eye with an air gun, 
whether a broken flange would have made an electric car leave the rails in the absence of excessive speed… cannot be decided as a matter of law.ǯ399  
 
The insistence on a causal connection has, notes Honoré, a crucial justificatory 
purpose for tort law, as a causal connection between the conduct and harm Ǯensures that in general we impose liability only on those who, by intervening in 
the world, have changed the course of events for the worseǯ.400 Professor Honoré 
emphasises repeatedly across a series of distinguished works on causation that it 
is crucial to distinguish between the concepts of causation, responsibility, and 
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legal liability. Being held responsible for the consequences of our actions 
encourages us to act so as to do good and to avoid doing harm, and also allows us 
to assume a character and identity for which we can, or must, take 
responsibility.401 An effort to ensure that people are only penalised for the 
wrongs they have caused is thus the basic foundation of a just system. Wright 
similarly argues for a non-normative concept of causation, articulated in famous 
NESS test for factual causation.402 This thesis submits that the extensive infusion 
of normative considerations into the factual causation inquiry is the result of two 
deeper problems in the law, outlined below.   
 
 
1.1.1 Conflation of factual causation and legal causation 
Traditional academic conceptualisations see causation as being a two-step 
enquiry. The first step, factual causation, requires the claimant to establish a 
historical connection between the defendantǯs act and the ultimate injury. This is 
normally decided using the but-for or sine qua non test which asks: would the 
injury have happened but for the defendantǯs negligence?403 This deceptively 
simple question, with its emphasis on necessity, can present insurmountable 
problems in some situations, where rigid applications of this test can be absurd 
or patently unfair to the claimant.404 Problems also occur in evidentiary gap 
scenarios, and here courts occasionally apply exceptional alternative tests to the 
but-for test, which will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 4. Thus factual 
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causation, as Weinrib notes, is a historical inquiry: it is 'a factual inquiry which is 
resolved by the production of evidence and the drawing of inferences from that 
evidence.'405  
 
Once factual causation has been established, the claimant must then demonstrate Ǯlegal causationǯ: that is, they must establish that the defendant should be legally 
responsible for the tort. This involves asking various questions such as whether 
there were any intervening events, or whether the defendantǯs act was too 
remote, or not proximate enough, for liability to be imposed.  
 
This, however, is merely the textbook view of causation. In practice, the analysis 
of causation appears to be a much more haphazard process than the academic 
view above suggests. Lord Hoffmann, for example, writing extra-judicially, 
concedes that judges rarely tend to apply the two-stage test of causation: ǮWhy 
do they (judges) obstinately refuse to apply the Ǯtwo-stage testǯ and distinguish 
between their findings of Ǯcause in factǯ and their subsequent decision about Ǯlegal causationǯ? None of these concepts appears to have attracted any judicial 
interest.ǯ406 His Lordship then goes on to state that in his view it is entirely 
appropriate for judges to avoid too much Ǯhand-wringingǯ about factual 
causation: causal rules are Ǯcreatures of the law and nothing moreǯ, Lord 
Hoffmann emphasises, before concluding that: Ǯ(t)he concept of cause in fact 
seems to me to add nothing of value to the discussion of this question.ǯ407 
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ǮThe failure to distinguish between cause and responsibility is a fundamental 
one,ǯ stated Prosser in 1951, Ǯand any attempt to state one in terms of the other 
has led and can only lead to the most hopeless confusion.ǯ408 Subsequent 
developments in the law since then bear out the prescience of this statement. 
Much of the current confusion in the law of causation arises because of this 
failure to distinguish between factual and legal causation. It is mystifying that the 
second step (ǲlegal causationǳ) is called a causation issue at all, because what it is 
really involves, in practice, is the arrival of the court at a decision about liability, 
using a variety of different criteria such as remoteness, foreseeability, 
intervening acts, and the eggshell skull rule. However, these do not assess 
causation. They examine primarily whether the degree of fault is proportionate 
to the consequences of legal liability.  
 
The proposition that Ǯlegalǯ or Ǯproximateǯ causation is not really a causation 
issue, and that factual causation must be objectively established before 
considering legal responsibility, has found strong support over the years from a 
plethora of distinguished academic voices. Professor Glanville Williams asserted 
(albeit in the context of criminal law) that, Ǯwhen one has settled the question of 
but-for causation, the further test…in order to qualify it for legal recognition is 
not a test of causation but a moral reaction.ǯ409 Further, Professor Williams notes 
elsewhere, ǮIf a fact is not the scientific cause of an event, it cannot be the 
proximate causeǯ.410 Prosser points out that terminology such as ǲproximate 
causeǳ covers a Ǯmultitude of sinsǯ. It is, he points out, a complex term of highly 
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uncertain meaning under which other rules, doctrines and reasons lie buried, 
and that at least in many cases there is no real question of causation at all.411 ǲIt 
(causation) is a question of fact,ǳ412 Prosser emphasises, going on to point out 
that establishment of this fact does is not, of itself, sufficient for liability. There is 
a practical necessity for legal responsibility to be limited to only some factual 
causes, but that limitation is not Ǯin any sense one of causation: it is one of rules 
and policies which deny liability for what has clearly been caused. Stapleton 
robustly argues that the term Ǯlegal causationǯ is a misnomer, and proposes that it 
should actually be termed Ǯscope of liabilityǯ for consequences, as ǲa bare reliance 
on undefined causal terms can lead courts to fail to distinguish the factual issue 
of historical involvement from the normative judgment of which consequences of 
the tort fall within the appropriate scope of liability. 413 
 
Lord Hoffmannǯs approach to causation appears instead to support a wholly 
normative analysis, where factual and Ǯlegalǯ causation are combined into a 
mostly subjective inquiry. With due respect to Lord Hoffmann, while such an 
approach may make the task of courts easier, it does great disservice to both the 
interests of justice as well as to the reputation of the law. To advocate that legal 
analyses of causation can be so detached from factual concerns is also to detach 
tort law from its basic theoretical foundations of corrective justice, which is the 
cornerstone of UK tort law. Causation is the central feature of corrective-justice 
based interpersonal responsibility since it is the causal relationship that 
connects the claimant and defendant as parties to an interaction, notes 
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Turton.414 Stressing that the causal inquiry is of utmost importance in the 
negligence analysis, Moore further explains that: Ǯ[C]orrective-justice…demands 
a robustly metaphysical interpretation of cause. For legal liability tracks moral 
responsibility on this view, and moral responsibility is for those harms we cause. ǮCauseǯ has to mean what we mean when we assign moral responsibility for 
some harm, and what we mean in morality is to name a causal relation that is 
natural and not of the lawǯs creation.ǯ415  
 
The call to clarify legal terminology in this area is not, it is submitted, a quibble 
about mere semantics. It is an issue that deserves serious revaluation because of 
its impact: this misplaced terminology has resulted in blurred boundaries 
between the analysis of factual causation and legal liability itself. It has damaged 
the clarity and coherence of the law by turning the causation analysis into a 
haphazard and occasionally incomprehensible exercise. Courts have gradually 
come to see the analysis of factual causation as an enquiry whose outcome must 
be shaped by where they wish liability to fall, rather than an objective evaluation 
of causation.  
 
1.1.2: Inflated role of causation in the liability analysis 
 
A further barrier to the willingness of the judiciary to examine factual causation 
objectively, it is submitted, is that the scope of the causation has now become 
excessively broad. Causation is seen as synonymous with overall liability, which 
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appears to lead to judicial anxiety to retain discretion over the outcome of the 
causation analysis. Ironically, the fact that courts give so large a role to causation 
(in theory) is what appears to make them reluctant (in practice) to conduct a 
genuine, objective enquiry about whether factual causation has been established 
on the balance of probabilities. Since causation answers are seen as the defining 
basis for liability, courts often carry out a retrospective analysis of causation, 
because they appear to believe that causal conclusions that are incompatible 
with the overall decision can lead to unfair overall outcomes.  
 
In Fairchild, Lord Hoffmann stated: 
Everyone agrees that there is no scientific or philosophical touchstone for 
determining the relevant causal connection in any particular case. The 
relevance of a causal connection depends upon the purpose of the 
inquiry.416  
 
Lord Hoffmann again elaborated on this point in Kuwait Airways Corporation v 
Iraqi Airways Co:417  
 
There is therefore no uniform causal requirement for liability in tort. 
Instead, there are varying causal requirements, depending on the basis and 
purpose of liability. One cannot separate questions of liability from 
questions of causation. They are inextricably connected. 
 
This statement typifies the inverted logic that now governs the causation 
analysis. To say that rules about causation can be framed depending upon the 
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basis and purpose of liability is to render the causation analysis a biased and 
meaningless exercise. Further, Lord Hoffmann offers no clarity about what, in 
this view, the purpose of liability is. His approach towards exceptional rules 
appears to subscribe to the functionalist view of causation: that is, that the main 
purpose of liability in negligence is to compensate the claimant. However, this 
vague analysis leaves many important questions hanging.  
 
A more coherent approach to causation requires courts to recognise that 
causation is but one strand in the negligence enquiry. Giving causation a 
narrower place in the overall analysis would help courts assess factual issues 
with much more objectivity and rationality. As Prosser puts it, the answer to the 
factual question is not determinative: it is, Ǯat most, a rule of exclusion.ǯ418 This is 
a point that Weinrib also emphasises: ǮThe finding that the defendant did in fact 
cause the injury does not automatically mean that he is liable since the court still 
must assess whether the factual causation should have legal consequences. Since 
cause in fact can determine innocence but not liability, it functions as a test of 
exclusion, allowing a court to weed out defendants without having to decide 
whether their conduct was legally culpable.ǯ419 
 
This also significantly contributes to UK judicial reluctance to give due weight to 
epidemiological evidence, because of a misconceived belief that if 
epidemiological evidence is accepted, it will dictate the outcome of the claim. 
McIvor presents this belief as a function of the lawǯs approach to statistics in 
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general, and posits that it results from courts Ǯconflating the substantive and 
evidential aspects of the test for factual causation and the reducing that 
conflation into a nonsense numerical test.ǯ420 This reflects the legal tendency to 
reduce scientific methodologies into somewhat Ǯpatǯ and simplistic rules and 
hierarchies. Chapter 5421 will later explore these legal hierarchies of scientific 
evidence further, and will demonstrate why these are flawed.   
 
 
1.1.3: Reducing the role for normativity in factual causation:  
 
Courts frequently justify their haphazard approaches to causation on the 
grounds that causation is a normative enquiry, and that it is less important to 
accurately assess causation than to achieve fair overall legal outcomes. However, 
for this thesis to contend that the causation element of the negligence analysis 
must briefly set aside normative concerns is not to negate the ultimately 
normative nature of the legal analysis. The proposal that factual causation must 
be examined objectively, not normatively, only emphasises that different strands 
of the negligence enquiry may require the exercising of different kinds of 
reasoning and cognitive processes. Every step involved in carrying out an 
ultimately normative enquiry does not need to be decided primarily by 
normative considerations, because that makes the individual elements of the 
negligence enquiry pointless. If I bake a Spiderman cake for a birthday party, 
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then the stage at which I sculpt Spiderman out of the icing sugar would 
ostensibly follow none of the processes seen as fundamental to cake-baking: I am 
not, at this stage, whipping flour and eggs and sugar into a fluffy mass ready for 
the oven. Nonetheless, I am still involved in the ultimate activity of baking what 
will hopefully be a very fine cake. 
 
Although legal decision-making may indeed require consideration of many other 
factors such as values, justice, and Ǯpolicy,ǯ these must be separated from the 
question of fact. Fumerton and Kress address the role for normative 
considerations in the legal analysis: ǮWhich of the indefinitely many causally 
relevant factors constitute proximate causes or the causes with which we are 
concerned in a legal context may well involve normative elements that cannot be 
eliminated. Traditionally, it is said that the proximate cause concept selects from 
among all actual causes the legally responsible causes by invoking policy 
considerations. But whether something is a causally relevant factor in producing 
some outcome may be non-normative through and through. One should not 
succumb to the temptation to suppose that relevant questions of causation are 
permeated by the normative even if the decision to focus only on certain causal 
factors is.'422  
 
Although causation may sometimes, as Lord Hoffmann notes, need to be 
differently assessed in different systems,423 this cannot justify a cavalier 
approach to facts and proof. A flexible approach to assessing causation is 
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different from an arbitrary and entirely subjective approach. This thesis agrees 
that courts need to be pragmatic, and cannot get bogged down by philosophical 
and metaphysical debates about causation in every dilemma they face. However, 
the law must at least have clarity about the basic purpose of causation in tort 
law, and strive to formulate principles that have a reasonable degree of clarity 
and coherence. 
 
This thesis does not advocate that scientific or epidemiological evidence should 
be decisive in legal decision-making. On the contrary, it argues that inflated 
perceptions of the certainty and authority of any form of scientific evidence is 
wrong and will lead to injustice all around (see Chapter 2, section 2).  
Nonetheless, scientific evidence, for all its fallibility, is amongst the most valid 
and well-tested forms of evidence we have. Used judiciously as a tool to help 
guide the factual causation analysis, rather than as determinative of the outcome, 
epidemiological evidence can help enhance the clarity of legal decision-making 
(especially where no other specific evidence is available: as is frequently the case 
in disease litigation). Questions of causation not only can, but also should, be 
separated from questions of ultimate liability. 
 
1.2: The problem with necessity-based tests for disease causation 
 
On the one hand, courts display a distinct fondness for the notion of a Ǯcommon-
senseǯ approach to causation, expressing the view that too much Ǯhand-wringingǯ 
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(as Lord Hoffman puts it)424 about rigid boundaries is unnecessary. Judicial 
pronouncements avowing a preference for Ǯordinary, everydayǯ concepts of 
causation abound in case law. Lord Salmon stated in Alphacell v Woodward that: 
 
The nature of causation has been discussed by many eminent philosophers 
and also by a number of learned judges in the past. I consider, however, that 
what or who has caused a certain event to occur is essentially a practical 
question of fact which can best be answered by ordinary common sense 
rather than abstract metaphysical theory.425 
 
Or, as Lord Reid put it in McGhee v National Coal Board, 
 
It has often been said that the legal concept of causation is not based on 
logic or philosophy. It is based on the practical way in which the ordinary 
man's mind works in the everyday affairs of life.426 
 
Hart and Honoré427 similarly emphasise that ǲit is the plain manǯs notions of 
causation (and not the philosopherǯs or the scientistǯs) with which the law is 
concerned.ǳ However, as Williams points out, Hart and Honoréǯs description may 
be partly true of the legal notion of proximity, but it is not true of the lawyerǯs 
use of the notion of but-for causation.428 The rigid and deterministic but-for test 
for factual causation, with all the attendant requirements it imposes on the 
claimant to prove that the injury was necessary for the harm, does not appear to 
tie with this common-sense approach, certainly not in disease litigation.  
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Unfortunately, the most current medical evidence (explored in Section 2 below) 
suggests that the but-for test is often neither practical, nor fair, nor a common-
sense approach, for the purpose of assessing disease causation, at least. Notes 
Professor Steve Gold, a legal scholar and biology graduate, proof of causation in 
toxic torts has presented persistent problems for the legal system, because 
scientific probabilities fit poorly with the demands for particularistic proof 
imposed by the lawǯs deterministic model of causation.429 This, Gold points out, 
is because toxic injuries almost never involve an observable chain of physical 
events allowing easy inference of a causal relation between a particular 
defendantǯs conduct and a particular plaintiffǯs harm. Courts turn to science to 
replace causal intuition, but a disjunction remains between the probabilities that 
science can know and the determined result that the law wants proven; leading 
to led to numerous calls for doctrinal reforms in recognition of the difficulties 
that toxic causation presents.430 The but-for test of factual causation has 
repeatedly caused problems, particularly when applied to disease disputes.431 
This has resulted in courts fashioning a number of modified tests to help 
claimants who are unable to establish factual causation due to evidentiary 
uncertainties. Many complex variations of such situations can arise, and courts 
have dealt with the dilemmas on a case-by-case basis, formulating a variety of Ǯexceptionalǯ432 principles to establish factual causation.  
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Prosser summarises the but-for or sine qua non rule as follows: ǮThe defendant's 
conduct is not the cause of the event, if the same event would have occurred 
without it.ǯ433 The problem with complex disease, as section 2 will demonstrate, 
is that the same disease can be caused in so many different ways, through so 
many different combinations of factors, that experts can almost never say with 
certainty that this disease would never have happened but for that part of the 
event. How, then, in such a scenario, is but-for causation to be established? As 
Justice Jay extrajudicially noted in a recent article:  
 
Practical problems naturally arise in the law where a fact in issue cannot 
be proved by direct evidence but by inference. The law may be based on 
a deterministic view of the natural world. Causes may in theory be 
observed as they occur, but they will not have been if the past event has 
come and gone. The drawing of an inference is the only available pathway 
to proof.434  
 
Chapter 4 will discuss the problems with the but-for test, and will outline the 
cases where courts have departed from this test. It will also attempt to frame 
some suggestions for alternatives to the but-for test that fit better with medical 
evidence about diseases resulting from exposure to harmful substances. First, 
however, we will explore current medical evidence, in order to better 
understand why a departure from deterministic causal models is imperative in 
this area of litigation.     
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SECTION 2: Medical evidence about disease causation: the multifactorial, 
stochastic nature of disease 
 
ǲMedicine is a science of uncertainty and an art of probability.ǳ 
-Sir William Osler435 
 
This section examines the medical issues surrounding disease causation, in order 
to demonstrate why it is crucial for the law to develop felicity with probabilistic 
reasoning in the assessment of disease causation. The lawǯs rather simplistic and 
deterministic conception of causality has led lawyers top believe that all events 
have clear, consistent, identifiable causes. The courtǯs only job, in this view, is to 
decide in regard of an alleged tort whether such a factor represented a breach of 
duty, and whether the factor Ǯswung the outcomeǯ: in other words, whether the 
event would not have happened without the tort. 
 
Unfortunately, when applied to claims for negligently caused disease, this 
approach to causation has repeatedly fallen apart, as shown across a string of 
toxic tort case law. 436 The legal desire to maintain the traditional deterministic 
reasoning around causation has necessitated  number of contorted exceptional 
tests for causation: the scope, justification and boundaries of which become ever 
more confused.437  
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Courts appear to evading the problem by clinging to the belief that all the 
problems are due to scientific inadequacies, and that soon better medical 
evidence will turn up, offering better proof of but for causation. This hope is 
deeply illusory, at least as far a disease causation is concerned.  Increasingly 
sophisticated research methodologies suggest that most major diseases result 
from a complex interplay of multiple factors, which have different effects on 
different people due to biological variations.438 Multiple studies of toxic 
susceptibility are unlikely to give identical results because of the influence of 
other factors and of random chance.439ǯVariabilityǯ stated Sir William Osler, the 
eminent Canadian physician who is viewed as the founding father of modern 
medicine, 440 is the law of life, and as no two faces are the same, so no two bodies 
are alike, and no two individuals react alike and behave alike under the 
abnormal conditions which we know as disease.ǯ441 In spite of massive 
investments in research time and funding, the etiologic mechanisms of many 
major complex diseases such as cardiovascular disease, cancers, psychiatric 
illness, asthma, diabetes and Alzheimerǯs Disease, etc. are still largely unknown 
or, at best Ǯvaguely known.ǯ442  
 
All of these issues constitute a challenge that the law will undoubtedly have to 
confront, as courts begin to run out of reasons to limit exceptional approaches to 
causation to a few select diseases. The sub-sections below outline the common 
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problems that arise when attempting to fit evidence about disease into current 
legal models.   
 
2.1: General difficulties in studying the effects of toxins 
 
Injuries from toxic substances are unlike typical harms that tort law has 
generally addressed, such as road accidents, trespasses, and property damage.443  
As Richard Wright notes, 444 the chemical and biological processes that result in 
disease are poorly understood: in marked contrast to traumatic injury cases, the 
disease process is unobserved and unobservable as it occurs. Gold445 defines a 
toxic tort plaintiff as one who claims that exposure to some chemical, 
radiological, or biological agent caused a disease. But as Gold further explains, a 
fundamental difficulty in proving such a claim is that exposure and disease 
usually do not correlate perfectly: some people get sick without exposure, and 
some people receive exposure without getting sick. It is a biological reality that 
disease causation is almost always multifactorial and complex. Added to this is 
infinite inter-individual biological diversity that biologists have to contend with 
in attempting to research disease. Thus, notes Cranor, establishing causation in 
toxic tort claims requires the claimant to rule out other possible contributory 
causes, which can include evidence from epidemiological studies, animal studies, 
or other toxicological studies.446    
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The idea that causation can be complex, and there may be multiple causes that 
can individually or together produce an outcome is not new or exclusive to 
disease research. Hart and Honoré note that John Stuart Mill was amongst the 
first philosophers of causation to provide an account of causal complexity.447 
There are, however, few areas of litigation where the limitations of causal 
knowledge are more apparent than in disease litigation.  Although there are 
some single-cause infectious diseases that have necessary, sine qua non causes 
that might fit more easily within legal thinking of causation such as the but-for 
test (e.g. cholera, tuberculosis, influenza, etc.), this is not typical of a vast 
majority of the most major diseases. When it comes to the study of disease, it is 
very seldom that all the relevant causal mechanisms are understood.448 Due to a 
variety of reasons, Cranor points out, scientists at present almost certainly do 
not yet know all the disease processes that early exposure to toxicants can 
initiate, promote, accelerate, catalyse, potentiate, facilitate or exacerbate. They 
may not know the lowest exposures during development that can contribute to 
risks, either immediately or later in life. 449 The difficulties are compounded by the 
fact that different diseases can vary in their onset and progression e.g. disease 
may have a long induction period or a long latency period, which makes it harder 
to use legal yardsticks such as proximity in order to assess causal connections 
between tort and injury. 
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Further, chemical substances have special properties that make the 
identification of their causal properties difficult.450 They can have long latency 
periods, and can operate through unknown, complex, molecular mechanisms 
that harm humans in ways that can remain hidden for years.451 Carcinogens, 
reproductive toxicants, and neurotoxicants, for example, are Ǯinvisible and 
undetectable intruders.ǯ452 Further, many genes and epigenetic factors may affect 
toxic susceptibility, toxins may affect people in many ways, and many effects may 
result from more than one toxin.453 So, for example, even though a particular 
genotype of the NAT2 gene makes it much more likely that a woman smoker will 
develop breast cancer, not all women of that genotype who smoke end up with 
breast cancer; some women who smoke develop breast cancer even though they 
do not have that genotype; some women develop breast cancer even though they 
neither smoke nor have that genotype.454 
 
2.2: Variable induction and latency periods 
 
The induction period of a disease is the period of time from causal action until 
disease initiation, while its latency period is the time from the disease 
occurrence to disease detection.455 Although the latency period can be decreased 
by improved methods of disease detection, the induction period cannot be 
shortened by early detection of the disease.456 Both the induction and the latency 
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periods can vary enormously across different diseases. Type 1 diabetes, for 
example, is a multifactorial, chronic disease with a long induction period, and 
little is known about its etiology.457 Several cancers are also characterised by 
long induction periods.458 Mesothelioma is a well-known example that lawyers 
are well acquainted with. However this, too, like anything in medicine, is highly 
variable. For some cancers, there will be some causal factors in the long chain of 
component causes that very quickly then lead to the disease onset, provided all 
the earlier triggering factors have been activated earlier.  
 
A disease can also have variable latency periods: once initiated, many diseases 
are not apparent or detected straightaway.459 For example, studies of 
Parkinsonǯs disease reveal that early life exposure to some toxicants can lead to a 
long period of Ǯsilent toxicityǯ usually lasting decades, in which certain parts of 
the brain operate at a suboptimal level before the disease manifests at a clinically 
recognisable level.460 Similarly, toxicants may add to the adverse effects resulting 
from exposure to other toxic or naturally occurring substances. Thus, two or 
more toxicants may add to produce a disease, or a toxicant plus a naturally 
occurring chemical may together contribute to disease, accelerate and illness or 
worsen it.461 The factors earlier in the causal chain may well have made a far 
more significant contribution to the ultimate outcome than the factors that were 
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more proximate in time, and once the earlier contributory events have occurred, 
it may require a relatively small event to tip the scales and trigger disease. 
This makes it much harder to assess causation in the context of disease claims. 
An example of the legal dilemmas this can give rise to is the ǲTriggerǳ 
litigation,462 which was a joint appeal brought by nine insurance companies 
regarding the extent to which the employersǯ insurance policies covered them 
against negligence claims for mesothelioma (a disease, as mentioned earlier, 
with a long latency period: the disease typically manifests around 30 years after 
exposure). The insurers argued that the policies only responded where the 
mesothelioma had manifested during the insurance period: Lord Mance called 
this contention as the manifestation or occurrence basis of insurance liability.463 
The employers and employees representatives, on the other hand, argued that 
the policies should be triggered if the exposure allegedly happened during the 
insurance period: the exposure or causation basis. A particular difficulty was that 
the long gap between exposure and manifestation of disease meant that many 
employers had had multiple insurance policies in the intervening period. 
Further, it was difficult to know when exactly the disease was triggered. This, as 
Lord Mance noted, meant that significant gaps could arise in regard of the 
employers cover under the manifestation basis.464 This gap, he noted, would also 
be open to deliberate misuse by insurers, who could escape liability by simply 
not renewing employersǯ insurance policies.465 The Supreme Court thus 
dismissed the insurersǯ appeal, and held that the exposure or causation basis of 
liability was the correct one. However, the claim led to much debate, and Lord 
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Phillips dissented with the decision. In a perplexing speech, Lord Phillips 
appeared to disagree with Fairchild, and to change his mind about how Fairchild 
should have been decided.466 This case illustrates the many layers of legal 
dilemmas that can arise from the complexities of disease causation.   
 
Section 2.3: Single-cause versus multifactorial models of disease 
causation 
 
There is little doubt in current medical thinking that a large number of diseases 
that rank highest among the causes of death and disability today- including 
hypertension, coronary heart disease, respiratory disease, and cancer- are 
multifactorial in origin. Buchanan et al.467 draw a contrast between complex 
diseases, and disorders resulting from simple Mendelian inheritance, infection, 
or environmental toxins, for which it is possible to identify a single causal agent 
that is both specific and highly predictive. Although a few diseases may be the 
result of a single sufficient and necessary cause, the majority of diseases are 
generally not the result of any single cause but rather of multiple causes- there is, 
usually, a constellation of causes that is responsible for a disease.468  
 
When a cause of disease is both necessary and sufficient, or nearly so, it should 
be easier to spot and confirm.469 However, in medicine, as Markum points out, 
the causal relationship is generally not a simple linear relationship between 
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cause and effect- the relationship is more likely to be complex and multifaceted. 
Asking such questions as whether a factor was Ǯsufficientǯ or Ǯnecessaryǯ for the 
disease only leads to controversy that often has no clear resolution. Because 
many complex diseases are caused by complex interactions between genetic 
factors (polygenic basis) and various environmental factors,470 it is extremely 
difficult to unravel and isolate the individual factors and precisely assess their 
relative contributory role in the disease.471 Thus, biomedical causation, notes 
Markum, is seldom strictly deterministic, but more often probabilistic.472 
However, most causes, whether sufficient or necessary, can be assigned a 
percentage in terms of their likely contributory role in a disease, and it may be 
much more worthwhile for the law to instead assess such questions in disease 
litigation. Chapter 4 (section 3) will suggest such an alternative approach to 
causation in disease claims.  
 
Further, even single-cause models of disease causation are no longer viewed as 
being linear and simplistic. A research becomes more sophisticated, it appears 
that there may be many more contributory factors than had earlier even been 
conceptualized under the traditional biomedical model, which was founded on 
the now-overturned idea that every disease has a specific pathogenic origin.473 
The relatively newer area of medical sociology highlights that causality even in 
single-cause diseases may be more complex, and that social factors (such as 
social class, poverty, stress, lifestyle, unpleasant living conditions, socioeconomic 
disadvantage etc.) may play a significant contributory role in the development of 
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all disease. There is now increasing evidence that social context can shape the 
diseaseǯs incidence, course and outcome- regardless of whether it is infectious, 
genetic, metabolic, malignant, or degenerative.474  
 
All of this adds a further layer to the complexity of disease causation, and 
illustrates the difficulties in isolating Ǯnecessaryǯ or but-for causes of diseases. 
Increasing medical research appears to be adding to, rather than reducing, the 
list of factors that interact in various different ways to produce disease, and it is 
now vital for the law to recognise the importance of probabilistic reasoning in 
assessing the causal role an alleged toxin may have played in the outcome.  
 
2.4: The under-appreciated role of stochastic factors in disease 
causation 
 
Courts appear to have long avoided confronting the repeated challenges posed 
by disease causation, by simply attributing these to inadequate science and 
deficiencies of existing research. This indicates an underlying judicial hope that 
as science advances, the problems will automatically be resolved, and scientists 
will sooner or later be able to able to provide much more conclusive proof of Ǯindividualisedǯ, but-for causation in disease disputes. Many people seem to 
share this faith in the powers of science to eventually resolve all uncertainties. 
Cranor, for example, following much distinguished legal scholarship on the 
complexities of disease causation, states hopefully that Ǯas research tools are 
refined, and as more studies are conducted, causes for adverse outcomes may 
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well be more definitely identified, and more certain conclusions may transform 
how scientists think about, analyse and assign causal responsibility for various 
diseases.ǯ475 
 
Sadly, this optimism about a future characterised by more or less complete 
causal certainty about disease may be misplaced. As Gold476 argues, the opposite 
is true. Some scholars, he notes, have hoped that genomic and molecular 
information will at last provide scientific certainty — definitive, individualized 
proof of toxic causation. However, increasingly sophisticated scientific research 
into the interaction between human genes and environmental exposures 
suggests future extension, rather than resolution, of the problem of causal 
indeterminacy in toxic torts.477 He cites genomic research to contend that 
actually, Ǯat the highest magnifications, certainty will dissolve into probability.ǯ 
Better scientific evidence will, he believes, only strengthen the argument for 
doctrinal reforms in toxic tort litigation, and for legal approaches that can take 
account of probabilistic evidence about toxic substances.478 
 
Coggon and Martyn479 (professors of medicine and epidemiology, respectively) 
explain why such causal completeness and certainty may be a long time coming, 
given the seemingly infinite number of variables that often interact in infinite 
numbers of ways to produce disease. They describe the insurmountable 
problems with the expectation of complete answers from medical sciences, given 
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the stochastic nature of disease causation: Ǯif they become ill, they demand a 
reason. If such a reason is not forthcoming, they imagine that this is because 
medical knowledge is still incomplete, and that further research will soon reveal the answer…Obviously, a patient with a disease must have been exposed to a 
combination of causes sufficient to induce that disease, but it does not 
necessarily follow that these causes are measurable or even identifiable. An 
analogy can be drawn with the throw of a die. The fact that a six is rolled does 
not mean that the die was heavily exposed to any risk factors for that outcome. 
Instead, this result is due to the operation of a complex set of circumstances 
(dimensions, shape, and weight of the die; the exact position of its centre of 
gravity; forces acting on it and its height above the ground when thrown; 
viscosity of the air; contour and elastic properties of the surface on which it 
landed, and so on), none of which could be shown to have a consistent effect on 
its own on whether the die rolls six.ǯ Coggon and Martyn conclude, after 
reviewing the nature of disease causation, that the role of stochastic processes is 
underappreciated.ǯ480 The enormous number of possible combinations of 
potentially interacting causal factors—genes, epigenetics, other individual 
characteristics, and exposures— makes it extraordinarily unlikely that complete 
risk characterization will ever be possible at an individual level.481 This means 
that reliance on statistical probability computations may be the only way, within 
current scientific knowledge, of explaining and predicting disease occurrence.  
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SECTION 3: Greater integration between legal and medical causation: how 
the law gets the science wrong 
 
This chapter has attempted to outline the current medical evidence about 
causation, and the problematic rigid legal approach to causation, in order to 
illustrate the extent of the divide between law and science in this area. Although 
lawyers have pinned their hopes on the idea that Ǯbetterǯ science will resolve all 
uncertainties about causation, increasing research into the causes of disease 
shows that Ǯmoreǯ science may increase, rather than narrow, this divide. Legal 
reform is imperative in the approach to factual causation.  
 
The relationship between medicine and the law, point out Spicker et al, 482 has 
not always been characterised by mutual respect. An unhealthy antagonism 
between these professions can lead to isolation of each from each other, and 
discourages a collaborative interdisciplinary approach to problems of mutual 
concern. This chapter has attempted to contrast deterministic legal approaches 
to causation, and probabilistic scientific models of disease causation, to make the 
point that the lack of alignment between law and medicine is becoming an 
urgent and pressing problem in disease and toxic tort litigation. If lawyers are to 
understand and properly engage with probabilistic scientific reasoning, any 
residual disciplinary antipathy must be overcome. Training for both lawyers 
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working in this area and for scientific expert witnesses could be one helpful 
strategy to bring about better understanding.  
 
Undoubtedly, legal questions are different from scientific questions. Thus they 
can rarely be answered by a simplistic application of scientific studies. For 
example, medical research is generally focused on prospective forecasting of the 
effect of a particular agent on an outcome. The law, on the other hand, looks 
backwards to see what agent might have caused the outcome: the outcome is 
already known, and the analysis of causation requires a retrospective 
assessment of the clinical and biological evidence.483As Faigman puts it, "[w]hile 
science attempts to discover the universals hiding among the particulars, trial 
courts attempt to discover the particulars hiding among the universals.'
484
 
Dawid, a professor of statistics at the University of Cambridge, uses the terms Ǯeffects of causesǯ (EoC) and Ǯcauses of effectsǯ (CoE) to define this distinction. 
The central question in the scientific inquiry usually pertains to the effects of 
causes, as future causal predictions are being attempted (e.g. Ǯwill taking this 
aspirin cause my headache to disappear?ǯ). Lawyers, on the other hand, are 
primarily interested in the Ǯcauses of effects, which is a backward-looking 
question: e.g. Ǯdid smoking cause my cancer?ǯ This distinction, Dawid feels, is 
important because the mismatch requires a need to be cautious when we try to 
bring scientific evidence and reasoning to bear on questions of legal causality.485      
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However, perceptions about the differences can sometimes be exaggerated. 
Faigman feels, for example, that science and medicine have spent relatively little 
time on etiological questions. The primary concern in clinical medicine, he 
opines, is on diagnosis and treatment, not on ascertaining etiology or causation: 
an oncologist might be curious about what caused the patientǯs leukemia, but his 
or her first task is to identify and treat the condition, not to determine whether a 
toxic substance, electromagnetic fields or genetic predisposition caused it.486 
However, this view may need to be qualified. While it is true that lawyers are 
only interested in causes and etiology rather than diagnosis and treatment, both 
etiology and treatment are important in medical research. The two issues are not 
as disconnected as such commentators such as Faigman suggest. Despite the 
greater practical, pressing concerns about diagnosis and treatment, 
understanding causation is also important to medicine, because this can provide 
important diagnostic and treatment cues. As Markum notes, identifying the 
diseaseǯs causes is the first step often towards the possibility of treating the 
personǯs illness.487  Thus a great deal of biomedical and epidemiological research 
remains devoted to causation.   
   
The perceived chasm between law and science may be further exaggerated by 
the fact that courts apply artificial concepts and terminology about disease that 
bear little connection with any known medical or empirical evidence; and then 
tend to seek testimony about these as though they are empirical facts. An 
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example of this is the legal distinction between Ǯdivisibleǯ and Ǯindivisibleǯ 
disease, which is a concept invented by lawyers, but largely unknown to 
scientific experts who are often asked to give their opinion on the issue. The 
concept of an indivisible injury appears to have first been formulated, 
interestingly, in a defamation claim (Associated Newspapers v Dingle).488 The 
term was actually used by Devlin LJ in Dingle to decide apportionment for 
different forms of damage that the claimant had suffered due to the libel, rather 
than in relation to disease: ǮThe damage due to mental distress and to 
widespread repetition constitute, it may be said, an indivisible injury for which 
the damages cannot be separately assessed as between different publications of 
the same libel, and therefore each wrongdoer whose act is a substantial cause of 
the injury must pay for the whole.ǯ489 Indivisible injuries would entail joint and 
several liability, stated Devlin LJ, while divisible injuries would attract several 
liability.490  
 
Since then, however, this artificial concept has become firmly enshrined in 
disease and toxic tort litigation through its application in Fairchild, which 
defined divisible disease as an injury that can be divided into component parts 
resulting from different causes. An indivisible injury, on the other hand, is 
defined in Fairchild as a more all-or-nothing concept, in the sense that the 
attribution of different parts to different causes is not possible.491 The court in 
Fairchild drew a distinction between asbestosis (deemed to be divisible) versus 
mesothelioma (deemed to be indivisible).  
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Feldschreiber et al take the view that distinction between divisible and 
indivisible diseases492 was a consequence of the prevalent view about the 
etiology of mesothelioma at the time Fairchild was decided (i.e. the single-fibre 
theory of mesothelioma). However, the single fibre theory is now discredited,493 
and evidence suggests something more akin to a dose-response relationship for 
cases of indivisible injury such as mesothelioma: consequently, the theoretical 
distinction between divisible and indivisible injuries to begin to break down.494 
Further, the distinction is also likely to have been formulated partly to address 
judicial concerns about injustice to claimants due to the particular circumstances 
in Fairchild. The case (discussed in detail later in Chapter 4) involved multiple 
defendant employers who had exposed the claimant to asbestos, leading to 
mesothelioma (a disease with an especially long latency period, typically 30-40 
years). This meant that the evidentiary hurdles faced by the claimants were 
particularly huge. Typically, mesothelioma claims also involve further difficulties 
because some of the defendants will be insolvent or will have simply stopped 
trading by the time the disease manifests. The judicial effort to protect claimants 
from risk of insolvency required the imposition of joint and several liability, and 
the causal questions appears to have simply been approached through 
backwards reasoning, so as to achieve the desired outcome. Regardless, the 
concept of divisible and indivisible disease appears to have taken on the status of 
empirical scientific fact for courts. 
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As this chapter has attempted to argue earlier, if the exigencies of a case require 
courts to take into account normative considerations in decision-making, it 
would be better for the clarity of the law to be transparent about this. Choosing, 
as they currently do, to twist causation reasoning in enigmatic ways in order to 
maintain the illusion that the decision is following some coherent legal principle 
does no service to the coherence of the law. Further, to view factual causation as 
an enquiry that can be shaped by what ǲfeelsǳ right renders causation 
meaningless. Such an approach also goes against the foundations of UK tort law: 
a causal link, as Professor Honoré notes, is necessary to both corrective justice 
and tort liability.495 
     
The law, it is submitted, has avoided confronting the challenges of disease 
litigation for too long by believing that mesothelioma and asbestos-related 
injuries belong to some special category of diseases that occur only rarely. 
Courts have therefore convinced themselves that formulating an exceptional 
approach to asbestos cases (and those other cases that can bring themselves 
within the narrow criteria for exceptional tests for causation) is sufficient to do 
justice in the majority of claims. Unfortunately, the available evidence does not 
support this legal illusion. A review of the case law shows that despite legal 
reluctance, the exceptional tests are increasingly being extended to a growing 
number of disease scenarios that do not fit the conventional criteria for the Ǯmaterial contributionǯ tests (such as most recently in cases such as Heneghan v 
Manchester Dry Docks Ltd & Others496 and the Privy Council decision in Williams v 
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Bermuda Hospitals Board497). Such is the complex nature of disease in general, 
that questions of Ǯbut-forǯ causation for some of the most disabling illnesses is 
likely to tie scientists and courts in knots for the foreseeable future. Rising 
numbers of claims for diseases allegedly arising from toxic exposures ensures 
that ever-new dilemmas will be placed before courts. The urge to do justice 
within existing inadequate and ill-fitting causation principles such will lead to 
increasing confusion in the law of causation. It is urgent for courts to pay regard 
to the best available empirical evidence about disease and modify the approach 
towards disease causation. Chapter 4 examines the string of toxic tort litigation 
where the but-for test has repeatedly proven impossible for claimants to satisfy. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
THE BUT-FOR AND EXCEPTIONAL TESTS FOR CAUSATION 
 
Chapter 3 highlighted the complexities of disease causation. It argued that the 
legal demand for science to provide precise answers to questions about the 
etiology of a specific claimantǯs disease, and about whether the tortious factor 
was necessary for the disease to occur, is a futile expectation- at least for now, 
and for the foreseeable future. Most major diseases can be caused in different 
ways, through interactions between many different factors. In that sense, 
complex disease litigation can be viewed as an area of the law where over-
determined causation is the norm, rather than the exception. In addition, causal 
factors in disease litigation act on dynamic, infinitely variable biological systems 
that adapt and respond differently to different substances, rather than on 
inanimate objects with fixed, determinate properties.  This makes it much more 
difficult to evaluate Ǯnecessaryǯ causal factors for disease, than, for example, a 
negligently caused fire in a building. Tort law, this thesis asserts, has completely 
ignored this problem in its rigid approach to causation. 
 
While courts have tended to see the problems raised by disease litigation as 
arising primarily from deficiencies in current scientific knowledge, this author 
contends that the greater difficulty arises from the lawǯs simplistic legal test for 
factual causation: the Ǯbut-forǯ test, and its inability to take account of the 
multifactorial and stochastic nature of disease causation. This chapter will 
outline the problematic application of the but-for test in disease disputes, and 
 168 
the situations where proven impossible to apply. This appears to have nearly 
always occurred in the context of complex disease claims. A central argument of 
this thesis is that it is no accident or coincidence that most of these dilemmas 
have arisen in disease litigation: this is simply further proof of the complexities 
of disease highlighted earlier in Chapter 3. Jones498 notes that while causation is 
relatively straightforward in most cases, most difficult cases tend to arise in 
claims for occupational disease and some claims for medical negligence: 
difficulties which usually stem from scientific uncertainty.  
 
Unfortunately, as this chapter will aim to show, situations where Ǯbut-forǯ causes 
of a disease are impossible to identify are not exceptional, contrary to judicial 
beliefs. Although courts hold on to the idea that evidentiary uncertainties arise 
only in a narrow range of conditions (such as asbestos-related disease), the 
reality is that most major diseases have similarly uncertain causation. A cancer 
caused by smoking looks no different on a scan from a cancer caused largely by 
genetic factors. Hazy judicial recognition of the gross injustice of the Ǯbut forǯ test 
in some scenarios has led to the development of more relaxed exceptional tests 
for factual causation, with poorly defined boundaries, on a case-by-case basis 
(most of these scenarios occurring in disease litigation). However, it is clear that 
courts experience much conflict in this regard. Legal outcomes in this area, as 
Jones points out, are more tied up in policy judgments about when claimants 
ought to succeed, and a judicial reluctance to translate policy judgements from 
                                                        
498 MA Jones, ‘Proving Causation- Beyond the “But-for” Test’ (2006) 22 Professional Negligence 251, 
251 
 169 
one type of claim to Ǯwith the result that outcomes on causation can seem to 
depend on the specific factual context rather than general principle.ǯ499    
 
This thesis contends that such an approach is bound to fail, as the slow extension 
of the exceptional tests to various different factual scenarios (especially in some 
very recent cases) clearly demonstrates. As the injustice of making such 
arbitrary distinctions between different diseases becomes more and more 
apparent, judges appear to have felt compelled to twist and contort causation 
reasoning in order to avoid injustice to deserving claimants facing 
insurmountable evidentiary gaps, while at the same time somehow still trying to 
maintain the illusion that the existent legal principles are still being applied.  
 
This chapter proposes that such contortion of legal principles is both 
unnecessary and damaging. The need of the hour is more practical, evidence-
based legal principles in disease litigation that better align with probabilistic 
scientific evidence about disease. Causal factors in medicine are usually assessed 
in terms of their likely role in the onset of disease (on their own, or 
synergistically), rather than in terms of the necessity of each individual factor to 
the illness. An example of this conceptualisation is the ǲcausal pieǳ (or 
sufficient/component cause) model (Rothman et al 2008),500 which explains 
disease as a product of several component causes, which together comprise a 
sufficient cause.501 Thus causal tests in this area need to move away from a focus 
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on the necessity of the tortious factor, to an assessment of its likely contributory 
role in the disease.  
 
Currently, courts prefer to apply the Ǯbut forǯ test for causation as far as possible. 
The exceptional tests are only intended for very narrow circumstances, and 
courts have devised a variety of restricting criteria for their use (criteria which, 
as later discussions of recent caselaw will show, are proving unfeasible in 
practice, as there is no real rationale for many of these restrictive criteria). This 
thesis contends that the Ǯmaterial contributionǯ tests, although poorly justified 
and arbitrarily applied, are at least a better fit in all but the most straightforward 
toxic tort cases than the but-for test, as they seem more able to take account of 
probabilistic and multifactorial causation. The haphazard nature of their use is 
problematic, however. In keeping with existent medical evidence, this thesis 
proposes that a more scientifically plausible test of general applicability to 
disease claims, such as a test for causation based on Ǯsignificant contribution to 
diseaseǯ, on the balance of probabilities, may be a more semantically appropriate 
in this area of the law. Such a test would avoid many of the impossible-to-resolve 
controversies around whether liability is being imposed for injury or risk of 
injury. Further, importantly, it would align better with scientific models of 
disease and would thus allow more appropriate application of probabilistic 
scientific and epidemiological evidence to the causal assessment.  
 
Most crucially, such an approach of general applicability to disease claims will 
not make arbitrary distinctions between chance factual circumstances. 
Currently, courts decide whether or not to use more relaxed tests depending on 
 171 
such factors such as whether the disease was divisible or indivisible (a 
distinction of the lawǯs own invention, and one that Chapter 3 argued should be 
abolished); whether the different factors were similar or dissimilar; or whether 
the exposures happened concurrently or consecutively. This thesis contends that 
it is both unjust and unnecessarily confusing to make legal outcomes hinge on 
such yardsticks when, in fact, the same evidentiary uncertainties characterise 
most complex diseases. The current approach makes legal outcomes a matter of 
luck rather than justice, and the justification for the relevance of distinctions in 
legal analysis is too weak or absent altogether  
 
While the probabilistic causal assessment suggested in this chapter lacks 
absolute certainty, the preceding discussions in chapters 2 and 3 have already 
highlighted that the quest for certainty is an illusory and misleading goal in 
science, particularly when the question pertains to the etiology of diseases. The 
role for evidence (including scientific evidence) in the law, it must be 
remembered, is not to verify which assertion is the ultimate truth, but only to 
decide whether the evidence points to the claimantǯs, or the defendantǯs 
assertion as being the more probable.502 It will be recalled that Justice Jay 
recently acknowledged that:  
Practical problems naturally arise in the law where a fact in issue cannot 
be proved by direct evidence but by inference. The law may be based on 
a deterministic view of the natural world. Causes may in theory be 
observed as they occur, but they will not have been if the past event has 
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come and gone. The drawing of an inference is the only available pathway 
to proof.ǯ503  
 
Further, this thesis asserts that if Ǯcontribution to the injuryǯ forms the basis of 
recovery in disease litigation, this can only be justified if compensation is 
proportionate to the extent of contribution as indicated by available evidence. 
The proposed new test only assesses the likelihood that a factor played a 
contributory role in the disease, and thus acknowledges that other factors would 
have played a part too. Thus, imposing liability for the whole injury on a 
defendant who may have only added to a part, or even none, of the harm would 
be disproportionate and excessive. Also, because most diseases can happen in 
many different (and often unknowable) ways, it shows due consideration of the 
fact that it is often impossible to be sure the tortious factor swung the outcome. 
Although a Ǯperfectǯ solution still remains elusive, the law should aim to minimise 
injustice as far as possible. Thus liability must be proportionate to the probable 
contribution of the factor to harm. Further, epidemiological methods can make a 
valuable contribution to such as assessment of likely contribution, even for what 
the law currently sees as Ǯindivisibleǯ diseases. However, its potential has so far 
been under-utilised due to rigid legal adherence to naïve and unscientific causal 
concepts.    
 
Section 1 of this chapter explores the traditional Ǯbut forǯ test, and its use in 
disease claims. This test has been useful as a test for factual causation in some 
situations, while in other scenarios it has proved less useful. Disease claims, this 
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section argues, clearly belong in the latter category. Section 2 outlines the 
development of the Ǯexceptionalǯ approaches, the narrow range of circumstances 
they were originally designed for, and the very slow (but steady) erosion of these 
restrictive criteria in recent cases. The most recent cases show that these 
exceptional tests are being applied to many diseases that do not fit the original 
criteria they were designed for, but in a confused and haphazard way. Section 2.1 
will examine the Ǯmaterial contribution to injuryǯ (or Bonnington)504 principle, 
section 2.2 will examine the Ǯmaterial contribution to riskǯ (or Fairchild)505 
principle, and section 2.3 will examine the Ǯdoubles the riskǯ test. Section 2.4 will 
outline the main issues about disease causation that are highlighted by the 
preceding discussion about the exceptional tests. Section 3 will suggest an 
alternative approach to causation that is more principled and justifiable, as well 
as more congruent with current medical and scientific understanding of disease. 
Epidemiology can play a valuable role in such a probabilistic assessment of 
causation.    
 
SECTION 1: The traditional approach to factual causation 
 
Chapter 3 (at section 2) earlier discussed the biological reasons for the 
unsuitability of a deterministic approach to the causes of disease. Prosser 
summarises the but-for or sine qua non rule as follows: ǮThe defendant's conduct 
is not the cause of the event, if the same event would have occurred without 
it.ǯ506 Thus, necessity is a central component of the but-for test. The problem with 
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complex disease, as Chapter 3 demonstrated, is that the same disease can be 
caused in so many different ways, through so many different combinations of 
factors, that experts can almost never be sure that this disease would never have 
happened but for that part of the event. How, then, in such a scenario, is but-for 
causation to be established? 
 
The normal rule for factual causation is the but-for test, which requires the 
claimant to establish that injury would not have occurred but for the defendantǯs 
negligence. This must be proven on the balance of probabilities: if it is more 
likely than not that the event was the cause, it is treated as if it was the cause.507 
Thus, as Steel and Ibbetson note, the normal rule of causation, which applies in 
almost all situations, has two aspects: the evidential and the conceptual. In order 
to establish liability, P has to show on balance of probabilities (evidential) that 
but for D's wrongful conduct the injury would not have occurred (conceptual).508 
 
One major advantage of the but-for test is its simplicity, assuming that a 
definitive answer can be given to the question.509 The test is thus well suited to 
answer straightforward causal questions. If, however, there is not a 
straightforward answer to the conceptual question, or we do not have sufficient 
evidence, the test can fail completely, or yield illogical outcomes. Even outside of 
the disease context, it is generally accepted that one situation where the but-for 
test is comes under stress in situations of over-determination,510 that is, when 
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there are multiple causal mechanisms that could result in the same effect. 
Staunch supporters of the but-for test such as Green also acknowledge that it is 
unable to deal with Ǯover-determinedǯ cause scenarios.511 Green, however, 
continues to advocate the but-for test despite its inadequacy in dealing with 
overdetermined causes, on the grounds this is, in her view, mostly just a 
theoretical rather than a practical problem. Firstly, contends Green, Ǯ…there are 
relatively few cases of this nature which actually trouble the courts,ǯ and 
secondly, in Professor Greenǯs opinion, Ǯjudicial pragmatismǯ has usually been 
sufficient to prevent injustice.512 This thesis, with respect, disputes both these 
contentions, at least as far as disease litigation is concerned. It argues that in 
disease litigation, over-determined cause scenarios are the exception rather than 
the norm. As a result of the frequency with which such situations arise in this 
area of the law, high levels of recourse to Ǯjudicial pragmatismǯ and creativity 
have led to unacceptable levels of confusion in the law of causation. The extent of 
current incoherence in tort law as a result of the haphazard application of the 
exceptional tests for causation suggests the danger of Ǯjudicial pragmatismǯ 
becoming simply another term for a mostly subjective approach to factual 
causation. 
 
Members of the judiciary have on a number of occasions also expressed more 
general and wider concerns about the Ǯbut forǯ test. This demonstrates that a 
rigid, simplistic, one-size-fits-all concept of causation may be insufficient to take 
account of, and deliver justice in, many situations. As the Canadian Supreme 
                                                        
511 Such as, for example, S Green, Causation in Negligence (Hart 2015) 9 
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Court judge, McLachlin J, extra-judicially pointed out513:  
Why are courts asking questions that for decades, indeed centuries, did not 
pose themselves, or if they did, were of no great urgency? I would suggest 
that is because all too often the traditional but-for, all-or-nothing, test 
denies recovery where our instinctive sense of justice- of what is the right 
result for the situation- tells us the victim should obtain some compensation. 
 
(McLachlin Jǯs reference to the all-or-nothing test, it must be noted, also raises 
important questions about the fairness of joint and several liability in complex 
disease cases, where multiple factors are often involved, and where evidentiary 
uncertainties are the norm. The principle of joint and several liability is currently 
applied in mesothelioma cases due to section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006, 
but it can also be extended to other diseases deemed Ǯindivisibleǯ.  McLachlin Jǯs 
concerns about the need for victims to receive some compensation suggests a 
belief that outcomes might be fairer, and reasoning more principled, if more 
moderate approaches such as proportionate liability are the norm. Issues of 
apportionment will also be briefly discussed in Section 3 later in this chapter). 
 
Lord Bingham noted, in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,514 some of the 
problems with the test, and its limited utility:  
  
The but-for test gives rise to a well-known difficulty in cases where there are 
two or more acts or events which would each be sufficient to bring about 
the plaintiff's injury...the test, applied as an exclusive criterion of causation, 
yields unacceptable results and the results which it yields must be tempered 
                                                        
513CJ McLachlin, 'Proving the Connection' in N Mullany & A Linden (eds), Torts Tomorrow: A Tribute 
to John Fleming (1998 LBC Information Services) 16 (quoted from Fairchild (n 8) at [11] (Lord 
Bingham)) 
514 Fairchild (n 8) 
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by the making of value judgments and the infusion of policy 
considerations.515 
 
Lord Bingham appeared to take the view that the only course left open to courts 
was to Ǯtemperǯ the rigidity of the but-for test by deciding factual causation on 
the basis of normative considerations. However, this thesis has already made the 
case (in Chapter 3 section 1) that assessing factual causation on the basis of 
value judgments is damaging to the ultimate aims of tort law (which is not to 
deny a role for normative considerations in other strands of the negligence 
enquiry such as remoteness, duty of care etc.). To decide on factual matters 
without giving primacy to objective evidence would be to make the factual 
assessment a hollow exercise.  
 
The Court of Appeal recognised some significant difficulties that beset disease 
causation in its recent decision in Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd516 This 
involved a claim where the biological evidence could not establish which (if any) 
of the exposures triggered the cell changes in the claimantǯs body; but where 
epidemiological and statistical evidence was able to establish how much the 
exposure attributable to each defendant increased the risk that he would 
contract the disease (the case will be discussed later in section 2.2 below). The 
Court of Appeal noted517 the submission of the defendantǯs expert, Dr Rudd, who 
made the point about the problematic legal approach to disease causation clearly 
during his re-examination: ?Where we have a process which is essentially 
random, a series of accidents, a stochastic process, it is never going to be 
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 Fairchild (n 8) at [10]- [12] 
516 [2014] EWHC 4190 (QB) 
517 ibid at [31] (emphasis added) 
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appropriate to have a deterministic model of causation. You are never going 
to say this employer contributed to this fibre which had that effect on that 
cell.? 
 
The bewildering range of arguments that claimants have made for an extension 
of exceptional tests to several diseases other than the restricted disease 
scenarios they were intended for (as we shall examine at length in section 2 
below) demonstrates this problem. Disease causation is prone to inherent 
evidentiary uncertainties and as well as to over-determined causation. Both 
these factors in combination make the but-for test fundamentally unsuited to 
this area of the law, and this has ensured that the most difficult causal dilemmas 
arise with unfailing regularity in complex disease claims. The section below will 
outline the development and further applications of the exceptional tests for 
factual causation. It will highlight the incremental extensions of these tests to a 
growing range of different diseases in recent case law: a development that, this 
thesis argues, is inevitable because of the nature of disease.  
 
SECTION 2: The ?exceptional? tests for factual causation 
 
Over the years, courts have created a number of exceptions to the traditional 
but-for test, which have evolved on a case-by-case basis. The need for the 
exceptional tests has arisen due to evidentiary difficulties that make it 
impossible for a claimant to satisfy the but-for test. An evidentiary gap scenario 
occurs when insufficient scientific knowledge or evidence make it impossible for 
the claimant to prove on the balance of probabilities that their injury or disease 
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would not have occurred without the involvement of the allegedly tortious 
factor.518  
 
The most well-known of these exceptional tests for factual causation, which are 
almost always invoked in complex disease claims, are the Ǯmaterial contribution 
to injuryǯ (or Bonnington) test and the Ǯmaterial contribution to riskǯ test 
(otherwise called the Fairchild test). Although the Fairchild test, in particular, has 
sparked tremendous controversy that continues even today, a string of prior 
cases had already paved the way for the development of the Fairchild principle. 
The section below will trace the development of the material contribution tests, 
as well as their ongoing applications, which are often problematic. In addition, it 
will also outline the third exceptional approach to disease causation: the Ǯdoubling of the riskǯ (DOR) test, which is based on a somewhat peculiar judicial 
understanding of epidemiological evidence, and which is usually called into play 
when courts encounter scenarios which do not fit the criteria for the material 
contribution tests.     
 
2.1: The ?material contribution to injury? (Bonnington) test  
 
2.1.1: Initial formulation 
 
The first clear relaxation of the standard but-for approach to causation occurred 
in the case of Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw.519 The claimant here was an 
                                                        
518 See G Turton, Evidential Uncertainty in Causation in Negligence (Hart Publishing 2016) 81-86 
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employee who had contracted pneumoconiosis following exposure to air 
containing particles of silica during his employment. While some of this exposure 
occurred without fault on part of the defendant (through ǲinnocentǳ exposure), 
the quantity of noxious dust was increased due to faultily maintained swing 
grinders (the negligent exposure). Thus, some part of the exposure was due to 
tortious factors, while some of it arose due to non-tortious factors, and both 
these exposures occurred simultaneously. Due to evidentiary uncertainties, the 
claimant was unable to establish that he would have suffered the same outcome Ǯbut forǯ the tort: pneumoconiosis is caused by gradual build-up of such toxins in 
the lungs. There was at the time no known way of preventing some part of the 
exposure. Thus the dispute was only in regard of the additional exposure due to 
the employerǯs negligence. However, the question of whether the disease would 
have happened anyway even without negligence was impossible to answer on 
available medical evidence due to the multiple sources of exposure. The House of 
Lords held that in this instance it was sufficient for the claimant to establish that 
the breach had made a material contribution to his injury, and on these grounds, 
ruled in the claimantǯs favour. Waller LJ referred to causation being established: 
…where medical science cannot establish the probability that Ǯbut forǯ an 
act of negligence the injury would not have happened but can establish that 
the contribution of the negligent cause was more than negligible.520 
 
This test is now commonly referred to as the material contribution to injury, or 
Bonnington test, and has been applied across a string of subsequent caselaw.   
Anderson521 notes that what this case did not decide (because it was never 
argued) was the extent of the defenders' liability. It is unclear, notes Anderson, 
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whether the defendants would have only been liable for the aggravation of the 
disease which the negligent dust caused, had medical evidence been presented to 
argue that the dust from the ǲnon negligentǳ source had been the main cause of 
the disease. But the House did not consider the issue of divisibility, so 
pneumoconiosis was treated as an indivisible disease, and full liability was 
imposed on the defendant.  
 
The Court of Appeal did, however, consider the point in in the later case of Holtby 
v Brigham and Cowan (Hull) Ltd.522 The plaintiff had worked as a marine fitter for 
nearly 40 years, and during the course of his employment he was exposed to 
asbestos for significant periods. He had worked with the defendants for nearly 
12 years during this time. The claimant developed asbestosis and sued the 
employer who had exposed him to asbestos for the longest period.  Stuart-Smith 
LJ held that the evidence indicated that asbestosis had resulted from and been 
aggravated by cumulative exposure to asbestos. Thus the defendant was only 
held liable for the part of the damage they had caused. Although the court found 
quantification difficult, Stuart-Smith LJ emphasised that the best that could be 
done was only to minimise injustice to either party as far as possible: ǮThe court 
must do the best it can to achieve justice, not only to the claimant but the 
defendant, and among defendants.ǯ523  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
521 GM Anderson, ‘Disease Causation and the Extent of Material Contribution’ (2006) 15 Scots Law 
Times 87, 93-94 
522 [2000] 3 All ER 421 CA 
523 ibid at [20] 
 182 
2.1.2: Inconsistencies, further applications and extensions of 
Bonnington 
 
The Bonnington principle left many questions unanswered about its scope and 
applicability: what exactly are the situations in which this test will and will not 
apply? Despite many judicial inconsistencies in its actual use, the Bonnington test 
is conventionally understood in academic analysis to be intended for restricted 
and very specific factual scenarios. For example, Green interprets it as applicable 
where there are multiple causal factors524 that operate concurrently rather than 
consecutively,525 and where the factors cumulatively contribute to the harm.526 
McIvor further cites cases such as Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North 
Shields) Ltd527 and Holtby v Brigham and Cowan (Hull) Ltd528 to note that the 
Bonnington principle is usually applicable to claims for divisible diseases.529 
However, as McIvor530 further notes, there have been many contrary judicial 
interpretations, as indicated by Lord Phillipsǯ obiter approval of its application to 
lung cancer, which is indivisible.531  This is consistent with many recent cases 
where courts have interpreted the rule to be applicable to may situations that 
fall outside the restricted criteria. The Ǯmaterial contribution to injuryǯ test has, 
since its original formulation, been applied to a number of different variations of 
multiple-potential cause situations. 
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Steel532 is of the opinion that the law is Ǯin a messǯ as far as the material 
contribution test is concerned: ǮMaterial contribution has at least two meanings. 
They are not properly distinguished. They have nothing in common. In one 
meaning, found in Bonnington, negligence will be said to have "materially 
contributed" to the claimantǯs damage where, but for the defendantǯs 
negligence, some part (of indeterminate size) of the claimantǯs damage would not 
have occurred.ǯ533 But, Steel further notes, Ǯmaterial contributionǯ also has 
another meaning, found in Bailey v Ministry of Defence.534 Here a defendantǯs 
negligence is said to have contributed to the claimantǯs injury if it played a 
significant role in the physical process by which that injury was produced.ǯ535  
 
In Bailey v Ministry of Defence,536 the Court of Appeal ruled in favour of a 
claimant who had suffered brain damage due to severe weakness that could have 
resulted from either the defendantǯs negligence, or her own physiological 
problems (pancreatitis), or both. The claimant argued that the weakness resulted 
from a combination of the two, and thus that the Bonnington principle of 
material contribution to injury should apply. The defence disputed this point. 
However, the Court of Appeal in Bailey held that the negligence had made a 
material contribution to the injury and that the two sources of Ǯweaknessǯ had 
cumulatively the ultimate asphyxiation. The court thus ruled that factual 
causation was established. This decision has resulted in much debate about the 
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boundaries of the material contribution test, and come in for a fair share of 
criticism. Bailey, for example, argues that the decision in Bailey is wrong, and 
that it should not constitute authority for the expanded Ǯmaterial contributionǯ 
concept.537  
Bailey also further notes another fundamental ambiguity at the heart 
of Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw: it is unclear whether the Ǯmaterial 
contributionǯ rule involves an application of the but-for principle or 
an exception to that ruleǯ.538 There is a lack of clear consensus on this issue in 
academic commentary. Bailey, for instance, is of the opinion that the material 
contribution test is an application of the orthodox but-for rule, and not an 
exception to it. 539 Stapleton and Steel, on the other hand, opine that the principle Ǯmust be understood as employing a causal concept which is broader than but-
for causation.ǯ540 
 
Additional inconsistencies arise in relation to the question of whether the test 
applies only when the two factors operate concurrently rather than 
consecutively. Green541 takes the view that the simultaneous exposure in 
Bonnington was central to the need for the material contribution to injury test, as 
there was no way that the court could divide up the claimant's injury into 
discrete sections to correspond to the two different sources of toxin. In 
Greenǯs542 assessment, had the two sources of exposure occurred consecutively 
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as opposed to concurrently, the problem would not have 
arisen: Bonnington could have been decided on straightforward causal 
principles, obviating the need for a material contribution analysis. However, the 
Privy Council in the recent case of Williams v Bermuda Hospitals Board 543 used 
the material contribution to injury test to uphold a claim for conditions that 
involve multiple causes that did not operate concurrently but consecutively. In 
Williams, the claimant suffered sepsis due to a combination of two factors: 
surgery due to appendicitis as well as negligent delay on part of the hospital 
which, he alleged, caused post surgery complications. The resultant 
complications were held to be due to a combination of both factors, but the 
claimant struggled to bring his claim within the Bonnington exception due to the 
fact that both factors did not act concurrently, but consecutively. Nonetheless, 
the Privy Council chose to extend Bonnington to also include situations where 
the causes are concurrent.  
 
  
Further, previous caselaw had indicated that the Bonnington test only applies 
when multiple similar factors cumulatively result in the injury. Thus, in Hotson v 
East Berkshire HA,544 the lack of evidence about cumulative operation of the two 
factors resulted in the court refusing to apply the material contribution to injury 
test, despite the negligence increasing the likelihood of the injury. The claimant 
in Hotson fell while climbing a tree and suffered ruptured blood vessels, but the 
hospital failed to diagnose this until five days later, leading to avascular necrosis 
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of the epiphysis. Evidence indicated that both the fall, as well as the hospitalǯs 
failure to diagnose/intervene on time, could have contributed to the injury, 
independently or cumulatively. Lord Bridge stated that unless the claimant 
proved on a balance of probabilities that the delay in treatment was at least a 
contributory cause of the avascular necrosis, he failed on causation, and that the 
evidence amounted to a finding of fact that the fall was the sole cause of the 
avascular necrosis.545 Hotson was distinguished from Bonnington partly on the 
grounds that the injury in Hotson was not cumulatively caused by a combination 
of factors, but by one or the other of different potential causal factors (i.e. the fall 
itself or the negligent delay).546 Similarly, in Wilsher v Essex Health Authority,547 
medical evidence indicated that there were four separate potential causes for the 
claimantǯs blindness in addition to the tortious cause, any of which could have 
independently caused the condition. The claim failed for lack of but-for causation 
on the balance of probabilities due to fact that the different potential causes were 
not similar to each other. The House of Lords in Wilsher distinguished 
Bonnington, where the injury was caused by a single known process (the 
inhalation of dust), and refused to apply the Bonnington test for causation. 
 
On the other hand, the outcome was very different in the very recent case of John 
v Central Manchester and Manchester Childrenǯs University Hopsitals NHS 
Foundation Trust,548 which was factually substantially similar to Hotson549 and 
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Wilsher,550 in that the situation involved multiple different potential factors that 
could have independently or cumulatively caused the injury. The court in John 
applied the material contribution to injury test to a claim where the claimant was 
left with long-term cognitive damage following a combination of an initial head 
injury and subsequent hospital delay in providing appropriate investigation and 
treatment. The claimant alleged that there was a negligent delay in the 
performance of the CT brain scan, and in not requesting an ambulance sooner. 
Thus the claimantǯs argument was that but for the defendant's negligence, he 
would have avoided some or all of the dangerously raised inter-cranial pressure 
that materially contributed to the brain damage that he had sustained from the 
initial head injury.551 Expert evidence indicated that both the initial head injury 
as well as the raised intracranial pressure following the negligent delay could 
have caused or contributed to the brain damage,552 thus but-for causation was 
impossible to establish. Picken J held that the Ǯmaterial contribution to injuryǯ 
approach applies in both single agency and multiple factor cases, awarding the 
claimant the entirety of damages. The court in John discussed Bonnington at 
length,553 and cited Lord Reid as having established that the material 
contribution test was of general application. The court also referred to Waller LJ 
in Bonnington who saw causation being established:  
 
                                                        
550 Wilsher (n 50) 
551 John (n 51) at [45] 
552 John (n 51) [103] 
553 John (n 51) [84] 
 188 
…where medical science cannot establish the probability that Ǯbut forǯ an 
act of negligence the injury would not have happened but can establish that 
the contribution of the negligent cause was more than negligible.554 
 
Professor Green rues the extensions of Bonnington to cases such as Williams as ǲunfortunate,ǳ555 because: Ǯmaking a material contribution to damage which is 
already bound to happen is not something which should attract liability in 
negligence.ǯ556  
 
However, in the view of this author, the judicial approach of cases such as 
Williams and John is surely the correct one (at least in terms of its final outcome, 
which is consistent with the argument of this thesis: that there is no justification 
for arbitrary distinctions between diseases in whether more flexible tests for 
causation should apply). Nevertheless, the significance of these recent decisions 
for present purposes is that it demonstrates ongoing disputes amongst experts 
about the remit of the Bonnington test.  
 
2.2 The ?material contribution to risk?(Fairchild) test 
2.2.1: Initial formulation 
 
The antecedents for the Fairchild principle were laid in the much earlier case of 
McGhee v National Coal Board.557 The scenario in McGhee was more complicated 
than Bonnington, and resulted in a far more significant relaxation of the but-for 
                                                        
554 Bonnington (n 7) at [46] 
555 S Green, ‘Case Comment: Material Contribution…’ (n 28) 171-172 
556 ibid (n 28) 172 
557 [1973] 1 WLR 1 
 189 
rule than the material contribution to injury test. McGhee involved a claimant 
employee who developed dermatitis following exposure to brick dust during his 
period of employment in a brick kiln. While some of this exposure was inevitable 
due to the nature of the work, it was compounded by the employersǯ failure to 
provide adequate washing facilities in the workplace. Doctors could only say that 
the effect of the two factors was cumulative, but could not be sure that the 
disease would not have occurred but for the failure to provide washing facilities, 
or even that this had made a material contribution to the injury. The House of 
Lords ruled that in the absence of complete medical knowledge of all the 
material factors relating to the disease (a statement that would, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, accurately describe the situation regarding most major diseases), 
materially increasing the risk of injury could also be sufficient to establish factual 
causation. The claim succeeded. McGhee thus represented a further dilution of 
the test for factual causation that Bonnington, and laid the foundation for the 
even broader Ǯmaterial contribution to riskǯ test. 
 
The McGhee test fell into disuse for some decades subsequently, but was 
resurrected in the landmark ruling in Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services.558 
Fairchild concerned three conjoined appeals where the claimants had all 
contracted mesothelioma after having been exposed to asbestos during separate 
periods of employment with several different employers. They were unable to 
establish factual causation due to two problems: (i) gaps in medical knowledge 
about mesothelioma and its etiological mechanisms and (ii) the fact that the 
claimant had worked for multiple defendants, each responsible of whom were 
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responsible for a substantial degree of exposure.559 Due to the long and variable 
latency period of mesothelioma, and due to the single-fibre theory of 
mesothelioma prevalent at the time, it was impossible to determine which 
individual employerǯs exposure had materially contributed to the disease.   
 
The Fairchild test was formulated to apply to 'evidential gap' cases involving 
multiple exposures to a single causal agent. Lord Bingham referred to the ǲrock 
of uncertaintyǳ:560 the fundamental problem that it was impossible for the 
claimant to prove their claim if the conventional rules of causation (including the 
Bonnington Ǯmaterial contribution to injuryǯ test) were applied, even though the 
defendant had significantly increased the risk that the claimant would suffer 
injury. Under the Fairchild principle, claimants can establish factual causation 
simply by showing that the defendant's negligence has materially contributed to 
the risk of the relevant harm being sustained. This was intended as a policy-
based response to the specific causal difficulties encountered by mesothelioma 
victims who had been negligently exposed to asbestos by multiple consecutive 
employers. However, the House of Lords did not specifically limit the material 
contribution to the risk of harm principle to this particular context, as McIvor 
notes.561 Mesothelioma was also deemed to be an Ǯindivisibleǯ disease, a legal 
term that is applied to diseases where it is believed that once triggered, further 
exposure to the triggering factor (here, asbestos) will not further worsen or 
aggravate the disease. This led to full liability being imposed on the defendant.   
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Lord Nicholls in Fairchild felt it necessary to clarify that in the unusual approach 
taken by the House towards causation:  
 
..the court is not... concluding that the ordinary 'but for' standard of 
causation is satisfied. Instead, the court is applying a different and less 
stringent test. It were best if this were recognised openly.562 
 
2.2.2: Inconsistencies, further applications and extensions of 
Fairchild 
A similar scenario to Fairchild arose again a few years later in Barker v Corus.563 
This involved a claim for mesothelioma by an employee who could not pinpoint 
which employerǯs exposure to asbestos had triggered his mesothelioma. He had 
been negligently exposed to asbestos by a number of different employers, and an 
additional complicating factor was that he had also faced work-related asbestos 
exposure during a period of self- employment. Although the House of Lords 
allowed the claimant to succeed by applying the Ǯmaterial contribution to riskǯ 
test, the court in Barker also recognized the potential injustice of imposing full 
liability on a defendant who may have only imposed part (or possibly, none) of 
the ultimate harm. Barker therefore attempted to ameliorate the harshness of 
the Fairchild rule by imposing proportionate liability on the defendant employer 
(proportionate to the time the claimant spent in his employment). However, the 
proportionate recovery ruling of Baker led to a public outcry, and Parliament 
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intervened to ensure that restricted recovery under the Fairchild rule is now no 
longer possible in regard of mesothelioma claims. The Compensation Act 2006564 
now rules out proportionate liability in claims for mesothelioma linked to 
negligent asbestos exposure.    
 
The Fairchild 'material contribution to risk' test, points out McIvor,565 is quite 
remarkable for several reasons. It does not require proof of the existence of any 
actual causal connection between the relevant breach of duty and the actionable 
damage. Further, it demands very little by way of proof of risk creation. Added to 
this is the fact that mesothelioma is held to be an indivisible disease, thus the 
defendant will be held to be liable for the entirety of the harm: even if there is a 
good chance that their tort may not have made any contribution at all to it. 
 
Clearly, this is problematic for many reasons. For one, the potential for injustice 
to a defendant is obvious. A further problem with the Fairchild test is the poor 
reasoning and articulation of its rationale (apart from the catch-all reference to Ǯpolicyǯ). Neither is there clarity about the circumstances in which these policy 
justifications will apply. After having powerfully advocated wide leeway for 
courts to decide causation answers as they saw fit (discussed extensively earlier 
in Chapter 3 section 1), Lord Hoffmann was anxious to reiterate that courts 
follow principled and transparent lines of reasoning. Discussing McGhee, Lord 
Hoffmann distanced himself from its 'legal fictionsǯ: 
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When some members of the House said that... there was no distinction 
between materially increasing the risk of disease and materially 
contributing to the disease, what I think they meant was that, in the 
particular circumstances, a breach of duty which materially increased the 
risk should be treated as if it had materially contributed to the disease. I 
would respectfully prefer not to resort to legal fictions and to say that the 
House treated a material increase in risk as sufficient in the circumstances 
to satisfy the causal requirements for liability.566  
 
However, by repeatedly dismissing the need for consistency in causation 
principles in practice as Lord Hoffmann does, for example, in an extra-judicial 
article 567 (also referred to earlier in Chapter 3), whilst continuing to maintain in 
theory that coherent, principled reasoning is being followed, Lord Hoffmann is, it 
is submitted, resorting to an even bigger legal fiction. 
 
The Fairchild approach as been received with very little warmth by the judiciary. 
At the same time, however, as we shall see further in this section, the Fairchild 
test is also being extended to a broader range of situations that were not 
originally envisaged as being within the scope of this test. The Supreme Court 
described a recent case centering on the Fairchild principles (International 
Energy Group Ltd. v Zurich Insurance plc568) as ǲyet another demanding chapter 
in [that] difficult series of decisionsǳ569 that has unleashed ǲa sort of juridical 
version of chaos theory.ǳ 570 Lord Sumption in the same case also pointed out 
that Fairchild had already ǲcruelly exposed the problem of dealing with complex 
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and interrelated issues piecemeal.ǳ571 Baroness Hale572 in Sienkiewicz 
acknowledged the difficulties created by the Fairchild approach, which she felt 
had ǲkicked open the hornets' nestǳ: 
I find it hard to believe that their Lordships there foresaw the logical 
consequence of abandoning the ǲbut forǳ test: that an employer or occupier 
whose wrongful exposure might or might not have led to the disease would 
be liable in full for the consequences even if it was more likely than not that 
some other cause was to blame (let alone that it was more likely than not 
that he was to blame). But...that is the logical consequence of Fairchild and 
there is nothing we can do about it without reversing Fairchild. Even if we 
thought it right to do this, Parliament would soon reverse us, and it is easy 
to understand why.  
 
Questions about the scope and applicability of the Ǯmaterial contribution to riskǯ 
test continue to plague tort law. The situations in which courts will depart from 
the Ǯbut-forǯ test remain enigmatic. Is the test restricted to mesothelioma, or is 
applicable to other diseases? Both courts and legal commentators are divided on 
this issue. Fairchild did not explicitly limit itself to mesothelioma as we noted 
earlier,573 but there have been subsequent pronouncements in the highest courts 
that have attempted to limit it in this way. In Sienkiewicz,574 Lord Brown 
expressed unhappiness about this exceptional principle, but felt that 
mesothelioma was in a Ǯcategory of its ownǯ575 and cautioned that: Ǯ(s)ave only 
for mesothelioma cases, claimants should henceforth expect little flexibility from 
the courts in their approach to causation.ǯ576 The scope to extend Fairchild to 
                                                        
571 ibid at [128] (Lord Sumption) 
572 Sienkiewicz (n 34) at [167]  
573 E.g. see above, text to (n 64) 
574 Sienkiewicz (n 34) 
575  ibid at [174] (Lord Bridge) 
576  Sienkiewicz (n 34) at [187] (Lord Bridge) 
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other conditions has been left open to courts. Steel points out: ǲBut has the 
extension of Fairchild not subsequently been ruled out by the Supreme Court decisions in Sienkiewicz v Greif… and Durham v BAI ȋRun OffȌ Ltd…? No. Of the 
seven judges in Sienkiewicz, only Lord Brown suggested that Fairchild should be 
taken to apply only to mesothelioma cases (at [174]). This obiter suggestion can 
hardly defeat the point that Fairchild was founded on McGhee. In any event, Lord 
Phillips in Sienkiewicz explicitly envisaged an extension of the principle (at 
[105]) whose justification cannot be limited to mesothelioma cases.ǳ577  
 
However, the very recent case of Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd & 
Others578 has now extended the Fairchild test to a claim for lung cancer where 
there were multiple different potential causal factors, thus clarifying that the rule 
is not restricted to mesothelioma. As Allan notes, the Court of Appeal in 
Heneghan also opened Fairchild to even further extension, stating that there is Ǯno reason why it should not apply to other diseases or injuries if similar factors 
which gave rise to Fairchild should apply. The most important of those factors 
was the uncertainty surrounding the physiological mechanisms which 
resulted in the disease.ǯ579  
 
If uncertainty about the causal mechanisms of a disease is the criterion that will 
now be used to decide whether the exceptional Ǯmaterial contribution to riskǯ 
test can be applied, per Heneghan, this leads to the result that a probabilistic 
assessment of causation should be of general application in disease claims. As 
                                                        
577 S Steel, ‘On When Fairchild Applies’ (2015) 131 LQR 363, 365 
578 Heneghan [2014] EWHC 4190 (QB); [ʹͲͳ6] EWCA Civ 86, [ʹͲͳ6] ͳ WLR ʹͲ͵6 ȋCAȌ 
579 D Allan, ‘The Extension of Fairchild to Lung Cancer’ (2016) 2 JPIL 61, 61 (emphasis added) 
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this author has discussed extensively throughout the thesis, uncertainty about 
causal mechanisms is inherent in disease scenarios. The outcome of Heneghan 
thus supports the argument that this thesis has made, that all disease situations 
where evidentiary uncertainty is a significant problem (i.e. most complex disease 
scenarios) should be assessed by more probabilistic causal tests. Further, 
Heneghan not only involved lung cancer, but also involved two entirely different 
causal agents, which also goes against the original Fairchild principle that this 
reasoning only applies to single causal agent scenarios. This also opens the door 
for further extensions that are possibly less controversial as the Compensation 
Act does not apply to non-mesothelioma situations, as outlined in section 2.2 
above. Thus proportionate liability could apply in such an approach.  
 
The Court of Appeal in Heneghan also cited580 the ǮPhurnaciteǯ581 litigation in 
order to support its decision to extend a more relaxed test to a scenario 
involving multiple potential causal factors. The ǮPhurnaciteǯ case concerned eight 
claimants who had all worked at a plant that produced a smokeless fuel with the 
trade name Phurnacite. They claimed damages for a range of conditions 
including respiratory illnesses (including pneumoconiosis), lung cancer and 
bladder cancer, alleging that these had been caused by exposure to two different 
carcinogen substances at the plant. The three claimants for lung cancer were 
exposed to carcinogens both from their occupational exposure at the Phurnacite 
Plant, as well as due to their smoking, as well as to environmental carcinogens. 
Lady Justice Swift acknowledged582 that all these factors were likely to have 
                                                        
580 Heneghan (n 81) at [38]-[39] 
581 Jones v Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change [2012] EWHC 2936 (QB) (‘Phurnacite’) 
582 ibid at [644] 
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played some part in the carcinogenic processes going on in the claimants' bodies, 
processes that were, by their nature, random. Regarding the medical evidence, LJ 
Swift stated that it was ǲnot possible to say, in relation to any individual cancer, 
which factor or factors have caused or contributed to its development.ǳ583 Lady 
Justice Swift also took the view that the Fairchild test could not be applied 
outside of the mesothelioma context584 (as we discussed earlier in this section, 
members of the judiciary seem to take widely varying views on this issue), so 
that only either the Bonnington or Ǯdoubles the riskǯ (DOR) test could be applied 
to these claims. The Bonnington test, LJ Swift further held, only applied to 
divisible diseases (as we discussed in section 2.1.2 earlier, members of the 
judiciary also take widely varying views on this issue). Thus, while the 
Bonnington test was applied to the claims for respiratory illness (which fell into 
the divisible category), Lady Justice Swift concluded that the claims for lung 
cancer and bladder cancer could not qualify for applying the Bonnington Castings 
principle. Thus the obvious alternative585 for these claims, concluded LJ Swift, 
was the Ǯdoubling of the riskǯ test.586 This test, a relatively recent alternative 
approach to disease causation, is explored below. 
 
2.3:  ?Doubling of the Risk? (DOR) test 
 
Chapter 1 (at section 3.3) introduced the problems with the legal misconception 
that epidemiology infers causation solely from the risk ratio or relative risk (RR) 
                                                        
583 ibid at [646] 
584 ibid at [540]; [543] 
585 ibid [655]-[656] 
586 See also McIvor, ‘The ‘Doubles the Risk’ Test..’ (n 32) 226-228 for a further analysis of how this 
approach relates to confusion around the scope of Bonnington 
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value, and the idea that epidemiologists apply a rigid threshold value of RR>2 in 
order to conclude causation. This RR value has been interpreted, in legal 
contexts, into the Ǯdoubling of the riskǯ (DOR) test, which has emerged in recent 
case law as a means of establishing causation in cases involving indivisible 
damage where there are competing sources of risk and the etiology of the 
disease is not sufficiently well understood to pinpoint the causes without 
recourse to probabilistic evidence.587  
 
The law appears to have now concluded that an RR>2 equates to proof of 
causation on the balance of probabilities. This, in turn, appears to arise from the 
judicial translation of the Ǯbalance of probabilitiesǯ test into a percentage figure 
(i.e. greater than 50% likelihood of a causal connection). Lady Justice Smith 
stated in Novartis Grimsby v Cookson588 that Ǯif occupational exposure more than 
doubles the risk due to smoking, it must as a matter of logic be probable that the 
disease was caused by the former.ǯ589 Novartis, it may be recalled from an earlier 
discussion (in Chapter 1 section 2) involved a claimant who developed bladder 
cancer following exposure to carcinogenic agents at work, as well as through his 
cigarette smoking. The dispute centred on the relative contributions of the two 
sources of exposure to the bladder cancer, and both medical and epidemiological 
expert evidence was adduced before the Court of Appeal. Jones v Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate Change590 (discussed in the previous section) chose 
to apply the DOR test to some of the claims (i.e. only to those that were 
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indivisible) in a joint appeal involving various different diseases, while the 
Bonnington test was applied to divisible diseases. 
 
This legal interpretation of the RR value is erroneous for several reasons. It is 
based on a fundamental misconception about epidemiology, and also errs in its 
simplistic translation of an RR value into proof on the balance of probabilities.  
As McIvor591 points out, at a theoretical level, the DOR test belies a series of 
misconceptions about the science of epidemiology and its potential relevance to 
tort law. In addition, at a practical level, the seemingly scientific manner in which 
courts apply the test is unscientific and internally inconsistent.592 Further, this 
view also becomes another reason to undermine epidemiology, because courts 
assume that epidemiologists infer causation from no more than an RR value. Lord 
Phillips stated in Sienkiewicz v Greif that Ǯif statistical evidence indicates that the 
intervention of the wrongdoer more than doubled the risk that the victim would 
suffer the injury, then it follows that it is more likely than not that the wrongdoer 
caused the injury.ǯ593 After his analysis of RR values and the DOR test, Lord Phillips 
concluded that Ǯan ǮRR>2 is a tenuous basis for concluding that the statistical cause 
of a disease was also the probable biological cause, or cause in fact.ǯ594 McIvor 
notes that both of these mistaken judicial ideas about epidemiology: i.e. that it 
makes inferences from Ǯnakedǯ statistics; and that epidemiologists make 
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593 Sienkiewicz (n 34) at [72] (Lord Phillips) 
594 ibid (n 34) at [84] (Lord Phillips)  
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sweeping causal inferences simply based on an RR>2 Ǯserves to cement the 
judicial view of epidemiology as a pseudo-science.ǯ 595 
 
In fact, epidemiological inferences are far more complex than this judicial 
description suggests. Epidemiologists use a variety of other measures (including 
other statistical measures such as the attributable fraction, discussed earlier in 
Chapter 1 section 3.3; as well as non-statistical measures) to assess this issue, 
not just RR alone. Moreover, contrary to the impression given by the courts, RR > 
2 holds no intrinsic significance or value in epidemiology.596 As we shall see later 
in Chapter 5 (section 1 and section 2.3), epidemiological inferences involve the 
use of many different techniques to assess the reliability of causal inferences. 
Further, Chapter 5 (section 3) will also discuss why it is erroneous to base legal 
outcomes directly on numerical or statistical figures, in general. In science, the 
totality of the evidence is all-important, and numbers in themselves can be 
meaningless and misleading, unless considered and interpreted in context. ǮMore 
probable than notǯ does not, epidemiologists Sander Greenland and James Robins 
stress, mean the same as an RR of more than 2.597 Numerical data can be 
valuably used to inform decision-making, but should not be determinative of the 
legal outcome.     
 
2.4: Problems in disease litigation highlighted by the exceptional tests 
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Diverse and occasionally chaotic in application as the alternative tests discussed 
above are, it is important to begin this section by noting one important unifying 
quality of all of these exceptional approaches employed in disease litigation: they 
are all more suited to probabilistic causal reasoning than the deterministic but-
for test. The other common feature all the exceptional approaches to factual 
causation share is that they have all been formulated to respond to urgent causal 
dilemmas and the apparent inadequacies of the traditional causation test in 
disease litigation. Further, all the arbitrary (and unjustifiable on principle) 
distinctions that were formulated to restrict their use are starting to break down, 
as the exceptional tests are being applied to an increasing number of diseases. 
Thus, they clearly highlight one central argument of this thesis: the pressing 
imperative for a legal approach to disease causation, at least, that can take 
account of probabilistic evidence.  
 
Oddly, despite the judicial and academic criticism of the Ǯmaterial contributionǯ 
tests, courts seem to be resorting to variations of these lines of reasoning in an 
ever-broadening range of disease-related claims. Despite many attempts to draw 
it back, the controversial Fairchild exception has not remained restricted to 
mesothelioma cases. It has been applied to, for example, Vibration White Finger 
condition598 and, in Heneghan v Manchester Dry Docks Ltd,599 to adenocarcinoma 
of the lung caused by asbestos. However, the applications of the test outside of 
mesothelioma situations are infrequent, and often require judicial creativity, 
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such as in Heneghan, where the court had to resort to somewhat perplexing lines 
of reasoning to justify its use. The preceding discussion of the exceptional tests 
appears to highlight a few issues pertinent to disease causation that will be 
outlined below. Similarly, as the discussion of the Bonnington test in section 2.1 
shows, the Ǯmaterial contribution to injuryǯ test, originally circumscribed to 
situations where similar causal factors acting concurrently make a cumulative 
contribution to the harm, has now been extended to situations where the 
multiple different factors may have independently been sufficient to cause the 
harm (as in John600) or where they occurred concurrently (as in Williams601). 
There appears to be no current agreement amongst the judiciary as to their 
scope and remit. This is, this thesis contends, because restricting criteria for the 
use of probabilistic tests in disease litigation is fundamentally unjust due to the 
nature of biomedical causation: the very recent extensions of the tests are simply 
a sign that this injustice is becoming more apparent. The following subsections 
outline a few key aspects about disease claims that the preceding discussion of 
the exceptional approaches highlights.  
 
2.4.1 The inadequacy of deterministic approaches  
 
All of these exceptional tests for factual causation in this area of the law reflect 
that it is futile to ask scientists for evidence that a certain factor was causally 
necessary in a claimantǯs disease. This question will repeatedly present the 
danger of potential injustice, as medical science can rarely answer questions 
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about what would have happened if the tortious factor had not been present. 
Even if courts only seek an answer to this question on the balance of 
probabilities, the fundamental conceptual question that courts ask science to 
answer is still about the necessity of the causal factor. As case after case shows, 
this is question is unsuited to assess a disease process which can happen in many 
different ways, and is fundamentally unobservable as its happens. 
 
The case of Bailey v Ministry of Defence602 serves as a good example of the 
impossibility of satisfying but-for questions in the assessment of disease 
causation. Weakness resulting from medical negligence does not look any 
different from weakness caused by, as in this case, pancreatitis. Nor it possible 
for an expert (no matter how skilled) to measure the quantity of Ǯweaknessǯ that 
pancreatitis and subsequent surgery results in; or to say how much weakness 
would have been needed to have cause the claimant to asphyxiate. Such a 
number, even if there were such a thing as units of Ǯweaknessǯ, would have no 
validity due to the incredible biological variability of different human bodies, in 
terms of resilience. To a medical expert, the existence of a potentially causal 
factor and the ultimate injury are events they can only infer the likelihood of 
causation from. Until human bodies come equipped with internal CCTV cameras 
that videotape toxins entering a claimantǯs bloodstream and beginning 
microscopic processes of cellular mutation, it may remain impossible to satisfy 
current legal questions about factual causation for most diseases. 
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The whole of the Fairchild approach seems to be founded on the idea that 
mesothelioma is somehow an Ǯexceptionalǯ disease in terms of the uncertainties 
about its onset, etiologic mechanisms, and the many unobservable and 
synergistic mechanisms through which it occurs. The recent expansions of 
Fairchild to diseases beyond mesothelioma, and to causal scenarios beyond those 
involving similar causal agents (such as in Heneghan), indicates that courts are 
realising that these arbitrary distinctions between factual scenarios in disease 
claims run counter to the principles of justice. Most diseases, as we saw in 
Chapter 3, have evidentiary gaps that can make but-for assessments of causation 
unworkable: mesothelioma is not extraordinary in its long latency period or 
somewhat mysterious onset and progression. In fact, if anything, it would be 
possible to argue that mesothelioma may actually be a simpler disease for courts 
to deal with, because it is a Ǯsignatureǯ disease that has one causal factor 
(inhalation of asbestos fibres) which is almost always linked to the outcome.603 
Further, there are no controversies at least around Ǯgeneralǯ causation aspects.604 
On the other hand, conditions such as cardiovascular disease and most other 
forms of cancer have no single necessary cause, but can be caused by many 
different combinations of various risk factors such as stress, genetics, poor diet, 
unhealthy lifestyle, smoking, etc. 
 
A medical expert who is forced to testify about whether any one of those was 
necessary for a specific claimantǯs heart attack or stroke will be forced to rely on 
mostly subjective opinion and educated guesswork. There would be high 
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variation between the opinions of different experts on this issue: a problem that 
can be, and often is, exploited in an adversarial judicial system, where each side 
brings it their own experts who are influenced by conscious or unconscious 
conflicts of interest to give very different opinions. It could be argued that this 
played a part in the outcome of McTear, where even extremely high Ǯgeneralǯ 
causal links- indicating a causal likelihood of around 90%- between smoking and 
lung cancer was disputed by the defendantǯs expert, and the court found this 
persuasive enough to rule that even general causation was not established 
despite the overwhelming epidemiological evidence.605 The law urgently needs 
to revise this scientifically naïve view of disease, and to develop principles that 
can deal effectively with probabilistic causation. 
 
2.4.2: Overdetermination as the norm in disease litigation  
 
Despite all the dilemmas the but-for test has raised in disease litigation, the 
judicial attachment to the traditional approach to factual causation has led to 
courts striving hard to formulate a variety of strict criteria to limit the use of the 
exceptional tests, pertaining to qualities of the disease, causal agents or timing of 
exposure. It appears, however, that this restrictive approach may have been 
easier to formulate than to implement. Despite much judicial effort to limit their 
use, courts are increasingly being presented with much sound scientific evidence 
to argue that they should be expanded to a growing range of diseases (since, as 
discussed earlier, inherent causal uncertainties characterise most complex 
diseases). As the previous subsections above demonstrate, all of these arbitrary 
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distinctions between disease and timing of exposure are already incrementally 
starting to break down in any case, especially in a number of very recent cases. 
Despite judicial reluctance, the Bonnington and Fairchild principles have recently 
been extended to more diseases and variant causal scenarios, even when these 
do not meet the original specified criteria.  
 
Most diseases are caused in many complex and stochastic ways, and can often 
arise from various different combinations of multiple different factors. Thus, this 
thesis contends that over-determined causation may be the norm rather than 
the exception in disease litigation. It is no accident that the most difficult 
dilemmas around causation arise in the context of disease claims: this is proof of 
the special complexities that beset this area. Given this reality, it is difficult to 
justify why this exceptional approach should be restricted to select diseases 
when similar uncertainties apply equally, if not more, to many other diseases. 
 
This thesis agrees in principle with the outcome of the recent cases, which 
widens the more flexible assessments of causation in disease involving toxic 
exposures, since it is a central contention of this thesis that probabilistic causal 
assessments must be the norm rather than the exception in disease litigation. 
However, this author disagrees with the form these extensions have taken. The 
extensions of the exceptional tests have so far been reluctant and haphazard, 
leaving a raft of questions hanging about when and where exceptional tests will 
apply. A fairer approach to such claims must not (and further, need not) occur at 
the cost of the coherence and clarity of the law. There is no need, this author 
argues, for recourse to effortful judicial creativity and Ǯpolicyǯ justifications in 
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order to assess disease causation differently: in this area, at least, it is possible to 
identify a more principled justification for such a departure from tradition (as 
will be discussed in section 2.4.3 below). It would do the law far more credit, this 
thesis asserts, to identify an alternative approach to causal analysis in disease 
claims generally, that is able to take account of probabilistic causation.  
 
A decade ago, Plowden and Volpe queried whether the exceptional rules 
applying to mesothelioma could be applied to hospital-acquired MRSA that 
might have been contracted due to hospital negligence.606 The condition, they 
pointed out, can potentially satisfy all of the Fairchild criteria:607 the claimant 
may well have been close to sources of MRSA as a result of both innocent and 
negligent means; and it is scientifically impossible to prove, merely by virtue of 
the fact of the infection, the moment or means of contamination. So could the 
more relaxed test of causation sanctioned by the House of Lords in the 
mesothelioma cases (such as Fairchild and Barker), queried the authors, allow 
the MRSA claimant to overcome the usual evidential impossibility of proving the 
means of contamination? A decade later, it appears that courts are starting to 
find such arguments persuasive, as indicated by cases such as Heneghan608 and 
Williams.609   
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The exceptional Fairchild principle enabled the claim for lung cancer in 
Heneghan to succeed, although the court ruled that damages should be 
apportioned according to each defendant's contribution to the deceased's risk of 
contracting lung cancer (despite the fact that lung cancer was held to be an 
indivisible disease). Lord Dyson drew support for the extension of the Fairchild 
principle to this scenario from the earlier Supreme Court decision in 
International Energy Group Ltd v Zurich Insurance Plc UK:610  
Thus, Lords Neuberger and Reed said at para 191 that the Fairchild 
exception is ǲapplicable to any disease which has the unusual features of 
mesothelioma.ǳ The possibility of its application in cases concerning other 
injuries or diseases was also expressly contemplated by Lord Hodge (para 
109) and Lord Sumption (para 127).611  
 
Steel612 is critical of the extension of the Fairchild principle to Heneghan, citing 
two reasons for doubting it: ǮThe first is the "single agent requirement" for the 
application of Fairchild: in order for the rule to apply, all of the potential 
causative agents for the disease must operate in substantially similar ways. Mr 
Heneghan was a smoker and this smoking might have contributed to his lung 
cancer. Smoking operates in a different way to asbestos dust in causing lung cancer… ȋJustice Jayǯs) interpretation of the single agent rule is, with respect, 
unappealing. The view that the rule does not apply (or is satisfied when the 
claimant has been exposed to the same kind of agents by multiple defendants is overinclusive… ǯ613 The second reason for doubting the decision, opines Steel, is 
that no claim was brought against the claimantǯs earlier employer, who had 
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contributed 56% of the total risk (greater than the aggregate risk contributed by 
the defendants.614  
 
However, the case of Heneghan again serves to strengthen the argument being 
advanced in this thesis. Any attempt to restrict, in principle, the more flexible 
and probabilistic tests causation to a few select diseases will inevitably run into 
problems, because most complex diseases share the quality of etiological 
uncertainties. Such distinctions as single/multiple agents, divisible/indivisible 
disease, or alternative/cumulative causes are illusory as far as decisions about 
causal contributions or ultimate liability are concerned.    
 
2.4.3: Dangers of excessive judicial ?pragmatism?: 
identifying a more principled approach 
 
The existent problems with disease claims are increasingly leading to courts 
having to make the effort to find ǲways aroundǳ existing legal principles, to avoid 
injustice to claimants for other diseases that do not fall within current 
exceptions. Despite its ambiguity and vagueness, the Ǯmaterial contributionǯ test 
is at least better able to handle its encounters with probabilistic evidence, and 
thus it us more suitable than the Ǯbut for Ǯ test to toxic tort litigation. However, 
the problem with this test lies in the hazy judicial explanation of its rationale. 
Courts explain the Ǯmaterial contributionǯ tests as being a special dispensation on Ǯnormativeǯ grounds, and this is cited as a reason why the circumstances in which 
this test will and will not apply have been left open.  Stapleton expresses 
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approval of this degree of Ǯnormativityǯ in factual causation, so that claimants can Ǯleap that gapǯ.615  
 
This thesis, however, submits that an exceptional causation approach in disease 
claims does not require hazy Ǯnormativeǯ grounds to justify it. However, although 
this author strongly advocates a more probabilistic approach to factual causation 
in toxic tort litigation, at the same time this must be distinguished from 
subjective decision-making that has no evidence at its base. There is no need for 
contorted legal reasoning in order to accommodate to the realities of disease and 
medicine. The but-for test makes a number of presumptions about causality that 
are detached from the real world, and from all available scientific evidence, when 
it comes to disease causation. For the law to continue with such unclear and 
uncertain assessment of causation carries a real risk that the factual causation 
element of the negligence analysis will eventually become entirely meaningless. 
 
Further, courts often resort to convoluted lines of reasoning in order to maintain 
the illusion that principled lines of reasoning are being followed, and to justify 
these extensions of the exceptional tests. Lord Nicholls, whilst agreeing with the 
majority ruling in Fairchild recognised the problems in the reasoning:  
I have no hesitation in agreeing with all your Lordships that these appeals 
should be allowed. Any other outcome would be deeply offensive to 
instinctive notions of what justice requires and fairness demands. The real 
difficulty lies in elucidating in sufficiently specific terms the principle being 
applied in reaching this conclusion. To be acceptable the law must be 
coherent. It must be principled. The basis on which one case, or one type of 
                                                        
615 J Stapleton, ‘Cause in Fact and Scope of Liability for Consequences’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly 
Review 388, 388 
 211 
case, is distinguished from another should be transparent and capable of 
identification. When a decision departs from principles normally applied, 
the basis for doing so must be rational and justifiable if the decision is to 
avoid the reproach that hard cases make bad law.616 
McIvor617 notes that much of the incoherence arises because courts have not 
always been consistent in their application of these principles in difficult 
probabilistic causation cases: they have failed to clearly articulate, or carefully 
circumscribe the exceptional policy considerations to justify a departure from 
orthodox factual causation principles. This thesis, however, contends that a 
departure from the but-for test in disease claims, at least, does not require policy 
justification. In this area of the law, the justification for a probabilistic approach 
to causation can be identified on more principled grounds: that is, the vast body 
of sophisticated modern biomedical research. It is imperative for the law to 
recognise that the growing mismatch between legal and medical models of 
causation. It would do the law far more credit to overhaul the legal principles 
that govern disease litigation, and acknowledge their inadequacy. Making 
impossibly fine distinctions between diseases cannot justify the approach that 
only a few select diseases will merit compensation, while other claimants who 
also suffer horrific harms (albeit with a different label) due to negligence will go 
entirely uncompensated. Thus this thesis contends that more probabilistic tests 
for causation should be of general application in disease claims.  
 
Not everyone agrees, however, with the more radical shift from orthodoxy 
suggested in this thesis. Sanders notes, for example, that ǲcalls for altering the 
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traditional Ǯbut forǯ test of causation in the toxic tort era wisely have been 
resisted by courts:ǳ the risk rule, he cautions, ǲis a risky concept.ǳ618 However, 
this author contends such changes are in any case already starting to occur in 
any case, and altered tests for factual causation are already being expanded 
further and further to many different diseases (especially in very recent years in 
UK courts). This thesis simply makes a plea for these changes to occur on a more 
principled basis. The boundaries of the material contribution tests appear, 
unfortunately, to be becoming even more uncertain and hazy, rather than less so, 
as time goes on. The Bonnington principle was formulated 60 years ago, and it 
should be a matter of concern that that this state of affairs still prevails. A more 
radical overhaul of approaches in this area is, it is contended, the need of the 
hour.   
 
To the extent that the judicial advocacy of Ǯcommon-senseǯ approaches to 
causation (discussed in Chapter 3, section 1) is a call for pragmatic approaches to 
causation that are flexible enough to take account of the available evidence, this 
thesis supports the idea of common-sense approach to causation. The law does 
not need to be drawn into deep debates about the philosophy of causation in 
order to evaluate factual causal links in a coherent way. However, to say that 
questions about causation can be adequately answered by instinct or common-
sense alone is deeply flawed. ǮCommon senseǯ, in this judicial definition, becomes 
so subjective that liability would almost become a matter of the judgeǯs personal 
instinct.        
 
                                                        
618 Sanders (n 106) 39 
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There may be some merit in the legal idea that Ǯthe causal requirements of one 
rule may be different from those of anotherǯ, as Lord Hoffmann concludes in his 
analysis of the causation caselaw in McGhee,619 Bonnington,620 Fairchild621 and 
Barker.622 This is also, as Chapter 3 (section 2) earlier illustrated, how scientists 
are increasingly coming to understand causation: that causation is not a 
monolithic concept, and that Ǯwhat causes are…can vary from one kind of system 
of causal relationships to anotherǯ.623 It appears, then, that then law and science 
may both independently be converging towards this idea. The argument 
contained in this thesis for a different approach to causation in disease litigation 
context is thus in line with Lord Hoffmannǯs analysis.    
 
However, it is a fundamental principle of justice that the law must be 
transparent, and legal terms and principles must possess at least a reasonable 
degree of certainty. As Stapleton notes, navigation of causation would be made 
more transparent by the clarification of legal terminology:624 To advocate a 
balanced, common-sense approach to the assessment of probabilistic evidence 
about causation is not to assert that examination of the causation question can 
be answered by subjective preferences and judgesǯ personal Ǯcommonsenseǯ 
preferences alone. If the law uses a different approach to causation in complex D 
claims, it is important to justify why this is so, and to have a transparent 
approach. The assessment of causation indeed requires common sense, but also 
                                                        
619 McGhee (n 60) 
620 Bonnington (n 7) 
621 Fairchild (n 8) 
622 Barker (n 66) 
623 N Cartwright, Hunting Causes and Using them: Approaches in Philosophy and Economics 
(Cambridge University Press 2007) cited from SS Coughlin, Causal Inference and Scientific 
Paradigms in Epidemiology (Bentham 2010), 15-16- see below n_ 
624 J Stapleton, ‘Cause in Fact and Scope of Liability for Consequences’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly 
Review 388, 388 
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requires more than that: it requires an objective scrutiny of the available 
evidence about factual connections between tort and harm 
 
A more realistic test for disease causation of general applicability would be more 
principled not only because it would accord with the principles of justice 
(because it would not draw arbitrarily discriminate between different diseases), 
but also because it would have as its justificatory basis the best available 
empirical evidence. The Ǯrisk ruleǯ (i.e. the Fairchild rule) can be further refined 
to have a little more clarity for better congruence with biomedical evidence and 
terminology: congruence that is vital in disease litigation. Section 3 below will 
suggest a new framework for such an alternative approach.  
 
SECTION 3: A suggested alternative: assessment of likely contribution to 
disease  
 
In view of the inadequacies of the but-for test, academics have proposed a 
number alternative tests for general application to the factual causation analysis 
(that is, not specific to disease litigation scenarios). One test that has been the 
focus of much debate (particularly in the US) is the NESS test.625 The NESS test, 
formulated by Wright, defines a cause in fact as Ǯa necessary element in a 
sufficient set.ǯ626 This test is generally viewed as being better able to handle 
some situations indeterminate causation, although there are a number of 
conceptual problems with the NESS test. There have been, for example, 
                                                        
625R Wright, 'Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics and Proof: Pruning the 
Bramble Bush by Clarifying the Concepts' (1988) 73 Iowa Law Review 1001 
626
 R Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1735, 1788-1803 
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philosophical questions about the concept of sufficiency.627 However, the most 
crucial problem for the use of the NESS test in disease litigation is that it is also 
based in a deterministic view of causation, and cannot deal with probabilistic 
causation. It does not effectively address the practical problems that arise in the 
assessment of disease causation: the impossibility of knowing whether a factor 
was necessary in the onset of a disease. As Berge notes, we do not yet fully 
comprehend the biological mechanisms that produce birth defects and illnesses 
such as cancers and auto-immune diseases for which plaintiffs seek 
compensation, and exposure to the defendantǯs product is not usually a 
necessary cause of a particular disease.628 The legal quest for a but-for cause, 
which Ǯis more causal than other causesǯ629 in the assessment of disease 
causation is therefore a doomed quest for the foreseeable future, for all but a 
small minority of diseases.  
 
 This area of the law, this thesis has argued throughout, requires a test that has 
sufficient flexibility to take account of probabilistic causation, rather than one 
that views causation in deterministic ways. However, as Fumerton and Kress 
note about the NESS test: ǮGiven the way in which we define lawful sufficiency, 
nothing is ever lawfully sufficient for anything in a radically indeterministic 
universe. For our purposes, we shall say that a universe is deterministic when 
each state or ǲtime sliceǳ of the universe is lawfully sufficient for the next and all 
subsequent states of the universe; an indeterministic universe is one that is not 
                                                        
627
 R Fumerton and K Kress, 'Causation and the Law': Pre-emption, Lawful Sufficiency, and Causal 
Sufficiency' (2001) 64(4) Law and Contemporary Problems 83, 96-97 
628 MA Berger, ‘Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic 
Torts’ (1997) 97 Columbia Law Review 2117, 2121 
629 WL Prosser, ‘Proximate Cause in California’ (1950) 38 California Law Review 369, 381 
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deterministic. A radically indeterministic universe is one in which no state is 
ever lawfully sufficient for any subsequent state. The NESS test presupposes determinism…Yet it is far from clear that our concept of causal connection 
precludes the possibility of causes in an indeterministic world.ǯ630  
 
The possibility, as Fumerton and Kress note, that there can be causation in an 
indeterministic universe suggests that we should hesitate before we regard X 
being a NESS of Y as an analytically necessary condition for X being a causally 
relevant factor in the occurrence of Y. Further, they point out, neither is X being a 
NESS of Y an analytically sufficient condition for X being a causally relevant 
factor in the occurrence of Y. Thus, they conclude, if the law is waiting for 
philosophers to offer something better than a pre-philosophical grasp of what is 
involved in one thing causing another, Ǯthe law had better be very patient 
indeed.ǯ 631 
This thesis suggests that a better approach to causation in toxic tort litigation is 
to determine whether the best available evidence indicates that the tortious 
cause made, on the balance of probabilities, a significant contribution to the 
disease. However, because this approach is probabilistic, liability must only be in 
proportion to the likely contribution to the disease. Such an approach would be 
realistic and flexible enough to satisfy the demand for a Ǯcommon-senseǯ 
approach, as well as be underpinned by objective evidence.  
 
3.1 The probabilistic test for disease causation: 
                                                        
630 Fumerton and Kress (n 130) 97 
631  ibid (n 130) 102-105 
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This thesis proposes that, in congruence with modern biomedical approaches to 
causation, factual causation in respect of disease claims should be assessed on 
the basis of whether the allegedly tortious factor significantly contributed to the 
onset or progression of the claimantǯs disease. However, as this approach 
recognises that individual causal factors often make only partial contributions to 
disease (and further, because we will rarely know if the outcome would have 
been different if a particular factor had not been present i.e. whether the factor 
was necessary for the outcome), it also proposes that this test can only work in 
conjunction with proportionate liability.  
 
The fact that this test applies equally regardless of whether the factor made a 
contribution to the onset of the disease, or only to its further progression, is also a 
further advantage. Contribution in either scenario, this thesis contends, is still a 
contribution to the injury. At the moment, the material contribution tests only 
view Ǯcontribution to injuryǯ as referring to a contribution to the progression of 
the disease, which is what causes legal distinctions such as divisible and 
indivisible diseases to take on undue importance. Thus, the Fairchild approach 
was only needed in the first place because Bonnington was only seen to apply if 
the progression of the disease was dose-related. Under the single-fibre theory of 
mesothelioma prevalent at the time, it was believed that mesothelioma, once 
triggered, could not be worsened by further exposure. Thus the Fairchild 
scenario needed a different test. But what if the initial onset, or triggering of a 
disease, requires a certain threshold amount of exposure? Surely each 
contributory factor contributing to the onset of a disease should count as having 
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contributed to the injury, but such a situation is not covered under the material 
contribution to injury principle, and has to satisfy the much harder Fairchild 
criteria. This is difficult to justify (and, in any case, the single-fibre theory of 
mesothelioma is now in doubt, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3). Regardless, 
under the new test, the same test would apply equally to both the Bonnington 
and Fairchild situations. This test thus abolishes the unfair distinctions between 
diseases in terms of legal outcomes, and avoids courts having to deal with all the 
controversies and confusion that result from these.   
 
This reframing of the test for factual causation in disease litigation does not need 
to lead to widening of the scope of liability: it must be remembered that this is a 
test for factual causation only. And, as this thesis has argued earlier, factual 
causation is not, and should not be, the be-all and end-all of liability. To say that 
something has been a contributory cause of an injury is not necessarily to say 
that there should be legal liability and responsibility attached to it. Courts only 
need to make causal decisions in regard of faulty behaviors, and there are several 
other strands of the negligence enquiry that must also be assessed before 
liability is imposed in negligence, such as duty of care, failure to take reasonable 
care, remoteness and the presence of intervening events. As Professor Honoré 
emphasises, that the law does not hold individuals legally liable for all actions for 
which they are in some sense responsible. Liability only attaches where the actor 
is on notice that the conduct is wrongful, the sanction is proportionate to the 
gravity of the misconduct, and causation is proved by sufficiently credible 
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evidence to justify the sanction.632  
 
Further, because this test imposes liability for probable contribution, this thesis 
acknowledges that it is important to build in further safeguards against claims 
for minor, incidental, or non-specific factors that could arguably have played 
some small contributory role. There are, for instance, a number of non-specific 
factors (such as stress, relationship difficulties, previous infections etc) that are 
hypothesised to slightly increase general predisposition to disease and illness. 
The test proposed in this thesis should however only be applied in regard of 
factors that are empirically established to play a specific, and significant, 
contributory role in the development of the specific disease that is being claimed 
for. The definition of significant here requires something more than the current 
legal definition of significant as anything more than de minimis. Further, this test 
must only be applied on a proportionate basis.          
 
3.2 Proportionate liability: 
 
As explained above in section 3.1, apportionment of liability is a crucial element 
of liability under this proposed new approach, in order to avoid gross unfairness 
to defendants. This test is fairer to claimants because it acknowledges that 
factors can sometimes work in conjunction with others in order to either trigger 
or worsen a disease, and thus does not ask for proof of necessity. However, in 
this acknowledgment, it also recognises making a defendant liable for the whole 
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 Anthony Honoré,‘Principles and Values Underlying the Concept of Causation in Law’ in D 
Mendelson and I Freckleton (eds.), Causation in Law and Medicine (Ashgate 2002) 3-4 
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harm, when all evidence suggests that they were only partially responsible, 
would be unfair to defendants, and would also open the doors for excessive 
liability. It is crucial to avoid such an outcome that would just substitute one 
patent unfairness for another. The Court of Appeal in Fairchild, for example, 
pointed out that it considered the claimants' argument to be not only illogical but 
also:  
...capable of unjust results. It may impose liability for the whole of an 
insidious disease on an employer with whom the claimant was employed for 
quite a short time in a long working life, when the claimant is wholly unable 
to prove on the balance of probabilities that that period of employment had 
any causative relationship with the inception of the disease...If we were to 
accede to the claimants' arguments, we would be distorting the law to 
accommodate the exigencies of a very hard case... In a quite different 
context Lord Steyn has recently said… that our tort system sometimes 
results in imperfect justice, but that is the best the common law can do.633 
 
Proportionate liability is already applied in regard of diseases deemed Ǯdivisibleǯ 
in UK law, as discussed briefly in section 2.1 above. This principle was applied in 
cases such as Thompson v Smiths Ship Repairers (North Shields) Ltd634 (a claim 
concerning exposure to successive noise) and Holtby v Brigham & Cowan (Hull) 
Ltd.635 Mr Holtby was exposed to asbestos dust while working for a number of 
employers, half of which time was spent with the defendants. He developed 
asbestosis, and sued the employers who were found to have been negligent. The 
judge found them liable but made a reduction in the total award of damages to 
reflect the fact that they had only been the employer for part of the relevant time. 
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 Fairchild [2002] 1 WLR 1052 at [103] (Court of Appeal)  
634 Thompson (n 30) 
635 Holtby (n 25) 
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The court reduced the damages by 25% rather than the exact proportion of the 
period of employment (which would have been 50% as he had spent half his 
time with the defendant.  
 
Further, courts have also attempted to apply proportionate recovery to 
indivisible diseases. Section 2.2.2 above discussed The House of Lordsǯ 
application of this principle in the mesothelioma claim in Barker636 (until 
Parliament intervened to bar the application of proportionate liability in 
mesothelioma claims). However, the Court of Appeal in Heneghan637 recently 
applied the proportionate recovery principle to a claim for lung cancer (an Ǯindivisibleǯ disease), with Justice Jay holding that in non-mesothelioma 
claims, Barker remained good law.  
 
Given that complete certainty is rare, and most disputed situations involve 
varying degrees of uncertainty about what actually happened, it is crucial for 
courts to have a clearer understanding about the value and limitations of 
evidence. Stein, in his treatise,638 suggests that the key function of evidence law is 
not so much to facilitate the discovery of truth, as to apportion the risk of error 
under conditions of uncertainty. He suggests that principles such as cost-
efficiency, equal-best and equality are possible drivers of the apportionment of 
risk in legal fact-finding. Steinǯs principles may be a useful tool with to approach 
situations where there is no other objective data available to guide the 
apportionment process in legal contexts. However, this thesis suggests that the 
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primary purpose of evidence is to minimise injustice by applying the scientific Ǯinference to the best evidenceǯ approach that has been advocated throughout 
the thesis to questions of apportionment. Thus, liability in the proposed new 
approach to disease claims should be proportionate to the likely contribution it 
made to either the onset or progression of the disease, as indicated by medical, 
epidemiological or any other available evidence. This, it must be noted, does not 
always equate to the amount of time a person has been exposed to a substance, 
but on many other factors such as its causal potency in the context of that 
disease. This is why scientific evidence is crucial in this area of the law.  
 
This point is also frequently raised in debates about disease litigation in the US. 
The American authors Lasagna and Shulman note that: Ǯit may be that the all-or-
nothing result of the balance of probabilities standard is inappropriate for cases 
dependent on scientific evidence. This has led many US authors to argue for a 
more discrete evidentiary standard, under which courts assign liability in 
proportion to the probability of causation of the substance in question (whether 
above or below 50 percent).639  
 
Following the House of Lordsǯ judgment in Barker on proportionate recovery, 
Parliament rapidly intervened to reverse that part of the judgment and imposed 
joint and several liability. Allan contends that it is difficult to see what basis there 
is for distinguishing between the mesothelioma victim and the lung cancer 
victim. The lung cancer victim already faces the hurdle of proving on a 
                                                        
639 L Lasagna and SR Shulman, ‘Bendectin and the Language of Causation in KR Foster, DE Bernstein 
and PW Huber (eds), Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law (MIT Press 1993), 116 
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conventional "but for" basis that asbestos or some other occupational exposure 
was the cause. The case for an extension of s.3 of the Compensation Act to lung 
cancer victims appears compelling.640  
 
This author agrees that there is little basis for discriminating between diseases, 
as this would make liability a matter of luck. However, the solution suggested by 
Allan it would not only open the doors for excessive liability, but run counter to 
the evidence, because given the interactive and only partially understood 
process by which multiple factors usually bring about an illness, it is relatively 
rare for a single factor to entirely bring about a complex disease. Liability must 
thus be proportionate to the likely causal contribution of each factor, as 
estimated by epidemiological and any other scientific evidence. This author thus 
argues that the solution to the problem raised by Allan is that proportionate 
liability should be applied to all diseases, and section 3 of the Compensation Act 
2006 should be overturned. 
 
The evidentiary model of epidemiology is a correct fit for this suggested 
approach, because it is fundamentally probabilistic. Epidemiology holds that a 
cause is simply one that increases the probability that a disease or harm will 
occur: a conceptualisation that does not require engagement with futile and Ǯunanswerableǯ debates about whether a causal factor was necessary, nor 
sufficient, for a disease to occur.641 The Court of Appeal in Heneghan also 
acknowledged642 the submission of the defendantǯs expert, Dr Rudd, who 
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emphasised that the ǳcurrent understanding of biological mechanisms does not 
form a basis for the practical attribution and apportionment of causation of 
particular cancers. This still rests upon epidemiological evidence and theories 
about biological mechanisms should not be used to undermine conclusions 
based upon epidemiological evidenceǳ. Notes Karhausen643 about the 
epidemiological approach: Ǯwe merely observe tendencies toward sufficiency or 
tendencies toward necessity: cohort studies evaluate the first tendencies, and 
case-control studies the latter.ǯ In applied sciences, such as medicine and 
epidemiology, causes are intrinsically connected with goals and effective 
strategies- causes do not explain event E but event E rather than event F.644 This 
is congruent with the argument advanced throughout the thesis, that the role of 
the court is only to decide whether it finds the claimantǯs or the defendantǯs 
evidence more persuasive, not to find out what actually happened.  
 
Thus, this thesis advocates for a better legal test for disease causation that can 
take account of the complexities of disease, and can accommodate probabilistic 
evidence. Further, it strongly argues for apportionment of liability, and suggests 
that epidemiological causal models have a valuable contribution to offer, both to 
establishing factual causation and then to calculating the likely contribution. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
BETTER USE OF SCIENCE: THE VALUE OF EPIDEMIOLOGY IN ASSESSING 
SPECIFIC CAUSATION   
 
As a relatively young science, epidemiology can sometimes be perceived as 
inferior to some of the more established sciences such as clinical medicine, or to 
hard sciences such as physics, which seem to offer theorems and laws with 
mathematical proof. Unfortunately for legal expectations (as this thesis has 
attempted to illustrate through the preceding discussions) such proof is simply 
impossible for disease causation, at least in our current state of human 
knowledge. Further, the notion that any science can offer complete conclusive 
proof regarding a question is fallacious: something that is now becoming 
increasingly evident even in the world of physics, the discipline which was once 
held as the benchmark for the ideal of science as conclusive and deterministic (as 
discussed earlier in Chapter 2). This chapter will now attempt to re-assess the 
legal and judicial misconceptions about epidemiology in light of the above 
realities, and will conclude that the devaluation of epidemiological inferences of 
causation is both unfair and impractical. It will suggest a way forward for the 
better legal use of scientific evidence generally, and epidemiological evidence in 
particular.  It is important to note at the outset that this thesis does not hold that 
all problems in the law-science relationship are due to inadequacies on part of 
the law. Unrealistic legal expectations from science are at least partially a 
consequence of the fact that some scientific expert witnesses give courts a false 
impression of how Ǯscientificǯ their assertions are, and often do not provide 
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courts with an accurate account of the extent of subjectivity, or potential for 
error, in their testimony (an issue that will be further explored in section 4 of 
this chapter).  
 
This author does not dispute the judicial observation that epidemiology cannot 
offer conclusive proof of specific causation. Epidemiological inferences about 
causality are indeed subject to limitations and caveats. However, such evidence 
is based in sound empirical foundations and is, in many situations, the best 
available evidence about disease causation that science may be able to offer, at 
least at present. Thus, it is submitted, courts have a responsibility, in the 
interests of justice, to give serious consideration to this form of evidence where 
it exists, particularly where there is no other evidence to help assess specific 
causation (as will very often be the case given the very complex and 
fundamentally unobservable mechanisms of disease causation). However, as this 
evidence does have potential for error, it must be evaluated in a nuanced and 
judicious way. Such data should guide, rather than determine, the legal outcome.  
 
Over the centuries, notes Klinkner,645 philosophers of science have struggled to 
answer questions about what makes scientific findings truthful and to formulate 
standards that would help identify good scientific explanations. They have 
considered whether scientific pronouncements ought to be causal, unified, 
nomological, statistical, deductive, inductive or any combination of these. Given 
that philosophers of science wrestle with such questions, how are judges, lacking 
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New Context and a Pragmatic Resolution (2009) 13 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 
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in scientific expertise and with little time for deliberation on metaphysical and 
methodological issues, to determine what makes scientific results valid and 
reliable, truthful and credible?646 
 
The case this thesis has made for judges to display better understanding about 
science is not a demand that they should transform into Ǯsuper-scientists with 
access to a level of knowledge superior to those who have given the evidenceǯ647 
as Mackay J put it, when expressing frustration with the Ǯunyieldingǯ scientific 
debates about causation. This thesis is a plea only for the law to more correctly 
identify the key features that differentiate Ǯgoodǯ science from poor science 
(rather than valuing misleading criteria such as necessity and certainty); and 
also for courts to be clear that there is no perfect science. To people who lack 
basic understanding of science,  Ǯscience is a monolith, a mystery, and an 
authority, rather than a methodǯ648 states Dr. Ben Goldacre, in his bestelling 
book, Bad Science. The judicial frustration frequently seen in disease litigation, 
this thesis has argued, is to a large extent a consequence of legal conceptual 
models that misunderstand science, and align poorly with available scientific 
evidence about causation (particularly disease causation). Over-inflated 
perceptions of the probative value of some forms of scientific evidence (such as 
some kinds of forensic testimony)649 is as pernicious a threat to the cause of 
justice as is the undervaluation and step-sisterly treatment accorded to other 
scientific disciplines such as epidemiology. Broadbent observes that Lord 
Nimmo-Smithǯs undermining of the epidemiological evidence in McTear v 
                                                        
646 ibid 
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648 B Goldacre, Bad Science (Harper Perennial 2009) 1 
649 See Chapter 2 section 2 
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Imperial Tobacco650 on the grounds that no amount of such testimony could 
convince him of the truth of the assertion that smoking caused Mr. McTearǯs lung 
cancer is deeply fallacious, because it seeks truth as the justificatory basis for a 
conclusion. However, argues Broadbent, the notion of Ǯtruthǯ is not sufficient to 
evaluate the validity of a scientific claim, because it assumes that there are, 
somewhere, sciences, that can provide absolute confirmation of the truth.651  
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis earlier attempted to dispel this myth. ǮPerhaps the most 
dramatic counterexample to the idea that a scientific theory must be true in 
order to be reasonably believed or relied upon is Newtonian physicsǯ notes 
Broadbent.652 ǮNobody could reasonably suggest that Newton was wrong to hold 
that space and time are absolute, even though modern physical theory suggests 
that he was in fact wrong: what makes Newtonǯs theory reasonable is that he 
advanced compelling arguments for his view and made use of available evidence 
in a rational way.ǯ653 This thesis contends that the yardsticks UK tort law uses to 
evaluate the validity of scientific evidence, and to differentiate between science 
and pseudo-science, must be based on more sophisticated and informed criteria 
than those it currently uses, such as truth and certainty.  
 
All legal decisions involving scientific evidence require management of the costs 
of error. Many legal commentators have expressed that judges need at least a 
basic understanding of the methods and statistics used to generate the error 
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rates.654 This requires some basic degree of familiarity with research methods, 
and when and why different methods are employed. It also requires courts to be 
able to take a more critical approach to data, such as knowing the need to 
examine the size of the study sample, the strategies employed to reduce bias and 
confounding, etc. The Criminal Practice Directions655 exhort judges to "be astute 
to identify potential flawsǳ in scientific evidence. Thus judges are expected to do 
more than passively wait for the opponent of the evidence to identify any flaws, 
which can only happen if they possess at least a preliminary foundational 
understanding of scientific evidence and how to utilise it appropriately. 656 
 
Chapter 1 cited the epistemic concerns courts express about epidemiology that 
hinder its effective application in UK law. Having now clarified the underlying 
legal misconceptions regarding science (Chapter 2), disease causation (Chapter 
3) and the reasons for the futility of deterministic Ǯbut forǯ questions in disease 
disputes (Chapter 4), this chapter will revaluate the misconceptions about 
epidemiology that we outlined in Chapter 1. A closer analysis reveals that none 
of these constitute a fair justification for treating epidemiological evidence as 
invalid in this legal context. This thesis concludes that the judicial rejection of 
epidemiological evidence on grounds of its inconclusive nature is misconceived 
and deeply impractical. 
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Sections 1 and 2 highlight that the UK judicial view of epidemiology as little more 
than Ǯstatisticsǯ is misconceived, and does the discipline a disservice. Section I 
will examine how epidemiologists make inferences about causation, and the 
decision-making strategies that guide this. Section 2 explores in detail the 
specific judicial misconceptions about epidemiology. Section 3 discusses a better 
approach to the use of scientific evidence, generally, in the law.  Section 3.1 
examines admissibility issues, and assesses whether UK courts need better 
guidelines in this regard. Section 3.2 examines the legal tendency to fall victim to 
the Ǯtyranny of numbersǯ: that is, the tendency to treat numerical or statistical 
data as an absolute that must be determinative of the outcome if considered. The 
resulting occasionally over-zealous interpretation of numbers leads to inevitable 
inaccuracy and legal disillusionment, causing courts to then react by swinging 
the other way and barring scientists from expressing probabilities in numbers 
altogether,657 (believing that the problem is with numbers rather than the 
rigidity in their interpretation). This is an unfortunate over-reaction, and will 
result in the loss of a valuable epistemic and scientific communication tool. The 
better solution would be help decision-makers to recognise the need for 
judiciousness in the use of numerical and statistical evidence. Section 3.3 
discusses the need to use expert testimony more effectively, evaluate its 
evidential validity, and to distinguish between fact and opinion in courtrooms. 
Section 3.4 discusses the need for more transparency and caution on part of 
expert witnesses. Section 4 suggests ways forward for a better use of 
epidemiological evidence in legal decision-making. Section 4.1 discusses the 
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importance of judiciousness when weighing up the probative value of such 
evidence. Section 4.2 discusses the use of epidemiological evidence in evidence-
based medicine (EBM), where population evidence is routinely used to make 
decisions about specific cases. This section suggests that the law could usefully 
borrow from such an approach. 
 
Undoubtedly, such inferences suffer from methodological limitations and are not 
conclusive. Undoubtedly, too, courts must not base liability decisions on 
epidemiological evidence alone, but on the totality of all available evidence (as 
well as consideration of all other factors apart from factual causation that are 
relevant to liability in negligence). The methodological concerns raised in UK law 
are entirely appropriate if they are intended as a caution against blindly 
accepting all epidemiological inferences as necessarily always reliable. However, 
these objections do not constitute valid grounds for dismissing epidemiological 
evidence from consideration in legal disputes.  
 
Disease causation is not just important to lawyers, it is also important for 
medicine, as causation plays a vital role in both treatment and prevention of 
disease. Lawyers seem to operate on the fundamental assumption that what they 
term Ǯpopulationǯ evidence is entirely irrelevant and useless for individual 
decision-making; and this is a significant factor that leads to judicial reluctance 
about epidemiology in causal disputes. However, to many other professionals, 
that assumption would sound absurd. In medicine, for example, individual 
clinical diagnosis and treatment not only is routinely informed by general 
evidence, but should be informed by this, under the principles of evidence-based 
 232 
medicine (EBM) that all practitioners are required to follow. The law should 
borrow from the methods that evidence-based medicine (EBM) uses when 
applying probabilistic, population-level evidence to individual cases.  
Epidemiology, with its probabilistic causal models that do not assess potential 
causal factors in terms of necessity/sufficiency, but instead evaluate these 
factors in terms of the likelihood of their potential to contribute to disease, has 
much to offer under a probabilistic legal understanding of disease causation.      
   
SECTION 1: How epidemiology makes causal inferences  
 
ǲWho knows, asked Robert Browning, but the world may end tonight? True, but on 
available evidence most of us make ready to commute on the 8.30 next day.ǳ658 
 
-Sir Austin Bradford Hill (Professor Emeritus of Medical Statistics, University of 
London), 1965 
 
The approach of epidemiology to causation is pragmatic and task-focussed, but it 
does not aim to provide a complete or conclusive account of causal mechanisms. 
As Coggon puts it, epidemiology: ǲhas much to offer, but we cannot expect it to 
provide a complete understanding of why some people get a disease and others 
do not.ǳ659 In practice, as Broadbent660 points out, epidemiological hypotheses 
are explicitly exception-ridden. They are framed not as universal generalisations, 
but as Ǯmeasures of the influence of one factor on outcome, or on measures of the 
strength of an association, or of the proportion of an effect that is due to a 
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particular factor or group of factors.ǯ661 Often, for many diseases, where events 
may have many causes, the aim is to measure the contribution of a specific factor 
on the disease: thus, probability theory and statistical inference are central to 
epidemiologic research.662 Sir Austin Bradford Hill clarifies the probabilistic and 
pragmatic philosophy underlying epidemiology: Ǯthe Ǯcauseǯ of a disease may be 
immediate and direct; it may be remote and indirect underlying the observed 
association. But…the decisive question is whether the frequency of the…event B 
will be influenced by a change in the environmental factor A. How such a change 
exerts that influence may call for a great deal of research. However, before 
deducing Ǯcausationǯ…we do not have to sit around awaiting the results of that 
research. The whole chain may have to be unraveled or a few links may suffice. It 
will depend on the circumstances.ǯ663 
Contrary to the judicial belief that epidemiological inferences of causation rest 
on simplistic numerical values or observed associations, the process of inferring 
causation in epidemiology is complex, and subject to much scrutiny. 
Epidemiologists are alive to the risk of Ǯfalse positivesǯ, and thus robust, good-
quality studies use a variety of techniques (both statistical and non-statistical) to 
reduce this risk. Coughlin664 explains that epidemiologic researchers formulate 
hypotheses based upon their own insights and the insights of others. In order to 
test hypotheses, empirical data is collected and analysed according to a research 
protocol, and observations are assessed to see if a causal hypothesis should be 
accepted or rejected. Epidemiological results are examined across studies (for 
example, to examine the consistency of findings and to determine whether they 
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can be replicated) to draw causal inferences.665 This is similar to Kuhnǯs 
description of how theories in most empirical sciences evolve, where existing 
scientific theories may be modified and new hypotheses generated for further 
testing.666 The adequacy of a theory may be evaluated based upon its accuracy, 
consistency, simplicity, fruitfulness, and scope or reach.667 
Epidemiological methods of data analysis rest on using techniques to put 
together, or synthesise, the evidence that has been discovered.668 The aim is to 
use strategies that give other researchers the knowledge to separate causal from 
non-causal associations. Thus epidemiology emphasises the use of inductive 
reasoning of sufficient strength and rigour. One of the ways in which statistical 
information from multiple similar studies is combined is a technique known as 
meta-analysis, which provides statistical tests for the overall results, which can 
also sometimes be incorporated into a systematic review of the literature, and 
using experts to examine the evidence.669 Epidemiological causal claims are 
substantiated by the use of both quantitative (e.g. counterfactual and structural 
models) and qualitative approaches (such as background knowledge and subject 
matter expertise about chronic disease epidemiology), as well as by using the 
Bradford Hill guidelines (outlined earlier in Chapter 1 section 1) as a heuristic 
aid for assessing whether observed associations are causal.670  
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The eminent epidemiologist Sir Austin Bradford Hill was emphatic, however, 
that the Bradford-Hill factors were only meant as Ǯviewpoints to examine 
associationsǯ,671 and that there can be no hard-and-fast rules of evidence that 
must be obeyed to determine when epidemiological evidence indicates 
causation: none of these criteria could bring indisputable evidence for or against 
cause-and-effect hypotheses, and none should be required as sine qua non.672 
Unfortunately, notes Haack, Hillsǯ ideas have often been misinterpreted and 
misapplied in legal contexts: the Ǯlegal penchant for convenient checklistsǯ has 
led many to construe his list as required criteria for the reliability of causation 
testimony.673 Courts dealing with epidemiological evidence should be alive to 
such professional mispractice.  
Probabilistic relationships are seen as surface phenomena of underlying causal 
mechanisms and relationships. Probabilistic theories only require that the cause 
should raise the possibility of the effect, and are applied more commonly to the 
assessment of general causal claims than of specific claims.674 But: and this is a 
crucial aspect of probabilistic epidemiological evidence that bears repeating: 
there are no hard-and-fast rules about when a relationship becomes causal.675 
The inference of causation is a complex one that rests on a number of 
considerations.  
SECTION 2: Re-examining the judicial concerns about the validity of 
epidemiology  
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As discussed earlier in Chapter 1, courts in the UK have expressed varying 
degrees of scepticism about such epidemiology in courtrooms; ranging from 
outright hostility (as seen in McTear v Imperial Tobacco676) to the more 
ambivalent but generally dismissive attitudes seen in Sienkiewicz v Greif677 
where several members of the Supreme Court cited various reasons for their 
discomfort with giving too much weight to epidemiological evidence. Lord 
Phillips' speech in Sienkiewicz offers a poor portrayal of epidemiology. 
Epidemiological evidence, His Lordship appeared to indicate, is not a satisfactory 
basis upon which to assess factual causation. McIvor points out that Lord 
Phillips' leading speech in Sienkiewicz, where he expresses serious doubts about 
the adequacy and reliability of epidemiological evidence, ǲseriously misconceives 
what epidemiologists actually do and the type of evidence that they bring to the legal table… ȋItȌ reflectȋsȌ a mistaken belief that epidemiologists are mere 
statisticians, concerned solely with the calculation of incidence rates and capable 
only of producing 'naked statistics'.ǳ678 This section will more closely examine 
the three distinct but related judicial beliefs about epidemiology that that seem 
to most hinder the effective application of epidemiology, as outlined in Chapter 1 
(section 3).  
 
2.1: Epidemiology and observational methods: exploring the  
?fetishisation of evidentiary hierarchies?679 
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ǲEpidemiologyǳ emphasised Professor Bradford Hill, ǲdeals with the 
characteristics of human populations and is therefore more an observational 
than an experimental discipline.ǳ680. Thus epidemiological causal inferences rely 
heavily on inductive reasoning and observational study designs, rather than 
experimental methods. To many members of the UK judiciary, this appears to 
indicate that epidemiology cannot offer any useful evidence for causation. The 
Supreme Court in Sienkiewicz v Greif went to great lengths to discuss the 
methodological inadequacies of epidemiology, as cited earlier (Chapter 1, section 
2.1.2). Most judges, Justice Jay points out in an extrajudicial article, subscribe to 
the fallacious notion that Ǯgold plated experimental evidence is always superior 
to data derived from observational studies.ǯ681 There is a blinkered belief, both 
within the legal profession and outside it, that Ǯrealǯ sciences must derive their 
data from experimental methods, rather than through observation (with the RCT 
usually placed at the pinnacle of this hierarchy, as the Ǯgoldǯ standard).  
 
The belief that experimental evidence is the only respectable form of scientific 
evidence is not only naïve (as the rest of this subsection will discuss), but it 
ignores the most fundamental problem about disease causation and toxic tort 
research: that it is usually impossible to carry out experiments to test out the 
cause of a disease without causing serious harm to participants, or intentionally 
risking their wellbeing. Further, Lord Dysonǯs criticism in Sienkiewicz (cited 
earlier in chapter 1 section 3.1) that epidemiological methods can only establish 
associations between alleged causes and effects that are insufficient to 
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conclusively prove causation,682 indicates a failure to recognise that no scientific 
method can conclusively prove causation. The blanket dismissal of evidence 
from observational sciences is mistaken on at least 2 counts, contend Rothman et 
al:683 first, the non-experimental nature of a science does not preclude 
impressive scientific discoveries. They provide the example of plate tectonics, 
the evolution of species, planets orbiting other stars, and the effects of cigarette 
smoking on human health. Secondly, note Rothman et al, even causal theories 
that are based on evidence drawn from the most stringent experimentation are 
also only tentative: even the most careful and mechanistic dissection of 
individual events cannot provide more than associations, albeit at a finer level. ǮExperiments (including randomised controlled trials) do not provide anything 
approaching proof and may be controversial, contradictory or non-reproducibleǯ 
as the authors point out.684       
 
Observational studies are usually employed to investigate whether certain 
exposures (or risk factors) are associated with the occurrence or progression of 
disease (that is, causal links).685 Investigators might compare, for instance, 
outcomes of people who or suffer an exposure (or receive a treatment), with 
those who do not. However, they do not allocate patients to receive the exposure 
or intervention, and do not administer it. The most common observational 
studies are case studies, case series, case-control studies, cohort studies, and 
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historically controlled studies.686 Although a detailed description of these is 
outside the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that, essentially, they are 
not experimental, controlled or randomised studies.  
 
It is crucial for the legal profession to understand that for many research 
questions related to potential toxicities and disease causation, observational 
study designs may often be the methodology of choice. For such questions, there 
is often no experimental data to be found anywhere: not because scientists lack 
the required will or resource, but because the experiments usually cannot be 
conducted without harming participants in the study, or intentionally placing 
them at risk of harm. Carrying out Ǯgold standardǯ RCTs in order to 
experimentally test the potentially harmful effect of a substance on humans 
might require a scientist to administer a potentially deadly substance to a 
(willing or unwilling) human participant, in order to examine whether the 
consequences are, indeed, deadly. For obvious reasons, such research would be 
morally and ethically impossible. Observational research methods can provide 
invaluable- if probabilistic- empirical evidence in such situations; and often 
constitute the best available evidence about causal links, in the absence of which 
there would no data at all to guide decisions about prevention or treatment of 
harms resulting from toxic exposure.  
 
Smith and Pell suggest, in a tongue-in-cheek article in the British Medical Journal, 
that those who look on observational data as an epistemically invalid and 
inferior way to acquire knowledge might wish to volunteer to verify whether 
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parachutes prevent death or major trauma in a randomised trial.687 The 
tendency to idealise experimentation and devalue observational data is not 
unique to the legal world. It also has a long- and unfortunate- history in the 
world of science.688 Early philosophers in the 17th century believed science could 
only be understood through experimentation, and the method of ǲdeductiveǳ 
inference: a trend that was further strengthened by the influential writings of 
Karl Popper, who held that science always required experiments that were 
designed and conducted to prove a hypothesis false.689 Popperǯs approach of ǲdeductive falsificationǳ 690 has attracted a huge and lasting following. Professor 
Sir Michael Rawlins, who was for several years Chair of the National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) (since its inception in 1999) notes in his 
Harvien Oration lecture that this tendency to formulate ǲhierarchies of evidenceǳ 
(usually with RCTs placed at the top, and observational studies at the foothills) 
currently Ǯbedevilsǯ the clinical world and medical policy-making.691 This, 
Professor Rawlins notes elsewhere, is a deeply unfortunate development: "The 
notion that evidence can be reliably placed in hierarchies is illusory. Hierarchies place RCTs on an undeserved pedestal… although the technique has advantages 
it also has significant disadvantages. Observational studies too have defects but 
they also have merit. Decision makers need to assess and appraise all the 
available evidence irrespective as to whether it has been derived from RCTǯs or 
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observational studies, and the strengths and weaknesses of each need to be 
understood if reasonable and reliable conclusions are to be drawn."692 
 
Although most clinical ǲhierarchies of evidenceǳ consider RCTs to offer stronger 
evidence than observational studies, there are actually many situations where 
observational studies would be preferred over experimental studies: e.g. where 
experimentation may be unethical, difficult to implement, inappropriate, or may 
lack generalizability.693 Further, they often cannot be generalized beyond the 
population that has been studied, and can be Ǯoutrageously expensive.ǯ694 
Observational studies may be more tentative, but have three potential strengths, 
emphasises Professor Rawlins: they provide an alternative to RCTs in assessing 
benefit, play a critical role in the assessment of harms, and provide valuable data 
about generalisability.695 
 
Howick points out that it is an odd but paradoxical truth of medicine that many 
therapies Ǯin whose effectiveness doctors have the greatest confidenceǯ (such as 
tracheostomy to open a blocked airway passage, or the Heimlich manoeuvre to 
dislodge airway obstructions) evolved through observation, and have never been 
supported by randomised trials of any description.696 Rothman et al697 note that 
Edward Jenner developed the smallpox vaccine after observing the low incidence 
of smallpox amongst dairymaids, which led to an initial inductive hypothesis that 
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having cowpox somehow conferred immunity to smallpox. (Under strict, anti-
inductivist logical analysis, such a causal hypothesis based on an observed 
association would constitute an unjustified assumption about causation). Jenner, 
however, discovered after further investigation of his observational findings that 
the observed association in this case was evidence of a causal connection: the 
cowpox virus did confer immunity to smallpox. Jenner used this to develop a 
vaccine for smallpox that led to a revolution in healthcare for humankind. The 
widespread global public health vaccination campaigns that occurred in the 19th 
and 20th centuries based on Jennerǯs observational studies have led to the 
complete eradication of smallpox, a devastating disease that is estimated to have 
killed 300-500 million people in the 20th century alone. Similarly, the physician 
John Snowǯs investigation of the cholera epidemics in nineteenth century London 
used observational techniques to discover that cholera was spread by 
contaminated water (a discovery that was later confirmed through classic 
epidemiologic methods such as case control and retrospective cohort studies).698 
The discovery that scurvy is caused by Vitamin C deficiency, the discovery of the 
causes of malaria, and more recently the identification of HIV as the cause of 
AIDS, are all classic examples of inferring causality using traditional 
epidemiologic observational methods.699   
 
Much of the scepticism about observational research arises from the fact that the 
conclusions of such research rely heavily on inductive reasoning. Chapter 2 
(section 3.2.1) discussed some philosophical problems that beset inductive 
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reasoning. The logical conundrum inherent in inductive reasoning is referred to 
in philosophical and epistemological literature as the Ǯproblem of inductionǯ. The 
problem arises because Ǯno matter how many times a proposition is tested and 
shown to be true, it is logically impossible to be absolutely certain we will have 
the same result next time it is tested.ǯ700 Thus, no matter how many times my 
flicking of a switch results in the light turning on, it is impossible for me to prove 
with certainty through observation alone that the flicking of the switch causes 
the light to turn on. There is no point at which I could guarantee that that the 
same thing will happen the next time I flick the switch. The problem arises 
because observers cannot perceive causal connections, but only a series of 
events. Similarly, the failure of a case cohort study to find statistically significant 
results is not always evidence of a lack of causation.701  
 
Professor Rawlins points out that disputes about whether deduction is superior 
to induction are ǲabsurdǳ: whole swathes of science such as astronomy, geology, 
evolutionary biology and genetics depend largely or exclusively on inductive 
inference.702 Notes Miller: ǮThe problem of induction cannot be escaped. But only 
philosophers are troubled by their failure to find a synthetic and a priori concept 
of cause. For most people, pragmatism is all that is needed to make sense of the 
causes of the great majority of the phenomena they encounter in everyday 
life.ǯ703 
                                                        
700 As also acknowledged by Popper and others. See further A Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: A 
Contemporary Introduction (Routledge 2005) 121 
701 A Broadbent, ‘Epidemiological Evidence in Proof of Specific Causation’ (2011) 17 (4) Legal 
Theory 237, 239 
702 Professor Sir Michael Rawlins (n 44) 1 
703 C Miller, ‘Causation in Personal Injury: Legal or Epidemiological Common Sense?’ (2006) 26 
Legal Studies 544, 547 
 244 
 
Sir Austin Bradford-Hill (1897-1991), amongst the most eminent British medical 
statisticians,  who was amongst the leading proponents of the much-valued RCTs 
as well as author of the Bradford Hill factors we have discussed at several points 
through this thesis, had this to say about evidentiary hierarchies: ǲAny belief that 
the controlled trial is the only way would mean not only that the pendulum had 
swung too far, but that it had come right off the hook.ǯ704 Cranor points out the 
utility of case studies in examining causal links from toxic exposures, and notes 
that they deserve much more respect in this area of the law than they receive 
from courts.705 Recent critiques of evidence-based medicine (EBM) suggest that 
rigid hierarchies of evidence should be replaced by the requirement that all 
evidence of a sufficiently high quality (including observational studies) should be 
considered in trying to come to a decision. 706   
 
Case control studies do not just use observations to make causal inferences from 
simple associations, but subject observational data to a great deal of further 
scrutiny to decide if the associations do, indeed, suggest causation. There are, 
undoubtedly, some methodological problems with observational studies. For 
example, they are prone to a variety of biases, such as self-selection bias, 
allocation bias and performance bias.707 They suffer from confounding, unlike 
well-conducted RCTs. However, it is equally important to note that there are 
special observational designs that have been designed to help reduce these 
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problems. Cohort studies often provide the best evidence that the exposure-
outcome association is causal. Case-control studies also help to reduce other 
sources of bias, and are superior to cross-sectional studies, because 
epidemiologists attempt to ascertain subjectsǯ exposure status before the onset 
of disease.708 Case studies can also be used, in fact, to refute false causal 
hypotheses drawn from associations between an event and its hypothesized 
effect. An important example is the now-discredited theory of the link between 
the MMR vaccine and autism (a theory put forward by Dr. Andrew Wakefield and 
others in The Lancet in 1998).709 This study was later retracted due to evidence 
of deliberate falsification of data: a fact that observational studies helped bring to 
notice.  
 
Thus, it is true, as Lord Dyson notes, that associations do not necessarily indicate 
causal connections. However, associations do indicate the possibility of a 
connection that can be tested. Thus, inferring that the roosterǯs crowing causes 
the sun to rise simply because you have observed an association between the 
two events would indeed be fallacious, but this observation does supply a 
hypothesis that can be tested, as Rothman at al. point out: if you wring the 
roosterǯs neck before the sun rises and the sun still rises, you have disproved 
that the rosterǯs crowing is a necessary cause of sunrise.710  Good case studies 
rest on a principle of diagnostic reasoning that is essential to all causal 
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judgments: ǮWhat makes case studies good evidence about causation is the 
analysis to which they are subjected and how scientists reason about them.ǯ711  
    
Evidence, as Professor Sir Michael Rawlins put it, has but one purpose: to inform 
decision makers. Both experiments and observations have a crucial evidentiary 
role to play in this. It is now imperative for decision-makers to Ǯavoid adopting 
entrenched positions about the nature of evidence, and for both to accept that 
the interpretation of evidence requires judgment.ǯ 712 The use of hierarchies as a 
replacement for judgment is dangerously wrong, as Rawlins emphasises: it is 
judgment, conditioned by the totality of the evidence base, that lies at the heart 
of decision-making.ǯ713 Scientists are at long last starting to acknowledge that 
observational methods may have long been undervalued and overlooked in the 
tendency to Ǯfetishise evidentiary hierarchiesǯ. More prescient philosophers of 
science (including those of such eminence as Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes and 
Thomas Hobbes) had many centuries ago pointed out that on philosophical 
grounds the observational approach was to be preferred to the experimental.714 
However, while scientists are beginning to properly recognise the value of 
observational methodologies, the law (in the UK, at least) appears to have 
remained entrenched in rigid and outdated beliefs.  
 
2.2: General versus specific causation:  
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The second major legal objection to epidemiological evidence is that 
epidemiologists derive their knowledge primarily from the study of 
populations.715  The judicial perception that it is impossible to apply 
epidemiological studies to determine causation in individual cases is amongst 
the main reasons that the claim in McTear716 did not succeed. Lord Nimmo-Smith 
stated, in unqualified terms, that there is a "fallacy of applying statistical 
probability to individual causation."717 It will be recalled from Chapter 1 (section 
2.1.1) that the court in McTear entirely dismissed epidemiological evidence in a 
claim for lung cancer allegedly caused by smoking, asserting rather oddly that 
not only could epidemiology not prove causation, but that it could not even 
provide information on the likelihood that there was a causal connection. The 
population attributable risk, His Lordship went on to assert as we saw earlier, 
was a measure for populations only, and did not imply a likelihood of disease 
occurrence within an individual.   
 
The distinction between general and specific causation has been debated for 
many decades, and such anxieties are not exclusive to the law. From the time of 
John Stuart Mill, notes Coughlin, philosophers have distinguished between Ǯsingularǯ causal claims (e.g. person Aǯs lung cancer was caused by smoking) 
versus general causal claims (cigarette smoking causes lung cancer).718 However, 
such philosophically engaging debates have not obstructed us from utilising the 
value that  Ǯgeneralǯ evidence can add to specific decision-making in professions 
apart from the law. Medicine is one obvious example. Routine clinical practice 
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and evidence-based medicine (EBM) requires practitioners to constantly apply 
data obtained from population studies in order to make (often life-and-death) 
diagnostic and treatment decisions about the individual before them. Judges 
have missed the point that most empirical research is done at the population 
level, yet it is often used to make statements about particular cases.719 UK law 
has very high regard from experimental or RCTs (see above, section 2.1), but 
even RCTs are a population-based empirical method. For example, an RCT to test 
out the efficacy of a new treatment, whether for cancer or schizophrenia, is 
conducted with large random samples of individuals drawn from within a 
population. The results are then extrapolated to individual cases in order to 
assess the chances of success and to make specific clinical decisions. There is no 
guarantee that any treatment that works for a large number of people in the 
study population will work for every individual it is administered to. 
Nonetheless, population data informs us about the likely outcomes for 
individuals, and that is the best that science can do.  
 
Wright720 refines the argument against the legal use of epidemiology further, by 
drawing a distinction between ex ante (before the event has happened) and post 
ante (after the event has happened) probabilities. Wright contends that it is 
epistemically valid to use Ǯgeneralǯ or population evidence in individual decision-
making ex ante, but not ex post. Wrightǯs reasoning, based mostly in Ǯspeculative 
metaphysicsǯ,721 is, for uncertain reasons, highly convincing to lawyers. This has 
caused many practical problems in the proper legal application of 
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epidemiological evidence. As Miller notes: ǮIn particular, it is the common lawǯs 
reluctance to accept probabilistic estimates of the uncertainty of past events (in 
contrast to its ready acceptance of the counterfactual chance of Ǯwhat might have 
beenǯ and of the future chance of Ǯwhat might yet occurǯ) which accounts for a 
large part of the incoherence.ǯ722  
 
With respect, this thesis contends that Wrightǯs distinction (between the validity 
of this evidence for estimating ex ante versus post ante probabilities) is, to 
borrow a phrase from Prosser, ǲmoonshine and vapourǳ,723 at least in terms of its 
practicality. It is difficult to find logical force in the argument that data that is 
epistemically valid for making probabilistic predictions about future events is 
epistemically invalid for formulating probabilistic explanations of past events 
(particularly when we have no other evidence to ascertain the past event, as is 
usually the case in disease claims; and providing we assume the absence of 
extrasensory abilities, we can usually safely do). The tasks of predicting the 
future or explaining the past are similar: both need to be able to accommodate 
probabilistic reasoning. Thompson notes that: Ǯwhat is true of prediction is 
equally true of explanation. Although there is no tight symmetry between 
explanation and prediction, they are two sides of the same coin.ǯ724 Future 
predictions are, in any case, often based on past information and experience. 
Making causal inferences requires a synthesis of both sources of data. As Prosser 
points out, proof of the relation of cause and effect can never be more than "the 
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projection of our habit of expecting certain consequents to follow certain 
antecedents merely because we have observed those sequences on previous 
occasions.ǳ725 
 
Further, Wright objects to Ǯnaked statisticsǯ on the grounds that it is not Ǯprobativeǯ: that is, that statistics only comprise general statements that do not 
remove the uncertainty surrounding the causal connection between tortfeasorǯs 
action and the claimantǯs injury.726 But what Wright fails to note is that 
particularistic evidence, too, has no claim to certainty. Why, then, does 
particularistic evidence necessarily have greater epistemic value than Ǯgeneralǯ 
evidence? Professor David Kaye points out the naiveté of the legal scepticism 
about purely statistical data. All evidence, he points out, whether it is 
particularistic empirical data or pure statistics, is ultimately probabilistic, so that 
the legal attitude that particularistic data is somehow Ǯqualitatively different, 
more reliable, or more trustworthy than statistical data is unsupportable.ǯ727 An 
example of this is eyewitness testimony (that is, incidentally, so frequently used 
in criminal litigation): this evidence is Ǯparticularisticǯ, but as Justice Jay notes: Ǯ…is almost always flawed because human memory is so unreliable. No one 
would claim this resolution to be scientific.ǯ728 It is difficult to imagine what 
evidence would satisfy the quest for particularistic evidence in disease litigation, 
given that no one can see or record the process of a toxin lodging in, for example, 
a personǯs lungs and altering cellular and chemical structures. Wright offers no 
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solution to this problem, but continues to advocate a rejection of generalised 
statistical evidence. The sooner the law gives up the fantasy that we will very 
shortly find conclusive and particularistic evidence of disease causation (at least, 
in the present stage of human evolution), the clearer it will become that it is time 
to give due value to pragmatic, best evidence about the causal question. Any 
evidence an individual has that Paracetamol will help their headache, or 
chemotherapy their cancer, is ultimately probabilistic and uncertain. When a 
person makes a decision to accept a medically recommended treatment, the 
personal decision (as well as the medical practitionerǯs recommendation) is 
largely informed by general evidence of efficacy and risk. Uncertainties about 
whether that treatment will work for us, as individuals, does not lead us to turn 
away from these treatments and choose prayer as our only recourse (at least, not 
most of us). Using population evidence to guide our treatment decisions when 
there is no specific evidence is a rational, scientific decision: we have used the 
best evidence that is available, and made an inference to the best explanation. 
Wright, it most be noted, advocates the very opposite of the scientific approach 
when he proposes that the available evidence must be rejected as it is imperfect, 
without providing any better alternative solution. To believe that personal 
beliefs and hunches are about as useful a guide to making factual decisions as 
statistical data would be akin to deciding that prayer or homeopathy is about as 
well-evidenced a treatment for cancer as chemotherapy, because chemotherapy 
is not always effective. 
2.3: Is a Relative Risk ratio (RR) of >2 necessary, or sufficient, to 
establish causation? 
 252 
The RR (relative risk) is a measure that epidemiologists use to compare the 
incidence of a condition (or disease) in a group that has been exposed to a factor, 
with a group that has not been exposed to that factor. The relative risk, in other 
words, tells us how much larger the exposed risk is than the unexposed.729  The 
balance of probabilities or Ǯmore likely than notǯ test has sometimes been 
misinterpreted by courts in statistical terms as the requirement that the 
statistics should show that disease incidence in individuals exposed to the agent 
should be at least twice the incidence of disease in those not so exposed:730 that 
is, courts tend to view an RR> 2 as equivalent to causation on the balance of 
probabilities. Courts call this the Ǯdoubles the riskǯ test (described earlier in 
Chapter 4 section 2.3).  
 
 
This is a crude conceptualisation of how epidemiologists make causal inferences, 
and does epidemiology a disservice as it leads to the legal undermining of this 
discipline. Further, this belief also leads to a variety of legal errors in disease 
litigation, through mechanistic applications of rigid RR criteria in the form of the Ǯdoubles the riskǯ test. Epidemiologists do not view Ǯdoubling of the riskǯ alone as 
proof of specific causation. The epidemiological inference of causation, as we 
have discussed above (see section 1) and extensively throughout this thesis, is a 
complex one that rests on a number of considerations. Epidemiologists 
constantly acknowledge that inferences about both general and individual 
causation cannot be proved by statistical probability alone. 
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An RR of 2 or more does not necessarily discharge the burden of proof on the 
balance of probabilities, and courts may need to take account of additional 
evidence: every association does not always turn out to be causative.731 Further, 
epidemiologists take pains to stress, RR is inadequate in many ways as a sole 
yardstick: it needs to be interpreted in the light of absolute risk or background 
risk.732 The background incidence rate of a disease is an important contextual 
factor to consider in interpreting RR values. For example, let us assume an 
incidence of a disease in an unexposed population is 1 in 1000 people, and the 
incidence in an exposed population is 2 in 1000 cases. The RR here in this simple 
hypothetical instance would be 2, but the absolute risk in such a situation is so 
low, that it would be difficult to make any reliable inference from it: in other 
words, it is very difficult to rule out such a result occurring by chance. Basing a 
causal inference on an RR>2 in such a scenario could lead to false positive 
conclusions about causation, and more evidence would certainly be needed.  
 
On the other hand, however, if the absolute risk of a disease is very high, then 
even an RR of something less than 2 might be significant. Let us alter our 
hypothetical scenario slightly, so that et us imagine the incidence of a different 
disease in an unexposed population is 200 in 1000 people; and the incidence of 
that same disease in an exposed population rises to 350 in 1000 cases. The RR 
here is slightly less than 2, but in absolute terms, this indicates a far more 
significant increase in incidence of the disease following exposure than in our 
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previous scenario. 150 more people out of every 1000 people in exposed 
population contracted the disease. This has a far lower chance of having 
occurred by chance than our previous scenario, and depending on other 
evidence, may indicate causation. Epidemiologists would however consider 
several other possibilities and try to rule out sources of error before making any 
causal hypotheses. They might scrutinise factors such as the study design and 
sample size; the possibility of confounding factors and whether these were 
controlled for (for example, was the exposed population coincidentally much 
more elderly and thus more prone to infection than the unexposed population?) 
and so on. If the two groups were relatively well matched in terms of 
demographic characteristics, the conclusion is likely to be much more robust). 
Thus the RR values viewed in isolation are an inadequate basis on which to base 
inferences of causation. The significance of the RR value would depend on 
absolute risk, study design and many other contextual factors. This illustrates the 
importance of considering the total evidence and contextual factors when 
examining scientific data. Mechanistic applications of numbers or statistics, 
without consideration of the context, will lead to false and illogical conclusions.  
 
There are several reasons why an RR value of less than 2 does not necessarily 
negate causation. It is often unusual for a new risk factor affecting large numbers 
of people to be confirmed as carrying a relative risk >2 for a major disease, notes 
Coggon,733 and epidemiologists have responded to the challenges by developing 
much more sophisticated statistical techniques to reduce the possibility of 
erroneous causal inferences. One approach, he explains, has been to conduct 
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very large studies with detailed assessment of exposure to a wide range of risk 
factors, carefully control for confounding, and then to apply advanced statistical 
techniques to look at the effects. With this method even an RR of 1.5 can be 
statistically significant, and the findings from such methodologies have achieved 
wide enough acceptance to influence public health policy, as Coggon points 
out.734  
Goldberg735 notes that US courts also disagree as to the proper role of the 
doubling of risk theory in deciding questions of both sufficiency and 
admissibility of scientific evidence of causation in toxic tort cases. They do not 
agree on whether to adopt the doubling of risk as a threshold, nor do they agree 
on the meaning of such a threshold: ǮMany courts accept the doubling of the 
incidence of disease in group studies; some courts insist on doubling of risk as a 
minimum threshold for establishing specific causation. Others have recognised 
that if other known causes can be identified and eliminated, something less than 
a doubling would still be sufficient to find specific causation.736 Thus, notes 
Goldberg, the requirement of an RR>2 for the admissibility or sufficiency of 
epidemiological evidence is subject to much scepticism.737 
 
The legal insistence on an RR>2 displays the rather superficial and incomplete 
legal understanding about epidemiological measures, and ignorance about the 
fact that these must be seen and interpreted in context. The tendency to base 
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legal conclusions on rigid statistical data such as an RR value of >2 is proof also 
reflects a wider fallacy that afflicts the legal use of scientific evidence generally: 
the Ǯtyranny of numbersǯ. Due to this fallacy, numbers, which for scientists are a 
valuable assessment and communication tool to clarify expressions of 
probability, are interpreted as meaning much more than they do. This fallacy 
also played a significant role in the wrong decision in the case of R v Sally 
Clark,738 discussed earlier in Chapter 2 (section 2.2). 
 
SECTION 3: More effective use of general scientific testimony 
The preceding discussions in this thesis have attempted to illustrate that, as 
Rothman et al. put it, 739 all fruits of scientific work, whether in epidemiology or 
in other scientific disciplines, are at best only tentative formulations of a 
description of nature, even when the work itself is carried out with no mistakes. 
Even causal hypotheses that have an extremely high degree of certainty (for 
example, the link between smoking and lung-cancer is almost universally 
accepted) are not definitely proved with absolute certainty as might accompany, 
say, a mathematical theorem.740 This is, simply, the nature of empirical 
inferences. The subsections below outline some specific suggestions that will aid 
better use of scientific testimony generally in legal decision-making.    
3.1: Admissibility issues: do we need Daubert-type guidelines in UK 
courts? 
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Much of the debate around the scientific evidence in US law has focussed itself 
around issues of admissibility. The Daubert,741 Joiner742 and Kumho743 decisions 
of the US Supreme Court clarify a more active role ǲgatekeepingǳ for judges in 
evaluating scientific testimony, both for relevance and reliability.  Scientific 
evidence presented before courts must meet specified criteria and demonstrate 
that it is the product of sound scientific methodology and reasoning.744 By 
contrast, as Edmond745 notes, the Ǯlaissez-faireǯ attitude of UK courts regarding 
admissibility shows that the UK is lagging far behind many similar jurisdictions 
in this area. When it comes to determining the admissibility (and probative 
value) of expert evidence in criminal proceedings, English courts have placed 
great store in trial safeguards and relied heavily on a range of relatively simple 
heuristics such as: whether the forensic analyst has training, study or experience 
in a legally-recognised "field' (a peculiarly legal incarnation of "reliability', 
observes Edmond) and perceived utility or necessity.746 The Law Commission of 
England and Wales has recently added its voice to the debate with the 
publication of a Consultation Paper on the admissibility of expert evidence, 
which recommends the creation of a new statutory rule that would require the 
trial judge to assess evidentiary reliability as a matter of admissibility.747 
However, this is not, of itself, sufficient. Formulating more stringent admissibility 
guidelines that end up being applied mechanistically, without improving legal 
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understanding of how the scientific method works will not resolve all problems 
that arise in the legal use of science. Cranor observes that American courts, 
where federal judges have been given greater responsibility to screen expert 
testimony, still do not always understand the nature of scientific inferences and 
the legal relevance of different kinds of scientific studies, which has prevented 
scientists in American courts from utilising the full body of data they would 
normally consider in coming to conclusions about causation.748 Unless judges are 
more informed about at least the basic principles that determine the reliability 
and validity of scientific testimony, such criteria only become mechanistic 
exercises that do little to help courts identify the right expert, ask them the right 
question, or to judge whether they have the expertise to answer it. Nonetheless, 
it is undeniable that the responsibilities imposed on judges in the US in regarding 
of scrutinising evidence and the guidelines provided to them to do so is a great 
improvement on the situation in UK law. With clearer guidelines for courts and 
the availability of training for judges, the responsibility to assess reliability 
should not be too onerous for courts. As Ward749 notes, in assessing reliability 
for the purpose of determining admissibility, the judge's task is not to determine 
whether the evidence is, in fact, accurate: it is only to determine whether there 
are sufficient indicia of reliability that a jury could rationally rely on the evidence 
in a way that could make a difference to the verdict. How strong the indicia of 
reliability have to be depends on many factors, including on the other evidence 
in the case.750  
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3.2: Escaping the ?tyranny of numbers?: ?People are not numbers?, but 
numbers can help scientific communication  
 
Courts tend to find the idea of using numerical or statistical data in legal decision 
making a heavy burden. Section 2 (above) discussed the discomfort courts feel 
about applying statistics to decision-making to individual cases. Pundik751 notes 
the wide contradictions that exist in the use of statistical data in the law. Despite 
the fact that such evidence is regularly adduced in litigation (e.g. in DNA 
matching, medical negligence cases to prove loss of chance, human rights law 
etc.), its use is accompanied by a Ǯvaguely articulated, almost intuitiveǯ judicial 
anxiety that statistical data is somehow epistemically inadequate for legal 
decision-makingǯ.752 This judicial view is expressed every now and again across 
different legal settings,753 but has received little rational scrutiny or justification. 
Even people who object intuitively to the use of statistical evidence in legal 
decision-making, points out Pundik,754 acknowledge that such evidence actually 
improves the accuracy of decisions. Meadow and Sunstein755 argue strongly that 
reliance on statistical data would dramatically increase the accuracy and 
rationality of tort law in many settings (including but not limited to medical law). 
The fallible opinions of isolated experts, they argue, should be supplemented or 
replaced by statistical data, as opinions are crude, second- best alternatives, and 
are inferior to the data that they approximate: ǲIn any case in which a disputed 
question calls for expert testimony about ordinary practice, it is hazardous to 
                                                        
751 A Pundik, ‘The Epistemology of Statistical Evidence’ (2011) 15 International Journal of Evidence 
and Proof 117, 117 
752 ibid 117-118 
753 It also occasionally surfaces, for example, in UK criminal law contexts, as seen in in R v T (n 13)  
754 Pundik (n 107) 132-136 
755 W Meadow and CR Sunstein, ‘Statistics, Not Experts’ (2001) 51 Duke Law Journal 629, 631 
 260 
rely on what particular experts recall. If the goal is accuracy in adjudication or 
regulation, it is far more sensible to make the outcome turn on statistical 
evidence.ǳ756  
 
The objections about statistical evidence, then, may largely be due to the anxiety 
that such evidence will be given too much weight by juries and judges when 
adduced: in other words, the objections may not be so much about the statistics, 
but about the worry that they may be interpreted erroneously. This has 
sometimes led to barring statistical or numerical testimony altogether in some 
contexts. The Court of Appeal in R v T757 held, unequivocally, that evidence 
regarding footwear prints should not be expressed in numerical terms, such as 
likelihood ratios. Probabilistic calculations in regard to footwear mark 
comparisons was, in the view of the court, ǲinherently unreliable and gives rise 
to a verisimilitude of mathematical probability. It cannot be right to seek to 
achieve objectivity by reliance on data which does not allow this to be done.ǳ758 
Cases such as R v Sally Clark,759 discussed earlier, may have served to intensify 
such anxieties about statistics. The Court of Appeal in that case, it might be 
recalled from Chapter 2 (section 2.2), attributed the earlier erroneous guilty 
verdict in the trial court to the overly persuasive nature of statistics, stating with 
disapproval that Professor Meadowsǯ Ǯgraphic referenceǯ to long odds winners at 
the Grand National was likely to have had a major impact on the minds of the 
jury.760 However, the Court of Appeal may have missed the point that the Ǯguiltyǯ 
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verdict in Clark was actually due a combination of many unfortunate factors. The 
statistical errors were also partly due to fact that the court relied on statistical 
testimony from an expert who was not a statistician but a doctor, and thus the 
name and reputation of the expert became decisive, rather than their science or 
specialism: a common legal problem that we have already pointed out. Further, 
another expert had deliberately withheld evidence in that case, and that had also 
played a significant role in the erroneous decision.  
 
Most importantly, however, the problem of inflated importance being given to 
the statistics can be easily remedied if courts realise that the numbers generated 
by statistical computations are simply probabilistic communication tools. In 
other words, we need to find a way for courts to be informed by the numbers, 
while resisting the tyranny of the numbers. If courts reject potentially valuable 
and illuminative statistical information just because of such anxieties, this would 
be a knee-jerk reaction that would discard Ǯthe baby with the bathwaterǯ, so to 
speak. Redmayne et al, 761 while crediting the court in R v T for emphasising the 
importance of pre-trial hearings and robust case management,762 are critical of 
its Ǯirrational directiveǯ that footwear evidence cannot be expressed in numerical 
terms at all. This directive, they point out, applies solely to footwear analysis, 
while courts will readily accept likelihood ratios in regard to several other forms 
of forensic evidence such as DNA matching. An even bigger problem with this 
approach is that prohibiting experts from presenting data in numerical terms 
altogether, and insisting they replace numbers with terms such as “moderately likely”, 
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“highly likely” etc. would deprive experts of the standard tools of their science, and 
lead to absurd inconsistencies and subjectivity. Such a situation, Redmayne et al. 
caution, is likely to lead to “a forensic free-for-all, with one (cautious) expert's 
“moderate support” equating to another (cavalier) expert's “very strong support”, 
predictably leading jurors astray or leaving them entirely baffled.”763 Further, 
numerical quantification also has several other advantages, such as its ability to 
encourage greater transparency and critical scrutiny of evidence, as well as the use of 
logical thinking and rigour in the production of evidence. All these advantages, 
Redmayne et al caution, would be lost by such a blanket prohibition. 
 
The worry that numbers will end up dictating the decision can be resolved by 
better awareness and training for lawyers about what the numbers do- and do 
not- mean. Numbers generated by statistical tools are simply a standardized way 
of communicating the strength of probability, not guarantees or absolutes. As 
Redmayne et al clarify: ǲSuffice it here to emphasise that numerical 
quantification does not necessarily imply any claim to objectivity. When a 
weather forecaster speaks of a 20 per cent chance of snow, it should be clear 
that, rather than expressing any verifiably objective fact about the empirical 
world, this is a statement of probability regarding future events informed by 
appropriate meteorological data and expertise.ǳ764 
 
Rather than discard all evidence that is probabilistic or possesses a degree of 
subjective interpretation, experts should be clearly required to be transparent 
about the subjectivity in their conclusions. As R v T rightly stresses, it is vital for 
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scientists to heed some basic principles in the presentation of their numerical 
evidence, such as ensuring they do not mislead courts into believing the 
likelihood ratios are possessed of false precision.765 Numerical conclusions 
should be properly supported by adequate data, and juries must not be 
bamboozled by statistical evidence, but provided that experts do so, it is ǲ(b)etter all round if experts are simply encouraged to give their best evidence as 
clearly, intelligibly, honestly, and transparently as they are able, and in 
accordance with the precepts of scientific validity, logic and reason.766 
 
3.3: Expert testimony: evaluating weight of evidence, and 
distinguishing between fact and opinion 
 
An associated point, raised earlier in Chapter 2 (section 2.3), is that both lawyers 
and scientific experts must be mindful of the distinction between facts and 
opinion. In the context of epidemiology, this is a crucial issue, because it often 
leads to courts favouring, as a general rule, sometimes questionably scientific Ǯspecificǯ (. e.g. medical or clinical) evidence over more scientifically valid Ǯgeneralǯ evidence. Courts need to be aware that in many situations there simply 
is no available scientific evidence that maps directly to the legal question (an 
especially frequent scenario in disease disputes). Where the evidence cannot 
directly answer what caused this particular claimantǯs disease, an expert giving 
testimony about specific causation will often take available general evidence 
about factors that contribute to that disease, and then apply this to the specific 
claimant in the context of his or her exposure history, background risks etc. 
                                                        
765 R v T (n 13) at [96]-[99]; [104]-[105] 
766 Redmayne et al (n 117) 354-355 
 264 
Where scientific evidence can inform a question, but is not sufficient of itself to 
answer the specific question, an expert can then provide an opinion about what 
may or may not have caused the disease. But this is no more than an opinion that 
is based on some evidence.  
 
Cooke767 points out, as cited in chapter 2, that used judiciously, expert opinion 
can be very valuable. Further, because interest, biases and uncertainty play a 
larger role in science than many philosophers would care to acknowledge, expert 
opinion has become an increasingly visible source of justification in science.768 ǮThere can be no doubt that experts know a great deal about topics on which 
ordinary people lack informationǯ note Meadow and Sunstein.769  But experts, 
like anyone else, are subject to biases. Their judgments about risk are affected by 
the same heuristics and biases to which most people are subject, even if (and this 
is a disputed question) expertise tends to reduce the most serious errors. 770 
 
Further, courts can be misled by the eminence of an expert into believing that Ǯscientificǯ evidence all belongs to one related category, and that sound 
qualifications in one scientific discipline gives an expert the ability to testify 
questions from other areas of Ǯscienceǯ, even if they are not from within their 
area of expertise (Chapter 2). Judgments about the admissibility of the expertǯs 
testimony must not be guided by generic principles based on their stature in 
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their own field: it is crucial that each discipline, and each expert, must be 
considered on their merits on a case-by-case basis.771  
 
3.4: More transparency and better understanding of legal issues on 
part of scientific expert witnesses 
 
Does the fault for the often-controversial encounters between law and science lie 
exclusively with courts, queries Jasanoff, or do our own expectations concerning 
science and technology need to be modulated in the light of what we know about 
adjudication and the nature of scientific inquiry?772  
 
Better use of scientific evidence in the law requires change not only on part of 
lawyers, but also on past of scientific expert witnesses. While lawyers must 
guard against the temptation to Ǯpushǯ experts into answering questions that 
they cannot validly answer, it is also crucial for experts, on their part, to resist 
the temptation to present their opinions and speculations as scientific evidence. 
Expert witnesses must be more transparent about the methodological, statistical 
and epistemic limitations of their testimony than many have so far tended to. 
Unreliable expert evidence can put justice in jeopardy. A person called upon to 
give expert testimony must consider whether they are sufficiently schooled, 
skilled and knowledgeable enough to fulfill that role.773 Sound expert testimony 
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will undoubtedly help achieve fairer results, but it is important for experts to be 
mindful that such witnessing must be ethical. 
 
Unfortunately, there are many instances where the practice of expert witnesses 
has fallen short of what could be described as ethical. In a landmark report on 
the law-science relationship, a committee of the US National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) drew attention to questionable practices and the lack of research 
in many areas of forensic science.774  The committee was surprised to discover 
that many forensic science disciplines are typically not supported by scientific 
research and that analysts are not necessarily bound by experimentally derived 
standards to ensure the evidence offered in courts is valid and reliable. The 
report also noted a tendency on part of scientists to appear somewhat ǲleeryǳ of 
lawyers and the legal process, while lawyers often expressed feeling frustrated 
by a scientific community that Ǯbelieves that its methods and procedures are 
above legal scrutiny and questioning.ǯ775  
 
R v T, despite going too far by imposing overarching barriers against useful 
communication tools such as normal scientific terminology, likelihood ratios etc., 
must also be lauded for recognizing and attempting to rectify some of the 
problems in the legal use of science. The Court of Appeal insisted that experts 
were required to note in their report whenever they expressed any views that 
were subjective and based on their experience.776 Further, the Court was clear 
that report writing should be transparent, and pre-trial safeguards should be 
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used to ensure that only sound and credible data is adduced before juries.777 All 
of these safeguards can also further help courts to recognise and reduce expert 
malpractice e.g. case management can help identify an expert's previous 
tendency to exceed his expertise,778 and thus can help to weed out experts whose 
practice is below the required standard of competence or ethics.  
 
SECTION 4: The way forward: A more constructive role for science and 
epidemiology in UK law 
 
William Blackstone779 exhorted that the law well practiced requires an insight 
into its fundamental ideals and purposes of justice: a need that becomes more 
acute especially when the law is brought into new areas, note Spicker et al.  As 
Spicker et al point out: Ǯlaw and public policy must deal with notions of causal 
relations that establish lines of responsibility and accountability. This calls into 
play examination of philosophical and epistemological issues. Epistemological 
questions assume practical importance at the interface of law and medicine, 
where it often appears that law and medicine are making appeals to quite 
different notions of causality or causation.ǯ780 This thesis has strongly argued 
that the legal and medical notions of causation are now so widely divergent that 
it is impossible to bring any coherence to the fraught area of disease causation 
within existing models. Coherence in the approach to causation, and to the entire 
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(eds.) The Law-Medicine Relation: A Philosophical Exploration (D Reidel 1981) xiii-xxvii        
780 ibid xiii-xxvii 
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area of disease litigation, urgently requires effort to bring about greater 
compatibility and integration between legal and medical models of causation.  
 
The above discussions have tried to illustrate that in the drawing of scientific 
inferences, rigid rules and criteria that govern what scientific evidence is to be 
accepted and what is to be rejected will inevitably lead to errors if applied 
without being evaluated in context. Thus, it is as fallacious to outrightly reject 
epidemiological evidence in specific causation disputes (as UK courts have 
sometimes done and as Wright urges both them and his native US counterparts 
to do781); as it is to go to the opposite extreme and insist that epidemiological 
evidence must be adduced by the claimant in toxic tort disputes (as some courts 
in the US have occasionally done).782 For the same reasons, it is as erroneous to 
impose a rigid threshold requirement that an RR>2 is essential to infer causation 
from epidemiological data (as discussed above section 2.3); as to believe that 
there are Ǯhierarchies of evidenceǯ in which experimentation and deductive 
inferences are always superior to observation or inductive inferences (above, 
section 2.1). All of these notions are erroneous if they are applied as hard-and-
fast rules (as the judiciary currently tends to do). 
 
4.1: Better recognition of the value of epidemiology 
 
Epidemiology, particularly clinical epidemiology, deals with decision making 
under uncertainty in a systematic way.  The Bayes theorem, for example, 
                                                        
781 E.g. Wright, ‘Bramble Bush…’ (n 82) 
782 L Lasagna and SR Shulman, ‘Bendectin and the Language of Causation in KR Foster, DE Bernstein 
and PW Huber (eds), Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law (Cambridge, Mass, MIT 
Press, 1993) 110-111 
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provides a technique provides a method by which prior knowledge of the 
probabilities (i.e., Ǯgeneralisedǯ evidence) can be used, in combination with any 
additional specific evidence, to arrive at Ǯparticularisticǯ individual diagnostic and 
treatment decisions. Many commentators (both lawyers and statisticians) argue 
that the Bayes theorem has great potential utility for toxic tort claims, because it 
can help to Ǯparticulariseǯ generalised statistical evidence for causation.783 The 
aims and methods of epidemiology must be understood within the context of the 
general goals of science, as Weed explains: ǲThe aim of science is to explain the 
world, to gain an understanding of it, to generate a form of knowledge, not 
certain nor proven, but well-evidenced, carefully considered in an open forum by 
a rather specialized community of practitioners, and subject to public 
scrutiny.ǳ784 Morabio785emphasises that: ǲWhen proof is not available, pragmatic 
epidemiologists simply acknowledge that there is no alternative to the causal criteria logic that… before inferring causation it is imperative to check for 
illogicalities and rule out gross contradictions between what has been found and 
what we think we know.ǳ786  
 
The cause and effect relationship in epidemiologic studies is determined through 
induction, inferred for the general population based on findings at the level of 
the individual, and then predicted back to new individuals through deductions 
                                                        
783 See e.g. CGG Aitken and F Taroni, ‘Fundamentals of Statistical Evidence: A Primer for Legal 
Professionals’ (2008) 12 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 181, 203-204; R Goldberg, 
'Using Scientific Evidence to Resolve Causation Problems in Product Liability: UK, US and French 
Experiences' in R Goldberg (ed), Perspectives on Causation (Hart, 2011) 162-163     
784 DL Weed (2006), ‘Commentary: Rethinking Epidemiology’ 35 International Journal of 
Epidemiology 583, 586 
785 A Morabio, ‘On the Origin of Hill’s Causal Criteria’ (1991) 2 Epidemiology 367, 367-369 
786 Cited from Feldschreiber, Mulcahy and Day (n 86) 181-182. 
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from the population level.787 It is a method that is neither perfect nor without its 
limitations, but this pragmatic approach has answered a plethora of questions 
about the causes of disease, and revolutionised healthcare in recent decades: for 
individuals, as much as for Ǯthe publicǯ. If the ultimate aim is to provide a 
complete causal account of disease and know why one person gets a disease 
while another does not, then success is unlikely, argue Coggon and Martyn.788 
The stochastic nature of disease, discussed earlier in Chapter 3 (section 2) 
results in the fact that whether or not someone develops a disease depends on 
combinations of events at a molecular or cellular level that science cannot yet 
measure. 789 At best, epidemiologists might hope to obtain clues to causation. 
Nonetheless, notes Weed about epidemiology: ǲWe are not stuck, it seems to me, 
behind thick wooden doors in some medieval ivory tower, hunched over 
bubbling potions in an alchemistǯs hideaway, futilely experimenting with one 
substance after another. We have actually found what we were looking for, 
preventable causes of diseases, some with strong effects others more modest in 
their effects. Our critics have done us a disservice by not including a table of 
accepted risks (some manipulable, some not) for the so-called complex diseases. 
It would be a very large table indeed. Epidemiology has made (and will continue 
to make) many discoveries.ǳ790  
 
That UK law would choose to dismiss such evidence on the grounds of its 
inability to give certainty about specific causation (despite the short supply of 
                                                        
787 AV Buchanan, KM Weiss and SM Fullerton, ‘Dissecting Complex Disease: The Quest for the 
Philosopher’s Stone?’ 35 International Journal of Epidemiology 562, 567 
788
 D Coggon, C Martyn, ‘The Stochastic Nature of Disease Causation.’ (2005) 365 Lancet 1434, 1434 
789 Coggon (n 15) 582 
790 Weed (n 140) 583-584 
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alternative sources of evidence about this question) is difficult to justify. The 
methods used by epidemiology are not perfect (what in science is?), and some 
poor-quality epidemiologic studies can be seriously flawed. Assessing the 
problems with the epidemiologic evidence about the linkages between the drug 
Bendectin and congenital anomalies, Lasagna and Shulman outlined the 
difficulties that can affect the validity of epidemiological data. These included 
recall bias (i.e. mothers of deformed babies were more likely to remember 
correctly the use of drugs during pregnancy), the fact that it is easy to miss 
modest increases in rates of congenital anomalies unless very large numbers of 
subjects are studied, and the fact that repeated dredging up of epidemiologic 
data will predictably turn up spurious correlations by chance.791  
 
As Gold puts it: ǮAdvancing scientific understanding can assist in legal fact-
finding even if science will not provide lawǯs longed-for, conclusive post hoc 
answer to the question of what did make a particular plaintiff sick. But the law 
must understand how science can best contribute. This understanding begins 
with acceptance of the fact that bringing toxicological understanding to the 
molecular level will not bring causation to the individual level. Even 
toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology produce data that ultimately are 
group-based, statistical, and probabilistic…Thus, finding that a plaintiff does or 
does not have a genetic susceptibility to the disease-causing effect of a substance 
to which the plaintiff was exposed will provide probabilistic but not 
deterministic evidence of causation or its absence.792 Although Lord Nimmo-
                                                        
791 Lasagna and Shulman (n 138) 102-103 
792 SC Gold, ‘When Certainty Dissolves Into Probability’ (2013) 70 Washington and Lee Law Review 
237, 276 
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Smith opined that there is a "fallacy of applying statistical probability to 
individual causation",793 Tavares points out that there are situations in which 
epidemiological evidence can be sufficiently honed to provide conclusions in 
individual cases, and that combined with clinical experience may well be 
determinative.794 Given the high legal regard the law has for medicine, it may be 
useful for lawyers to understand how the medical profession manages 
evidentiary uncertainty, and the extent to which evidence-based medicine (EBM) 
is founded on the application of inconclusive population evidence to individual 
cases, as the section below explores.  
 
4.2: Lessons from evidence-based medicine: the pragmatic use of 
population evidence in medical decision-making 
 
As we discussed earlier in Chapter 1, UK courts appear to accord greater weight 
to testimony from doctors rather than epidemiologists, when assessing 
causation, and medical evidence seems much less subject to judicial scrutiny or 
criticism. This is ironical, because much of the testimony medical experts provide 
about a specific claim is often itself based either on epidemiological or 
population studies, or on subjective opinion (since, as we have noted earlier, 
there is often no specific evidence about what caused a disease: a tumour caused 
by a toxin looks no different to a tumour caused by genetic factors). Thus, Ǯparticularisticǯ evidence such as Wright seeks may not only be elusive for a very 
long time to come in disease litigation, but where adduced, may often contain 
                                                        
793 McTear (n 32) at [6.184]   
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34, 36 
 273 
substantial elements of subjectivity and room for error (arguably, sometimes 
even more more than epidemiological testimony). This does not, however, make 
medical decision-making invalid: clinicians simply follow the pragmatic principle 
of using the best evidence they have.  
 
This thesis attempts only to make a plea for is for the law to recognise these 
issues, so that evidence can be weighed appropriately. Medicine, as doctors will 
themselves usually be first to point out, is an uncertain pursuit.795 In the course 
of their professional training it is vital for physicians to learn how to deal with 
uncertainty in their diagnostic and treatment decisions. The attribution of 
causality in medical science follows the same principle, and as Feldschreiber, 
Mulcahy and Day note, is Ǯboth an art and a science.ǯ796 A common medical 
aphorism often repeated to medical students exhorts: ǲWhen you hear hoof beats 
on the cobblestones of London, think of horses, not zebras.ǳ797 That is, in 
conditions of uncertainty, clinicians are encouraged to base their decision-
making on the best evidence suggested by the general population, or on the most 
likely hypotheses. A medical textbook explains the probabilistic reasoning that 
lies at the heart of the Zebra Rule: ǲAs you find abnormalities, you will need to 
decide the likely diagnostic possibilities so that you can search for clues to 
support or refute your differential diagnosis. Remember, common things are common so…think about the most frequent possibilities first when formulating 
                                                        
795 G Cooke, ‘A is for Aphorism’ (2012) 41 Skin Cancer 534, 534 
796 Feldschreiber et al (n 86) 179 
797 It is difficult to ascertain clearly source of this common medical aphorism that is frequently found in 
many medical textbooks it is attributed to Sir William Osler by KP Ryan, When Tumour is the 
Rumour and Cancer is the Answer (Author House 2014) 297. Regardless, it is generally accepted as 
a core principle of medical decision-making.  
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your differential (hence the Zebra Rule above).ǯ798 To most medical practitioners, 
the assertion that population studies tell us nothing about an individual case 
would be an absurd one, as they routinely rely on population studies to aid 
individual clinical decision-making. Inferences about specific causation often 
require extrapolation from the evidence, using strategies such as inference to the 
best explanation. Courts that are unaware of this fact may tend to be overly 
impressed by Ǯspecificǯ rather than Ǯgeneralǯ evidence.    
 
Medicine is highly reliant on Ǯpopulationǯ epidemiological evidence, and 
epidemiologists are highly trained to respond to the many multidisciplinary 
issues that must be considered in this general assessment of disease causation, in 
addition to statistics. Notes McIvor: ǮWhile statistics are certainly an important tool used by epidemiologists, they are no more than a tool… Epidemiologists are 
trained in statistics, research methodologies, and also in medicine. The highly 
specialised techniques that they use for drawing causal inferences from 
empirical data are informed by all three disciplines.ǯ799   
 
Evidence based medicine (EBM) is generally defined as Ǯthe conscientious, 
explicit and judicious use of the current best evidence in making decisions about 
the care of individual patientsǯ, and rests on the integration of clinical expertise 
and the best external evidence.800 This decision-making process, as professor of 
primary healthcare Dr. Trish Greenlagh observes, heavily involves the use of 
mathematics (or what lawyers tend to refer to as statistics): ǲEBM is the use of 
                                                        
798 NJ Talley, S O’Connor, Pocket Clinical Examination (2nded Elsevier 2004) 23   
799 McIvor, ‘Debunking…’ (n 34) 570 
800 DL Sackett, WM Rosenberg et al, ‘Evidence-Based Medicine: What It Is and What It Isn’t’ (1996) 
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mathematical estimates of the risk of benefit and harm, derived from high-
quality research on population samples, to inform clinical decision-making in 
the diagnosis, investigation or management of individual patients.ǳ801 
(Emphasis is added).  Thus, stresses Professor Greenlagh, ǮIf you follow an 
evidence-based approach to clinical decision-making, therefore, all sorts of issues relating to your patients… will prompt you to ask questions about 
scientific evidence, seek answers to those questions in a systematic way, and 
alter your practices accordingly.ǯ      
 
Justice Robert Jay points out that it is vital to recognise that scientific decision-
making, just like legal decision-making, involves exercising judgment and 
extrapolating from existing data: ǲ…in so many cases a medical expert will be 
expressing an opinion in the individual case on the basis of clinical judgment. 
That, no doubt, may be a compelling amalgam of observation and experience, but 
it certainly does not entail the recruitment of the claimant to any randomised 
controlled trial. In the same way perhaps as the good judge, the good doctor is 
applying intuition honed by experience to a particular evidential matrix and 
conjuring a common-sense conclusion out of the mix. Outside the courtroom, 
that good doctor will be expressing himself or herself in terms of degrees of 
confidence (or lack of it); inside the courtroom, those possibilities are ironed out 
and become transformed from an expert expression of probability into a judicial 
expression, once the judgment is delivered, of synthetic certainty.ǳ802 As Miller 
points out: ǮScience, however complex it might appear, is a… pragmatic activity – 
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Books 2014) 1  
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a theory is only as good as the rigour of the last (unsuccessful) attempt to refute 
it. And no branch of science is more deliberately pragmatic than that concerned with the cause and distribution of disease, viz epidemiology… Politicians are not 
philosophers; they cannot wait for certainty before, for example, banning a drug 
which appears to have a harmful side-effect… Epidemiologists can assist both 
politicians and lawyers by devising criteria that indicate when the inductive leap – from statistical association to causation – might be justified.803 Just like 
politicians (and doctors), the law does not have the luxury of being able to wait 
until certain and perfect evidence appears out of scientific journals, or to operate 
on the belief that intuitive conclusions about factual matters is a better 
substitute until that happens. As Miller notes elsewhere, Ǯcivil courts cannot 
commission laboratory experiments or epidemiological studies, but nor can they 
suspend a case until someone else does.ǯ804 In any case, as the Bayesian 
philosophers of science point out, even though perfect, ultimate truth may exist, 
it is usually impossible to know when we have found it.805  
 
Rejecting useful, reliable evidence from a discipline that has proved its value by 
its many achievements in healthcare is an illogical approach. Tavares notes that 
it was the impossibility of applying epidemiological studies to determine 
causation in individual cases which was cited as the principal reason the tobacco 
litigation failed, but the law needs to learn to apply the best available evidence 
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805 Rothman et al (n 39) 26-30 
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(even where this is overtly probabilistic) to aid factual questions, for: Ǯif only 
everything could be reliably determined on "common sense"!ǯ806  
 
Probabilistic epidemiological methods can be refined and combined with other 
evidence to formulate robust and justifiable inferences of causation. Where Ǯgold 
standardǯ methodologies are impossible to implement, alternative research 
methodologies such as observation can offer valuable- and robust- alternatives, 
even if they require further corroboration through larger sample sizes, better 
statistical techniques and more replication before findings can be accepted as 
valid. The Law Commission Report emphasises the importance of improving 
applications of scientific evidence in UK law. However, as Heffernan and Coen807 
note: ǮThe success of the Law Commission's proposals turns in no small measure 
on the education and training of judges and lawyers in forensic science. The 
Consultation Paper recognises the benefits that would flow from judges and 
criminal practitioners receiving practical training on the methodology of science…and how to determine the reliability of experience-based 
expertise,808 but stops short of making a formal recommendation in this regard.ǯ 
Lasagna and Shulman recommend that an expert panel may help the court to 
subject the validity of all scientific evidence to standardised critical evaluation, 
rather than leaving it to juries to correctly weigh and contextualize scientific 
testimony may be useful.809 Despite age-old controversies about the 
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epistemological foundations of science, and the endless debates regarding the 
law-science interface, confidence in scientific method is not misplaced.810 The 
legal approaches towards causation of have enormous practical implications for 
vast numbers of people (claimants and defendants) involved in toxic tort 
litigation demands that courts use all available evidence to arrive at the fairest 
and most informed solutions possible, despite the inherent uncertainties around 
disease causation. This cannot be possible without due consideration of scientific 
and epidemiological evidence wherever available. Perfect answers may be 
elusive, but this does not justify us therefore turning our backs on the best 
answer that is available. The philosopher Simon Blackburn points out, Ǯ…there 
may be rhetoric about the socially constructed nature of Western science, but 
wherever it matters, there is no alternativeǯ.811  
 
The eminent epidemiologist Sir Austin Bradford Hill noted in 1955: ǮAll scientific work is incomplete - whether it be observational or experimental. 
All scientific work is liable to be upset or modified by advancing knowledge. That 
does not confer upon us a freedom to ignore the knowledge we already have, or 
to postpone the action that it appears to demand at a given time.ǯ812 UK tort law 
cannot justify continuing to dismiss an evidence-based approach to decision-
making even six decades later, in a futile longing for perfect proof. 
 
 
  
                                                        
810 Klinkner (n 1) 129 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
This thesis has aimed to advocate reform in the UK judicial approach to 
epidemiological and scientific evidence in claims for negligently caused diseases. 
It has outlined the issues that hinder the effective application of such evidence in 
UK tort law, and has contended that poor legal understanding about scientific 
reasoning as a whole, as well lack of awareness about the complexities of disease 
causation, lie at the heart of the problematic approach towards epidemiological 
evidence. The thesis first outlined the problematic beliefs about the discipline 
that hinder its effective application in the law. In order to show why these 
judicial beliefs are unjustified, the thesis then addressed the wider legal 
misconceptions about science, and the mismatch between legal and medical 
views of causation. After clarifying the fundamentally probabilistic nature of 
scientific reasoning (and how the law has misunderstood it); as well as the 
complexities of disease causation (and why the existing confused and 
deterministic legal principles of causation cannot deal effectively with these), the 
thesis then argued for a more probabilistic and scientifically informed approach 
to causation in complex disease litigation. It also made a case for the crucial role 
for evidence in the factual enquiry.  
 
Despite many judicial attempts to resort to normative and subjective approaches 
to factual causation, it is becoming increasingly obvious to lawyers that it is 
impossible to escape the need for scientific evidence in disease litigation. 
However, this thesis has argued that such evidence cannot be appropriately 
applied or utilised unless the law revaluates outdated legal approaches to 
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causation, and to science in general. The thesis highlighted the legal factors that 
hinder the ability to use such evidence coherently, and concluded by making 
suggestions for a better use of scientific, particularly epidemiological, evidence in 
the law.  
 
Chapter 1 introduced epidemiology and the UK legal approach to 
epidemiological evidence. It evaluated some strengths and limitations of the 
discipline, and then outlined the judicial view of such evidence, as indicated by 
some key judgments. This discussion highlighted the concerns that courts have 
about the alleged epistemic deficiencies of epidemiology, including its reliance 
on population data, statistical tools of analysis and observational methodologies. 
It also highlighted substantive errors around the importance of measures such as 
relative risk thresholds.  
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the probabilistic nature of science and the scientific 
method. It explored the deeply erroneous view that the legal profession has of 
the ideal science as being one that possesses the quality of certainty, and about 
ideal scientific testimony as being one that provides conclusive proof to the legal 
inquiry. This view is not only fundamentally erroneous, but is dangerous, as it 
has occasionally led to erroneous legal outcomes due to wrong applications of 
scientific evidence. Criticisms of epidemiological evidence on such grounds 
reflects a mistaken judicial belief that probabilistic reasoning is unique to 
epidemiology as a scientific disciple, and the corollary that other sciences are 
capable of providing certainty. In fact, this chapter illustrated, scientific evidence 
is almost always probabilistic in nature, and very rarely supplies definitive 
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certainties: now more so than ever before. Discoveries of the twentieth century, 
particularly in the world of physics, have shaken many of the older, deterministic 
conceptualisations of science fundamentally. Even physics, traditionally that 
most deterministic of sciences, is now being fundamentally challenged by 
realisation of insurmountable uncertainties. Our ability to know and predict 
things, it appears, is much more limited than once thought. All sciences now 
seem to be converging towards an acceptance of their limited knowledge. The 
chapter contended that lawyers have failed to appreciate this, which has led to 
unrealistic expectations about scientific evidence, and inflated perceptions of its 
probative value. These unrealistic expectations can quickly turn to 
disenchantment when the legal longing for certainty is not fulfilled, or when 
excessive deference to scientific testimony leads to wrong legal outcomes. 
Courts, this thesis contended, consequently go to the other extreme and dismiss 
probabilistic scientific evidence as having no meaningful role to play in the 
factual enquiry. The sceptical judicial in UK courts attitude to epidemiology is an 
example of this.  
 
Chapter 3 highlighted the complexities of disease causation, and the growing 
mismatch between legal and medical approaches towards disease. It argued that 
confused principles of causation in tort law, and an excessive infusion of 
normative considerations into the factual enquiry, are a further barrier to an 
objective and evidence-based assessment of factual causation. This normative 
approach is even more likely to be resorted to in disease claims because of 
evidentiary uncertainties that make legal tests for causation often impossible to 
satisfy. The determinism of the Ǯbut forǯ test, and its emphasis on Ǯnecessityǯ of 
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the causal factor in bringing about the harm, is particularly unsuited to assessing 
disease causation. This is due to the very complex, multifactorial and stochastic 
nature of disease, making this one of the most uncertain areas of science. The 
chapter explored current biomedical evidence about disease, in order to 
highlight the increasingly probabilistic medical conceptualisations of disease. 
This chapter argued strongly for greater legal coherence with scientific and 
medical views of causation. It highlighted the urgent need for legal approaches 
that can better align with probabilistic empirical evidence.  
 
Chapter 4 outlined the Ǯbut forǯ test and the alternative exceptional tests that 
have been applied to the factual causation assessment. It discussed why the Ǯbut 
forǯ test proves inadequate so often in complex disease claims, which has led to 
the development of a number of somewhat haphazard, piecemeal exceptional 
tests for causation. There is currently little clarity about when these exceptional 
tests will apply. The chapter highlighted that the exceptional tests are now being 
widened to many different disease scenarios, and contended that this is 
unsurprising, since all diseases are characterised by fundamental causal 
uncertainties. Overdetermination, this chapter argued, may be the norm rather 
than the exception in disease litigation.  Simpler, less rigid tests for factual 
causation, that take due account of probabilistic causation, would be a much 
better fit in this area of the law that rigid, necessity-based tests such as the but-
for test. The more principled solution, this chapter proposed, would be to replace 
the Ǯbut forǯ test in complex disease claims with a more practical, flexible, 
probabilistic test for causation which assesses the contribution of a tortious 
factor to the disease, on the balance of probabilities, rather than its necessity. 
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This should be applied on a proportionate liability basis. This would also allow 
for appropriate and realistic assessment of scientific, medical and 
epidemiological evidence in disease litigation. 
 
Chapter 5 then returned to epidemiology, and re-examined the judicial 
objections to epidemiology in the light of all the preceding discussions about 
science and about the complexities of disease. This chapter also suggested some 
general strategies for improving the use of scientific evidence in the law. It is 
imperative for UK courts to recognise that science very rarely supplies definitive 
certainties. Scientific research methods inevitably possess methodological 
limitations and flaws, which scientists refer to as their error rates. Good 
scientific research clearly defines the potential for error or confounding 
variables in the research, and these error rates must be taken into consideration 
when interpreting research evidence for any purpose (including legal 
purposes)813. Thus, experts who provide their testimony in qualified and 
tentative terms, and are transparent about their potential for error, may often be 
providing more scientifically credible testimony than experts who make 
excessively confident and sweeping assertions.  
 
Uncertainty about oneǯs conclusions, this thesis tried to contend, does not imply 
that the conclusions are baseless or unsound. If that were so, then almost all 
human scientific knowledge would be worthless. The fundamental quality that 
distinguishes reliable from unreliable inferences is that reliable inferences are 
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arrived at only after all relevant available evidence (whether supportive or 
contrary to our hypothesis) has been objectively evaluated and considered. Legal 
decision-making must be informed by all available relevant evidence that exists 
(especially in this area of the law, which is deeply challenged by evidentiary gaps 
and confusion). The central argument this thesis has made is that especially 
when it comes to disease causation, probabilistic evidence is the best that 
science currently has to offer, and epidemiology is the scientific specialism that 
can provide the best probabilistic evidence about the determinants and causes of 
disease.  
  
Epidemiological research, for all its methodological caveats, has made an 
invaluable contribution to our knowledge about the causes of disease, and 
through illuminating questions of causation, has led to enormous improvements 
in public health.  There is no justification for the law to ignore such evidence 
where it is available. Neither is it justified to believe that it is better to assess 
factual issues entirely on the basis of subjective values or personal preference, 
just because the available evidence is not conclusive. This thesis has argued that 
used judiciously, epidemiology can help develop a fairer and clearer legal 
approach in this challenging and complex area of the law. The uncertainties and 
imperfections of epidemiologic evidence may find a more honest fit in a system 
that reflects the subtleties of causation, noted the American authors Lasagna and 
Shulman.814  This thesis has attempted to make the plea that it is now imperative 
for the UK tort system to do so.  
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